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The asset participation relationship between the state and the corporate entity is an
essential determinant of corporate value in the natural resource sector. Natural re-
sources deplete, with the result that oil reserve replacement is an accepted imperative
for companies that derive earnings and balance sheet values from global resource assets.
Corporate asset values in the sector are underpinned by entitlement to future reserves.
Specifically, I show that the global nature of government participation varies and that
it matters in which country reserves are held since entitlement structures directly deter-
mine how the state and corporate producers share economic rents from resource assets.
My global Oil and Gas (O&G) sector study provides market evidence of economic and
state variable limits on the value of globalization.
Findings revise the low oil price paradigm covered in prior studies and provide evi-
dence that, for O&G producers concerned with reserve replacement, global asset values
are directly affected by state entitlement terms. In developed OECD countries, state
and corporate agent participation terms are price insensitive, and take the form of
concession contracts with royalty or profit taxation terms. By contrast, in emerging
NON-OECD countries state agents participate on production sharing terms that are
linked to the market price of oil. Relative to comparable OECD oil assets, the value
of corporate agent participation in Non-OECD O&G assets is limited by explicit and
progressive state agent participation terms that favour sovereign state agent returns.I
show that unless price sensitive entitlement clauses are is included in the value of cash
flow expectations, state participation terms potentially invert risk return convention
under conditions of increasing oil prices. The Fama and French (1993) framework is
used to provide market evidence of economic state variable limits on the returns for
O&G companies with relatively high asset holdings in Non-OECD countries.
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Part I.
Doctor of Philosophy – Thesis
1. Introduction
This study examines the effect of state economic variables on the corporate value of
asset globalization in the natural resource sector. Country state participation terms
have important fiscal and legal differences that are relevant when valuing assets across
global natural resource markets. The importance of fiscal and legal differences as
between emerging and developed markets have recently been noted by Bekaert and
Harvey (2002) and Bruner et al. (2002), both of whom suggest that global differences
are likely to mitigate against valuation model convergence.
In his review of the history of the oil and gas sector Yergin (2003) suggests that oil’s
natural resource legacy raises fundamental questions as to how state and corporate
entities jointly participate in asset sharing. Natural resources introduce a physical
characteristic that enables enables host countries to generate economic rents from land
in their jurisdiction. Economic rents in the context of this oil and gas study, are
defined as the difference between the market price (of oil), on one hand, and, on the
other, the costs of production plus an allowance for additional costs – transportation,
processing, and distribution – and some return on capital. In reviewing the global state
of economic rent sharing, Yergin (2003) specifically asks, how should – the host country,
the producing company, or the consuming country that taxed it – share economic rents?
There remains no global agreement on this elemental issue, and as a result the asset
pricing effect of state participation on natural resource asset values remains a largely
unexplored area of finance.
All parties, Yergin (2003) suggests, have legitimate claims. The host country has
sovereignty over the physical oil reserves. Yet, reserves would be without value unless
the foreign company risked capital and employed its expertise to discover, produce, and
get it to market. The host country is, in essence, the landlord, the company a tenant
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who would pay an agreed rent. The oilfield exploitation scenario clarifies “.... the great
divide of the petroleum industry: a rich discovery means a dissatisfied landlord. He
knows that the tenant’s profit is far greater than necessary to keep him producing, and
he wants some of the rent. If he gets some, he wants more” Adelman (1972).
Economic rent sharing principles vary widely between OECD and Non OECD coun-
tries. The oil and gas sector is used to provide evidence that progressive state oilfield
participation effectively limits the corporate value of emerging Non-OECD oil and gas
(O&G) investment relative to developed OECD country investment. I use an extensive
global sample of oilfields to demonstrate that the nature of Non-OECD state participa-
tion limits the corporate benefits of globalization in the natural resource sector. Global
variations in the form of state and corporate agency oilfield asset participation are also
shown be Bruner et al. (2002) to have the potential to mitigate against valuation model
convergence.
Country differences between global O&G markets fits well with the state participation
concept mooted by Stulz (2005), who identifies redistributative taxation as a tool to
facilitate expropriation (from corporate agents) by the state. State participation in the
form of Non-OECD production sharing O&G contracts are contrasted with concession
state participation structures in OECD countries and included in the market study as
a separate factor in addition to the Fama-French Three-Factor Model.1 It is suggested
that emerging countries use state powers to maximize their own welfare by reducing
the relative O&G payoffs to investors and corporate insiders. The distinction between
predatory and contracting theory of the state, North (1981), is used by Stulz (2005) to
suggest that in their best form contracts should be mutually advantageous. I concur,
but suggest that the global shortage of replacement O&G reserves, the inability to
transfer capital committed to physical fields, coupled with the potential for state asset
expropriation means that corporate agents have little choice but to co-invest with Non-
OECD countries in the form of production sharing contracts.
1In general, OECD countries use royalty systems. Production sharing contracts generally occur in
the Non–OECD regions of Africa, Indonesia and much of the former Soviet Union. Reported
reserves are based on the economic interest held subject to the specific terms and time frame of
the agreement. For a full discussion of entitlement contracts see Guidelines for the Evaluation of
Petroleum Reserves and Resources, SPE Working Paper 2005, and Bindemann (1999).
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Finance theory suggests that corporate asset values are based on the value of the
expected future benefits from reserve entitlement Ross (2004). Natural resource assets
deplete, and as result, asset replacement is shown by Strong (1991) to be an accepted
imperative for a sector that derives earnings and balance sheet values from resource
assets . State oilfield participation terms vary significantly in the sector, with the
result that, post state agent participation, expected corporate benefits vary widely.
Specifically, it is shown to matter to O&G producers where reserves are held, where
replacement reserves originate, and what oil price expectations are. Each of these
factors have direct implications for corporate earnings, asset values and, as might be
expected, corporate share prices.
The interaction of state effects on asset pricing is supported by all 5 separate empirical
chapters. Real asset data for 292 oilfields are used for the first and fourth of the
empirical chapters where the simulation intensity is limited. For chapters two and
three where simulation runtime intensifies, a subset of 211 oilfields is selected using
stratified sampling in line with Cochran (1946). The extensive and global nature of my
study asset based approach has precedent in two important natural resource studies.
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) study a single copper mine to evaluate natural resource
investment and Paddock et al. (1988) model a single offshore oilfield in order to isolate
specific and important option characteristics. The structure of my thesis and key
contributions are as follows.
My primary research objective is to establish whether when state agent taxation is
included, and all other factors held equal, oil and gas assets behave the same across
OECD and Non-OECD countries. To provide insights into this objective, a distinction
is made in the first chapter between OECD and Non-OECD oil and gas assets. In
the first chapter of this study, I introduce the global oil and gas field data and estab-
lish valuation methodology using the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) industry
standard NPV valuation. The prescribed SEC discount rate is applied throughout
this study. In applying an asset valuation model to oilfields, market uncertainty for
oil price is introduced through stochastic simulation. This refinement recognizes the
modern asset pricing techniques mooted by Laughton et al. (2000), introducing market
uncertainty at the source, in my study oil price market risk. The contribution of this
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chapter is both tactical and strategic. Tactical in that taxation is shown to not be a
constant function in monte carlo simulation. I use a simulation technique proposed by
Kretzschmar and Moles (2006), calculating taxation in each iteration. The second and
strategic contribution of this first chapter is the demonstration that Non-OECD state
agent participation is at the expense of corporate agents, a natural resource finding in
line with the recent financial asset study by Stulz (2005).
The second empirical chapter, extends the first chapter by highlighting the effects of
the state participation under variable oil price levels and stochastic uncertainty. This
allows me to combine key findings of the market price of commodities Bessembinder
et al. (1995) and Geman (2005) with underlying oil and gas physical asset values.
211 fields provide insights into natural resource asset pricing. The extensive sample
highlights the differences between pre and post tax asset values, and then, in turn,
illustrates post tax differences between OECD and Non–OECD assets.
The third empirical chapter uses oilfield data to provide expanded insights into natu-
ral resource asset response to oil price volatility. This work uses stochastic simulations
at three price levels to provide insights into the effects of state participation on asset
volatility and hedge ratios. Findings reinforce post-tax differences in asset value from
the previous chapter and illustrate that temporal variance in physical assets is a hidden
dimensional outcome of price risk, Geman et al. (2002).
The fourth empirical chapter provides accounting insights into price volatility dis-
closure work by Rajgopal (1999) and Boone (2001). I support prior findings that price
volatility is not disclosed in accounting information. Additionally, I show that OECD
and Non-OECD data are not differentiated in SEC disclosures and that SEC account-
ing disclosures are influenced by regulatory institutions Bushman and Piotroski (2006).
This finding of disclosure deficiency suggests an ex ante lack of transparency about
asset holdings may inhibit market recognition.
The final chapter provides market evidence of the importance of underlying asset
values (as measured in the first four empirical chapters) in sector book to market
measures as proposed by Fama and French (1992). Specifically, previous chapters
enable me to provide insights to two unanswered questions raised by Fama and French
(1995) p 153:
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“. . . (i) What are the underlying state variables that produce variation in earnings
and returns related to size and BE/ME?
(ii) Do these unnamed state variables produce variation in consumption and wealth
that is not captured by an overall market factor and so can explain the risk premiums
in returns associated with size and BE/ME?”
The market evidence in the final chapter of this study strongly suggests that coun-
try/state agent effects do explain the risk premiums associated with size and BE/ME.
The effects are, in many instances, sufficiently strong as to dominate the explana-
tory power of size and BE/ME. The expectation is that as oil prices increase, corpo-
rates with high Non-OECD asset holdings are likely to begin to experience share price
under-performance relative to companies with low Non-OECD asset holdings. State
participation, and oil price value response is extraneous to the asset, and is capable
of potentially inverting the risk return convention proposed by Mehra and Prescott
(1985), demonstrating limits to the benefits of globalization for oil and gas companies.
I find that despite accounting non-disclosure of homogenous oilfield data, a market
discount exists for companies that are overweight Non-OECD assets. This finding is
in contrast to industry findings by Cavaglia et al. (2000) and suggests that, relative
to comparable OECD oil assets, corporate participation in Non-OECD O&G assets is
limited by contracts that favour state participation. A significant contribution of this
thesis is the provision of evidence that state participation differences mitigate against
valuation model convergence and that these effects have the potential to invert risk
return convention.
Findings provide natural resource evidence that state agent participation in oilfield
cash flows has the ability to limit the corporate value of globalization on company asset
participation. The constrained corporate upside for assets in Non-OECD countries is
in contrast to equity market studies by Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Bekaert et al.
(2005) who suggest that emerging markets provide consistent and compensatory value
premia. This thesis concludes by using the constructs of the Fama and French (1993)
Three-Factor-Model to provide market evidence of limits to share returns for companies
overweight emerging country oilfield asset holdings. I find market Country/state agent
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effects explain the risk premiums associated with size and BE/ME, an insight into a
state variable factor unresolved by Fama and French (1995).
2. Literature and Institutional
Framework
Chapter Research Focus: State Participation Effects on
OECD and Non-OECD Assets
Non-OECD market O&G sectors are characterized by production sharing contracts. They typically
provide oilfield operators with pre state participation guarantees to cover a return on their capital
costs. In exchange, host countries impose a reserve entitlement structure that contractually escalates
oilfield participation sharing by the local government based on the price of oil (Angola), and in some
cases the volume of oil pumped (Indonesia). The explicit link between operator asset entitlement and
commodity prices differentiates Non-OECD market O&G sectors from OECD sectors, Bindemann
(1999).
Overview
Concessions (OECD) and PSCs (Non-OECD) have legal and regulatory complexities that have the
potential to cause asset cash flow participation inversion between OECD and Non-OECD markets.
Studies by Haushalter et al. (2002) and Jin and Jorion (2006) relate to a period when oil prices range
between US$18/bbl and US$35/bbl and cover the years 1992 to 1994, and 1998 to 2001 respectively,
periods comparable to the US$33.75/bbl to US$45/bbl price range in this study. The coexistence of
progressive taxation and oil prices above US$45/bbl has been a reality since 2004, allowing insights
into the combined effects on global oilfield asset valuation. Bindemann (1999)
Research Acknowledgements
Appreciation is expressed to my supervisors who suggested the need for the inclusion of an Institutional
Structure in this chapter.
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2.1. Institutional Oilfield Contracting Structures
The past 24 years have seen a significant shift in global proven reserve distributions.
Figure 2.1 illustrates that Non-OECD areas have experienced the greatest growth in
oil reserves over the period with direct implications for the returns oil producers when
invested in oilfield assets in these emerging markets. Chapter 7 suggests that in the last
eight years 75% of reserve replacement has occurred from Non-OECD countries. This
oil and gas phenomenon makes the understanding of differential state participation
terms a necessity for any meaningful analysis of sector returns.
The equity market convention established by Mehra and Prescott (1985) is that risk
and return are positively correlated in global markets, and when compared to OECD
markets, higher Non-OECD risks are compensated by higher return premia. I suggest
that if no account is taken of differing oilfield responses to stochastic oil prices (as
opposed to valuing cash flows based on certain oil prices) globally divergent forms of
state participation in oilfield cash flows have the potential to invert this fundamental
convention. In this study, the term ‘state participation’ is used to refer to government
participation, or government take as used in the oil and gas sector. This recognizes the
ex ante asset claims of all forms of taxation and production sharing against producer
reserves in favor of the asset’s local government. The claim interpretation recognizes
the contractual nature of state claims against oilfield assets, with corporate agents
sharing in residual cash flows Kretzschmar et al. (2007). The two main forms of oil-
field ownership in the oil and gas sector are production sharing contracts (PSCs) and
concession holdings.
The equity market premium puzzle identified by Mehra and Prescott (1985) has
been expanded by many studies that have begun to grapple with the distinction be-
tween emerging market and developed market characteristics. Conover et al. (2002)
provide ex ante tests for difference in equity risk premia, comparing developed and
emerging market monetary cyclicality. However, unlike equity markets, oilfield data
limitations mean that there is no best practice convention for global real asset value
comparison (Bruner et al. 2002). In fact, Yergin (2003) suggests that there is absolutely
no agreement on the method of global state participation in natural resource assets.
Bekaert and Harvey (2002) encapsulate the multi disciplinary and multi faceted prob-
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lems facing comparative asset valuation in emerging markets, summarizing the global
asset valuation challenge as one that needs to link international economics, asset char-
acteristics, development economics and law with political science and country specific
fiscal terms.
Concerns about valuation model convergence recently attracted increasing interest
at colloquia with Bruner et al. (2002) and Bekaert and Harvey (2002) identifying the
need for further empirical study in this area. Bruner et al. (2002) advance reasons
for the importance of emerging market valuation review, noting that investment flows
into emerging markets continue to be material. Nowhere is this trend more evident
than in the oil and gas sector where there is a strong economic and geopolitical relation
between state and corporate agents. The location of global reserve holdings is illustrated
in Figure 2.1. The figure highlights several important factors. The balance of asset
distribution in the Americas has recently shifted in favor of South America (Non-
OECD). The North American region is now the only global region with an overall
reduction in proven reserves. Greatest reserve growth occurs in the Non-OECD regions
of Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East.
Figure 2.3 provides insights into the highly variable rates of government take where
government take is measured as a percentage of pre-tax PV in the regime. It is notable
that government take varies widely on a global basis. The detailed terms of which
are provided in Appendix C. Due to the difficulty of disclosing detailed tax terms in
concession or PSC countries on a field by field basis, I provide an overview of the range
of concession and PSC terms applicable to all fields in the sample (Table 2.1).
Oilfield assets are uniquely positioned to provide comparative insights into global
real asset valuation and emerging market specificities. The oil and gas (O&G) sector
has been extensively used in studies that attempt to isolate asset valuation and risk at-
tributes, Haushalter et al. (2002) emphasize the cost of extraction while Jin and Jorion
(2006) note that global commodity oil markets are homogenous, well traded with oilfield
assets subject to equivalent global oil price volatility. There exists a representative and
comparative spread of oilfield assets between OECD and Non-OECD countries, provid-
ing the means to isolate component cost structures and study valuation convergence
as between OECD and Non-OECD market real assets. Figure 2.2 quantifies the extent
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Figure 2.1. Global Proven Reserve Distribution as Between OECD and Non-OECD Re-
gions
The two colour shades illustrate movement in absolute reserves over a twenty four year period, 1980–
2004. This figure illustrates in which regions proven reserves are held and provides insights into the
likely entitlement structures under which state and corporate agents operate assets (OECD countries
operate under concession regimes whereas Non-OECD countries operate under production sharing
contracts). By the same measure it matters where replacement reserves originate. The figure does
not include Oil Sands and Unconventional Reserves. Source: Reserve movements derived from proven
reserve figures in the BP Historical Statistical Review – Tristone
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Total Proved Reserves - % Change Since 1980









Figure 2.2. Changes in Global Proven Reserve Distribution as Between OECD and Non-
OECD Regions
This figure isolates the movement in proven reserve holdings by regions. The axial bar graphs il-
lustrate movement in absolute reserves over a twenty four year period, 1980–2004. Oil Sands and
Unconventional Reserves are not included. Source: BP Statistical Review 2004 – Tristone Capital
to which OECD countries (North America and Western Europe) experience the lowest
increase (decrease for North America). The use of a representative oilfield assets across
both Non-OECD and OECD markets mean that this work embodies a “. . . unique in-
terdisciplinary interest that bridges both investment and corporate finance”, Bekaert
and Harvey (2002).
Ross (2005) defines the value of an asset in the context of probability theory under
the no-arbitrage assumption with the risk-free probabilities π∗.
V (z) = E[φz] =
∑
π∗i φizi (2.1)
Where the asset value V in Ross (2005) general form pricing kernel is reflected
by the expected value of the product of its future payoffs z with the pricing kernel
φ. In this study, the asset value payoff to the corporate agent and, in the natural
resource sector, the equilibrium of the asset pricing kernel is directly affected by state



























































































































































































2. Literature and Institutional Framework 14
agent participation in asset returns. This is reflected in the wide global variations of
participation rates – where variant forms of taxation are levied on corporate agents.
In order to overcome the effect of stochastic variations in taxation, this analysis
considers three simplifying assumptions. First, natural resource assets deplete, and
as a result state agents find it optimal to extract value out of existing assets since
depletion precludes future expropriation. Second, state agents in both OECD and
Non-OECD countries do not have the skills or expertise to deliver technical O&G
development projects. Finally, the rate of state taxation participation is deterministic,
and is based on terms and rates in existence at January 2006. In line with Stulz
(2005) this assumption is a necessary simplification in that ad-hoc changes in either
the deterministic tax regime or in political agents in countries are possibilities.
2.2. Literature and Principles of PSC and Concession
Fiscal Terms
Indonesia, in the 1960s, introduced the first production sharing agreements in the oil
and gas industry. These first PSCs were simple cost recovery agreements that enabled
the accelerated recovery of producer development cost and have now been extensively
adopted throughout the developing oilfield regions of the world. The terms of these
agreements vary from country to country but the principal remains the same; corporate
producers have a right to share in the oil resource but to no own it. The state is
a participative production sharing partner in the development. An overview of the
structural nature of production sharing contracts and concession terms are provided in
Section 2.3.
Due to the confidential and closely held nature of information in the oil and gas
sector, an effect commented on by Haushalter (2000) few academic studies have been
able to penetrate the confidential terms negotiated in Non-OECD countries. Notable
exceptions are the Indonesian study performed by Gramlich and Wheeler (2003) and
the study of a US company exploration contract Hampson et al. (1991). Both studies
are characterized by their limited data, a factor that I overcome using the generous
sponsorship of oilfield data across six global regimes. Hampson et al. (1991) cover

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2. Literature and Institutional Framework 16
the contracting essentials of a partnership contract in a case study format, covering
a single field. In essence their suggestions are that key features of PSCs need to be
tailored between the state and the contractor in order to derive an optimal sharing
rule. Important inputs in the derivation of optimal sharing, are the concepts of cost
recovery (termed ‘cost oil’) and profit sharing (termed ‘profit oil’).
Oil companies under concessionary fiscal terms are allowed to sell all of their pro-
duction to market prices, while under PSC fiscal terms, they are only entitled to the
production which covers the sum of ‘cost oil’ and ‘profit oil’. This principle is covered
in Section 2.4 which shows the important difference between these two PSC agreement
processes. Cost recovery for instance, allows the contractor to recoup costs during
development of new fields (currently the case in Angola, While profit share generally
occurs in more mature production provinces, Indonesia in my study. Additionally,
in some areas, such as the Angolan deep-water oil fields and new prospecting is en-
couraged, contractors are therefore also allowed capital costs uplifts, which allows the
partner group to uplift all capital costs by at least 40%. In situations where large,
high-cost, development projects are required (i.e. the majority of Angola’s deep-water
discoveries) the capital uplift means that for a project with capital expenditure of US$3
billion the recoverable costs are US$4.2 billion. Production remaining after cost recov-
ery is termed profit oil/gas and is divided between the contractor and the government.
The basis on which this division is made varies between contracts with more recent
contracts based on the contractor’s rate of return (ROR) whereas in earlier contracts
the split was based on cumulative production. Figure 2.4 illustrates an example of con-
tractor and state participation in an oilfield governed by a production sharing contract
at an oil price of US$45/bbl.
By contrast, concession agreements apply the same fiscal principles as corporate
taxation. There is no a priori fiscal claim to profits, nor in the UKCS, GoM and
Angola is there government take prior to cost recovery. The state shares pari passu
with the corporate in post cost profits, however these may be defined by the state. This
concession effectively removes the fist leg of profit sharing shown in Figure 2.4
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Cost Oil Recovery 33 1/3% (max. 50%)
US$ 10.80
Net Cash Flow: 
US$ 7.56




Profit Oil Split 60%
US$ 13.50
US$ 4.50
Tax  30% (US$ 3.24)
Gross Revenue: US$ 21.06 Revenue: US$ 23.94
Corporate Government / State
Corporate Take: 24 % of Field Cash 
Flow after Cost Recovery
State Take: 76% of Field Cash Flow 
after Cost Recovery
Figure 2.4. Flowchart illustrating an Example of Contractor and Government Participa-
tion in a Production Sharing Contract
The figure shows the Institutional Relationship between PSC Producing contractors and the State at
an oil price of US$45/bbl. It is instructive to note that cost recovery or Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
allocation occurs before the profit split. This illustrates that corporate cost recovery is ensured in
PSC regimes. The profit split between producer and state is weighted in favour of the state, while the
rate of profit share is connected to oil price. At higher prices state oilfield participation increases, see
Table 2.3. By contrast, for concession institutional frameworks, there is no cost recovery guarantee.
The profit split is, however, constant and state participation rates are not progressive with oil price.
Detailed country participation terms are found in the Fiscal Term appendix. Source Bindemann
(1999), amended.
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2.3. PSC and Concession Fiscal Terms
Concession terms are set out for each country in columns (a) to (e). In the case of US
Gulf of Mexico, oil companies are subject to a royalty tax which is deducted from the
well-head value of the oil, and a federal income tax which is taxed on net operating
profit. In deepwater GoM, the royalty rate is 12.5%, while it is 16.7% in shallow
water fields. Although, royalty tax is no longer applicable for UKCS and NCS oilfields,
oil companies operating in these regimes are required to pay either a supplementary
corporation tax (UKCS) or a supplementary petroleum tax (in UKCS and NCS).
By contrast, PSC tax terms are more complex. Some PSC contracts are based on
the contractor’s rate of return (based on the contractor’s accumulated compounded
post-tax cash flow, e.g. Angola IRR, column (f)), whereas in other contracts the split
is based on cumulative production (e.g. Angola PROD, column (g)).
2.3.1. PSC Oilfield Contracting Terms
To facilitate comparative insights into concession and production sharing regimes I
perform a comparative taxation computation for the same field. Insights into the
detailed calculations are performed by calculating at US 45 for the same field, an
Angolan field, under Angolan and GoM terms. To illustrate insights into PSC state
participation terms I demonstrate below a detailed Angolan oilfield tax calculation.
For ease of comparison of institutional frameworks as between OECD and Non OECD
countries, a GoM concession calculation follows.
Table 2.2 shows field data for a large Angolan oilfield.1 Column (a) shows the pro-
duction profile (in thousands of barrels of oil per day) for each year in the whole life of
the oilfield, while column (b) depicts the corresponding price forecast.2 In this specific
1Oil production, field life, operating expenditures and capital expenditures have all been changed in
order to ensure that no confidential information is revealed.
2The standardized SEC measure requires the use of the current year-end price of oil over the whole
field life, I apply a slightly more conservative approach to incorporate findings from Bessembinder
et al. (1995) – for both concessions and PSC calculations. A P45 oil price scenario at time 0
consists of US$45/bbl for 2006, US$40/bbl for 2007, US$37/bbl for 2008, US$35.87/bbl for 2009 and
US$36.77/bbl for 2010. From 2010 onwards, the oil price is increased by 2.5% a year. In addition,
I develop 4 price scenarios where the prices in the P45 scenario is scaled down up or down with a
constant factor. For instance, I calculate a P33.75 scenario where all the P45 prices are multiplied
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example the oil produced is of Hungo quality (in contrast to West Texas Intermediate
(WTI) and Brent blend), a quality of oil typically sold at a discount to WTI or Brent.
Annual expected gross revenue (column c is calculated as the product of production
(column a) and price (column b). Columns (d) and (e) describe the expected expenses
incurred from operating the field (operating expenses, opex) and investments to prepare
the field for production (capital expenditure, capex), respectively. Company cash flow
(column l) is calculated as gross revenues less opex, capex and government take.
Columns (f) to (k) relate to the calculation of government take and profit splits
between the government and the contractor, and will be described in more detail in
Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Table 2.5 articulates how the SEC variables reserves, production
and NPV are calculated.
All offshore contracts awarded since 1991 fall under the ROR based model. During
the application process bidders must specify the rate of return steps and the profit oil
splits applicable to each tier. The contract allows for up to five different tiers of profit
splits with rates varying from contract to contract. Typical rate of return based profit
splits are given in Table 2.3:
The split is determined by the rate of return achieved in the previous period. The
ROR calculation is based on the contractor’s accumulated compounded post-tax cash
flow. The contractor’s cash flow is defined as in Table 2.2 (column (l)). Exploration
expenditure is not included in the computation of contractor’s net cash flow. Only
expenditure after the date of commercial discovery is included.
The contractor’s cash flow is compounded at each of the ROR rates specified in the
contract and the profit oil split is taken relating to the highest ROR which yields a
positive result (Table 2.4).
by 75%, resulting in an oil price of US$33.75/bbl at time 0. Similarly I calculate a P22.5 scenario
(50% of US$45/bbl, equivalent to US$22.5/bbl), a P67.5 scenario (150% of US$45/bbl, equivalent to
US$67.5/bbl) and a P90 scenario (200% of US$45/bbl, equivalent to US$90/bbl). I tested this mean
reversion against SEC tests and found that this is an accurate and more conservative approximation
of the price effect on SEC PSC disclosures. Using static SEC year end prices actually increases
the PSC price effect on reserves by enabling PSC claims to occur sooner, simply strengthening
conclusions made.
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Table 2.3. Profit splits for a typical Angolan oilfield under PSC tax terms
(a) (b) (c)
IRR State Share of Profit Oil Contractor Share of Profit Oil
<15% 25% 75%
15% - 25% 35% 65%
25% - 30% 55% 45%
30% - 40% 75% 25%
>40% 85% 15%
The compounded cash flow will by construct turn positive when the rate of return
is achieved. For example, the 2003 company cash flow was minus US$105 million. The
relevant Tier 1 cash flow for 2004 is calculated as
−105× 1.15− 323 = −US$444 million,
while the Tier 2 cash flow in the same year is calculated as
−105× 1.25− 323 = −US$454 million.
This compounding is done for all the years in the field’s life. In 2009, the Tier 1
compounded cash flow turns positive (US$622 million) signifying that the company
has achieved at least 15% return on its investment. This results in a change in the
profit split in favor of the government. Total profit oil for the following period is split
35%: 65% (government percent: contractor percent). In 2012 the company is expected
to have achieved a 30% return on its investment, and will only be allowed 25% of the
profit oil.
Since oil companies under PSC terms are only entitled to the production which covers
cost oil and profit oil, their entitled production (Table 2.5 column (d)) will be different
from total field production (Table 2.5 column (b)). In 2006 the field is expected to
produce 10 million barrels of oil per year.
Under concession terms, the oil companies would be entitled to the entire 10 million
barrels/yr. However, under the PSC terms the production entitlement is less than
this amount. In 2006 the contractors cost oil is US$76 million and its share of profit
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Table 2.4. Profit split tiers for a typical Angolan oilfield under PSC tax terms
(a) Using Table 2.2 column (l)
(b) Previous year’s (b)×(100%+15%)+(a) where 15% is the assumed first tier rate of return threshold
(c) As (b) but using 25%
(d) As (b) but using 30%
(e) As (b) but using 40%
(f) Share determined by reference to Table 2.3 above. The split applicable in any one year is that
determined by the rate of return achieved in the previous year (goes to column (h) in Table 2.2 (for
following year)).
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Year Applicable 1st Tier 2nd Tier 3rd Tier 4th Tier State
Cash flow Share
US$M US$M US$M US$M US$M %
2003 -105 -105 -105 -105 -105 25%
2004 -323 -444 -454 -460 -470 25%
2005 -552 -1062 -1120 -1150 -1210 25%
2006 -603 -1825 -2003 -2097 -2297 25%
2007 576 -1523 -1928 -2151 -2640 25%
2008 1291 -460 -1119 -1505 -2406 25%
2009 1151 622 -248 -806 -2217 35%
2010 669 1384 360 -378 -2434 55%
2011 435 2027 885 -56 -2973 55%
2012 406 2737 1512 333 -3756 75%
2013 215 3363 2105 648 -5043 75%
2014 222 4089 2854 1064 -6839 75%
2015 209 4912 3776 1592 -9365 75%
2016 196 5844 4916 2266 -12915 75%
2017 183 6904 6328 3129 -17898 75%
2018 175 8115 8085 4243 -24883 75%
2019 167 9499 10273 5683 -34669 75%
2020 159 11084 13000 7547 -48377 75%
2021 152 12898 16403 9963 -67575 75%
2022 145 14978 20649 13098 -94460 75%
2023 138 17363 25949 17165 -132106 75%
2024 43 20011 32480 22358 -184905 75%
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Table 2.5. Calculation of reserves entitlement, production entitlement and Remaining
NPV under Angola PSC tax terms
(a) Total field remaining reserves in million barrels of oil equivalent.
(b) Total field annual production in thousands of barrels of oil equivalent per day.
(c) Companies’ remaining reserves in million barrels of oil equivalent.
(d) Companies’ entitled annual production (net of royalty) in thousands of barrels of oil equivalent
per day. Calculated as (b) less royalty (deepwater: 12.5%).
(e) Companies’ net present value of expected entitled cash flows.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Remaining Production Entitled Entitled Remaining
reserves reserves production NPV
mmboe 000boe/d mmboe 000boe/d US$M
2003 800 0 412 0 1614
2004 800 0 412 0 1880
2005 800 0 412 0 2391
2006 800 10 408 9 3182
2007 797 100 377 88 4103
2008 760 200 313 175 3938
2009 687 200 251 168 3041
2010 614 180 206 125 2194
2011 549 165 174 86 1744
2012 488 154 145 80 1483
2013 432 144 127 50 1226
2014 379 135 110 44 1133
2015 330 126 95 41 1024
2016 284 118 81 39 917
2017 241 110 68 36 813
2018 201 103 56 34 711
2019 163 96 44 32 608
2020 128 90 33 30 501
2021 95 84 22 29 392
2022 64 79 13 27 279
2023 36 74 3 25 162
2024 9 24 3 9 39
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oil is US$57 million, a total of US$134 million. This is equivalent to a production of
3200 barrels per day, or 8.75 million barrels of oil a year (sum of cost oil and profit oil
divided by market price of oil, i.e. 134/41.9). Oil reserves are calculated as the sum
of production over the whole field life (columns (a) and (c)). As Table 2.5 shows, the
difference between total production and entitled production increases with government
share of profit oil. The expected net present value of the company cash flow is calculated
using a discount rate of 10%, equivalent to SEC requirements (Table 2.5 column (e)).
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2.3.2. Concession Contracting Terms
Subjecting the Angolan field to GoM tax terms indicates two important principles.
Firstly, the tax rate in the GoM concessions is lower than that levied against Angolan
fields at an oil price of US$45/bbl. This insight is expanded in Chapter 3 and is used to
provide extensive and detailed analyses of the effects of differential and price sensitive
state participation contract terms on corporate asset values. For ease of reference and
completeness inf Table 2.6 and 2.7 I describe the calculation of reserves, production
and remaining NPV for the same field as in Tables 2.2-2.5, save that it is subject to US
GoM deepwater taxation and not Angolan PSC tax terms. Oil companies’ entitlement
to production and reserves in the specific oilfield is shown in Table 2.7.
2.4. Literature and Structure for Interpreting OECD
and Non OECD Contracting Terms
State participation differences between markets are shown to mitigate against global
asset valuation convergence. In this study of global oilfield assets I extend the find-
ings by Haushalter et al. (2002) and provide empirical insights into the effect of state
participation costs on corporate asset pricing. Four supporting empirical studies are
undertaken in this thesis, each of which builds on a defined body of literature. To
enable a structured approach to this analysis, the literature relevant to each chapter is
introduced below and then covered in depth when reviewing the results and conclusions
in each empirical chapter.
Non-OECD market O&G sectors are characterized by production sharing contracts.
They typically provide oilfield operators with guarantees to cover a return on their
capital costs and, in exchange, impose a reserve entitlement structure that contrac-
tually escalates oilfield participation sharing by the local government based on the
price of oil (Angola) and in some cases the volume of oil pumped (Indonesia). The
explicit link between operator asset entitlement and commodity prices differentiates
Non-OECD market O&G sectors from OECD sectors, Bindemann (1999). Legal and
regulatory complexities are demonstrated to have the potential to cause asset cash flow
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Table 2.7. Calculation of reserves entitlement, production entitlement and Remaining
NPV under GoM concession tax terms
(a) Total remaining reserves in million barrels of oil equivalent. Calculated as the sum of column (b),
multiplied by 0.365 (transforming thousands of barrels per day into millions of barrels per year).
(b) Total annual production in thousands of barrels of oil equivalent per day.
(c) Entitled remaining reserves in million barrels of oil equivalent. Calculated as the sum of column
(d), multiplied by 0.365 (transforming thousands of barrels per day into millions of barrels per year).
(d) Entitled annual production, net of royalty (12.5% in US GoM Deepwater, See Appendix 2.1 in
thousands of barrels of oil equivalent per day.
(e) Companies’ (and total) net present value of expected entitled cash flows.
Year Remaining Production Entitled Entitled Remaining
reserves reserves production NPV
mmboe 000boe/d mmboe 000boe/d US$M
2003 800 0 700 0 4140
2004 800 0 700 0 4659
2005 800 0 700 0 5448
2006 800 10 700 9 6545
2007 797 100 697 88 7774
2008 760 200 665 175 7721
2009 687 200 601 175 7157
2010 614 180 538 158 6688
2011 549 165 480 144 6232
2012 488 154 427 135 5807
2013 432 144 378 126 5391
2014 379 135 332 118 4985
2015 330 126 289 110 4536
2016 284 118 249 103 4087
2017 241 110 211 96 3635
2018 201 103 176 90 3177
2019 163 96 143 84 2711
2020 128 90 112 79 2235
2021 95 84 83 74 1746
2022 64 79 56 69 1241
2023 36 74 31 64 718
2024 9 24 8 21 173
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participation inversion between OECD and Non-OECD markets. Studies by Haushal-
ter et al. (2002) and Jin and Jorion (2006) relate to a period when oil prices range
between US$18/bbl and US$35/bbl and cover the years 1992 to 1994, and 1998 to 2001
respectively, periods comparable to the US$33.75/bbl to US$45/bbl price range in this
study. The coexistence of progressive taxation and oil prices above US$45/bbl has been
a reality since 2004, allowing insights into the combined effects on global oilfield asset
valuation.
The equity market premium puzzle identified by Mehra and Prescott (1985) has
been expanded by many studies that have begun to grapple with the distinction be-
tween emerging market and developed market characteristics. Conover et al. (2002)
provide ex ante tests for difference in equity risk premia, comparing developed and
emerging market monetary cyclicality. However, unlike exchange traded equity market
assets data limitations mean that there is no best practice convention for global real
asset model comparison. Bekaert and Harvey (2002) encapsulate the multi disciplinary
and multi faceted problems facing comparative asset valuation in emerging markets,
summarizing the global asset valuation challenge as one that needs to link international
economics, asset characteristics, development economics and law with political science
and country specific fiscal terms.
Concerns about valuation model convergence recently attracted increasing interest
at colloquia with Bruner et al. (2002) and Bekaert and Harvey (2002) identifying the
need for further empirical study in this area. Bruner et al. (2002) advance reasons for
the importance of emerging market valuation review, noting that investment flows into
emerging markets continue to be material. Nowhere is this trend more evident than
in the oil and gas sector where there is a strong economic and geopolitical relation
between state and corporate agents. Oilfield assets are therefore uniquely positioned
to provide comparative insights into global real asset valuation and emerging market
specificities. Johnston (2002) provide specific insights into the oil and gas production
sharing state and corporate partnership principles needed for this thesis. Their case
study approach is expanded in this multi asset study while chapter 6 expands Gramlich
and Wheeler (2003) work on the disclosure of oil and gas contracts.
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The oil and gas (O&G) sector has been extensively used in studies that attempt
to isolate asset valuation and risk attributes, Haushalter et al. (2002) emphasize the
cost of extraction on firm equity value while Jin and Jorion (2006) note that global
commodity oil markets are homogeneous, well traded and have comparable oilfield as-
sets subject to equivalent global oil price volatility. There also exists a representative
and comparative spread of oilfield assets between OECD and Non-OECD countries,
providing the means to isolate component cost structures and study valuation conver-
gence as between OECD and Non-OECD market real assets. The use of representative
oilfield assets across both Non-OECD and OECD markets mean that this chapter em-
bodies a unique interdisciplinary interest meeting the Bekaert and Harvey (2002) need
of bridging investment and corporate finance.
State participation differences between markets are shown to mitigate against global
asset valuation convergence. I extend the findings by Haushalter et al. (2002) and
provide empirical insights into the effect of state participation costs on corporate asset
pricing. My findings demonstrate that despite starting with a comparable set of global
oilfield assets, state participation causes asset risk and return performance to differ
significantly across global markets. Specifically, evidence is provided that Non-OECD
assets have an initial operational cost and risk advantage that is reversed with the
inclusion of state participation. I show that under conditions of oil price variability
Non-OECD state participation limits corporate agent returns. Oil entitlement terms in
Non-OECD countries are complex, with important implications for asset pricing in the
entire O&G sector. Non-OECD market O&G sectors are characterized by production
sharing contracts. They typically provide oilfield operators with guarantees to cover a
return on their capital costs and, in exchange, impose a reserve entitlement structure
that contractually escalates oilfield participation sharing by the local government based
on the price of oil (Angola) and in some cases the volume of oil pumped (Indonesia).
The explicit link between operator asset entitlement and commodity prices differenti-
ates Non-OECD market O&G sectors from OECD sectors as discussed by Bindemann
(1999).
An important question is whether studies by Haushalter et al. (2002) and Jin and
Jorion (2006) which relate to a period when oil prices range between US$18/bbl and
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US$35/bbl and cover the years 1992 to 1994, and 1998 to 2001 respectively still hold.
I answer this question by analyzing asset values at three price levels. The first is
US$33.75/bbl comparable to oil prices used in their studies. The coexistence of pro-
gressive taxation and oil prices above US$45/bbl has been a reality since 2004, allowing
insights into the combined effects on global oilfield asset valuation. I facilitate these
insights by valuing the same assets at US$45/bbl.
The variables of oil price expectations, geographic holdings, replacement reserve ori-
gin, and total-cost ratio are used as independent determinants of the intensity of state
intervention as between OECD and non-OECD countries. The simplifying assumption
of deterministic state taxation enables the treatment of state participation as a specific
prior claim against the corporate value of the oilfield asset.
Findings provide an important cautionary insight into limits to the corporate value
of globalization in the oil and gas sector. Evidence is provided that emerging market
sovereign states pursue their own interest more aggressively than developed market
agents. This behavior limits corporate upside of asset values, and thereby, the benefits
of globalization. The limitation on participation in the corporate asset values in the
context of progressive state participation in Non-OECD countries is shown to be capable
of causing an inversion of risk return convention. Additionally, as noted by Bekaert
and Harvey (2002), global differences in the form of state participation are shown to
be capable of mitigating against asset valuation model convergence.
2.5. Stochastic Literature
Informational efficiency and exactly what is meant in the finance of asset pricing by this
attractive phrase is not entirely clear suggests (Ross 2005). The lack of clarity stems
from the value to be placed on the cash flow expectation and the value to be attached
to the uncertainty of state participation in asset cash flows. In the stochastic chapter of
this work, I use the detailed field data to price each field at three different price decks
to overcome the difficulties in obtaining asset valuation and risk data that have been
noted in many studies. Haushalter et al. (2002) sum up the competitive advantage of
information, suggesting that companies are unlikely to provide market disclosures about
2. Literature and Institutional Framework 31
asset holdings that would affect their competitive positioning. Recent work has focussed
on the natural resource sector in an attempt to limit endogeneity and separate the
value of enterprise assets from the value of risk management. It is demonstrated that,
for homogenous assets, country specific oilfield contractual terms cause divergent and
heterogenous asset valuation and risk responses to oil price movement, a refinement that
combines the industry centric approach of Cavaglia et al. (2000) and the importance
of country factors (Stulz 2005). A combination of industry specific entitlement terms
and the country location of resource holdings are shown to be important inputs for the
accurate pricing of global natural resource assets.
In a general study Allayannis and Weston (2001) find evidence of value premia for
720 corporate entities that undertake risk management, findings supported by Adam
and Fernando (2006) who examine 92 North American gold mining firms. Jin and
Jorion (2006) question findings by Allayannis and Weston (2001)and identify possible
endogeneity between hedging activities and firm value inputs. I concur with the need
to limit endogeneity of input variables in risk studies, but note that within their sample
of O&G sector US firms, Jin and Jorion (2006) make no distinction between country
variant corporate entitlement and “government take” structures that govern oilfield
assets (Kretzschmar et al. 2007). This work follows prior studies by Haushalter (2000)
and Haushalter et al. (2002) who favor the O&G sector in an attempt isolate the value
of risk management by limiting model variables. Jin and Jorion (2006) suggest that
the sector is exposed to homogenous risks, the evaluation of which are aided by O&G
disclosures, their focus is built on the assumption of equivalent entitlement to proven
reserves at all price levels; a condition Kretzschmar et al. (2007) show does not hold.
As Haushalter et al. (2002) note, market imperfection arguments for corporate risk
management should focus on the cause of cash flow uncertainty, and flows in O&G are
directly affected by asset entitlement structures. I highlight difficulties associated with
determining risk measures at the firm level. A global sample of O&G assets is used to
demonstrate that, for firms with global asset holdings, oil price movements cause asset
cash flow measures of value and risk to vary widely and heterogeneously based on the
different forms of government participation in oilfield contracts.
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Government take, in O&G, is analogous to the concept of“expropriation by the state”
mooted by Stulz (2005).3 The differing global forms of O&G government participation
enables a critical comparison of differing forms of ruler discretion. I use the analysis
to provide insights into the statement by Jin and Jorion (2006, p.915) that O&G asset
“delta equivalents can be measured precisely”. Corporate oilfield participation is shown
to be country specific and capable of being accurately determined only with reference to
underlying asset holdings. This chapter suggests that country differences are a relevant
and necessary consideration in studies of international O&G asset holdings, an asset
based application of the state participation principle.
The consensus in finance is that asset values are a function of future cash flow benefits
(Ross 2005), and that asset and risk pricing accuracy depends, in turn, on information
about cash flow risk behavior. Several recent studies have focussed on the effects of com-
modity prices on firm value, and document a relation between stock returns and factors
other than overall market returns. This is particularly true for commodity-producing
firms, whose stock prices are ultimately associated with changes in asset values in re-
sponse to movements in the the price of the underlying commodity. Strong (1991)
demonstrates a positive relation between stock prices of oil companies and changes in
oil prices and Tufano (1996) and Blose and Shieh (1995) establish correlation between
the value of gold mining firms and gold prices. I extend these works and show that cash
flow effects of oil price movements on value measures vary widely and heterogeneously
based on reserve entitlement contracts.
2.6. Longitudinal Literature
The longitudinal study of oilfields covers the whole life field response to oil oil price
shocks and draws on a different body of literature. Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2006) and
Szegö (2002) identify the need to model correlation and co-dependence between risk
factors. Like Szegö (2002) I find that the relation between asset risk behavior and
3The term ’government take’ is used as understood in the oil and gas industry and refers to all
forms of government taxation, whether royalty, profit based or production sharing. The terms
are contractual, determined by the entitlement structure, and are usually specific to the regime
that the oilfield is located in. Corporate entitlement is the residual oilfield entitlement available to
oilfield producers after government take.
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price variability is not linear; an insight that I accommodate by separating the O&G
fields into concession and production sharing fields. This allows an analysis of the price
response of longitudinal cash flow risks as between production sharing assets (PSCs)
and concession fields. PSCs typically provide oil companies with guarantees to cover a
return on their capital costs and, in exchange, impose a reserve entitlement structure
that contractually escalates oilfield participation sharing by the local government based
on the price of oil and in some cases the volume of oil pumped. Linking asset entitlement
explicitly and contractually to a range of returns based primarily on commodity prices
differentiates production sharing from concessions, Bindemann (1999). Kretzschmar
et al. (2007) provide a comprehensive insight into the taxation and accounting effects
of these agreements. When subject to identical oil and gas price variability, these
regulatory and taxation differences between O&G assets are shown to directly affect
longitudinal cash flow risks.
Nawalkha et al. (2003) propose an unrestricted duration vector approach to isolate
and hedge interest rate risk exposure for fixed income assets.4 They investigate the
weighted average of the distance between cash flow maturity and the planned hedging
horizon by computing generalizing M -vector models and conclude that finite length
vector models may improve short-term hedging performance. I differentiate risk periods
in this study by dealing with cash flow and risk metrics over the whole–life of the
asset. Natural resource asset characteristics limit model choices available, Brealey and
Kaplanis (1995) for instance assume that a foreign firm will produce cash flow of £1 in
perpetuity, a condition that does not hold for depleting assets. Sercu and Wu (2000)
conduct a comparison of historic regression hedges and forward looking future delta
hedges. They provide evidence that forward looking hedges outperform hedges based
on regression of historic data. I approximate the findings by Sercu and Wu (2000)
and base the hedge ratio analysis on estimates of future field cash flows and future oil
prices.
Like Brooks et al. (2002) I define the conditional optimal minimum variance hedge
ratio under the objective of total return maximization. Two different time horizons of
hedges are used in the time period definition. The first period corresponds to rolling
4Nawalkha et al. (2003) refer to unrestricted in the context of allowing for shifts in term structure
which are not limited by a depleting asset or a “particular function form”.
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36 months traded futures contracts, (James 2003), and the second discrete measure,
draws on the average 60 months duration in oil field financing. This discrete method of
hedging field generated cash flows is in contrast to continuous fixed income hedges as
analyzed by Nawalkha et al. (2003). In summary, I approximate the discrete hedging
approach used by Brealey and Kaplanis (1995) but I incorporate minimum variance
hedging that allows for time variant and asymmetric shifts in the covariances as high-
lighted by Brooks et al. (2002). Findings coupled with detailed asset data demonstrate
that at the oilfield level, risks are bounded in time and differ from oilfield asset to asset.
Unbounded risk measures, for the purposes of this study, are analogous to whole field
life minimum variance hedge ratios.
2.7. Accounting Literature
Prior studies have shown oilfield disclosures to be value relevant in interpreting assets
and earnings of companies in the oil and gas (O&G) industry (Boone 2002). Reserve
disclosures for companies in the energy sector provide important information needed
to interpret the current and prospective performance of oil and gas exploration and
production (Quirin et al. 2000). Boone (2002) undertakes a survey of an extensive
earlier debate as to SEC present value disclosures and confirms their value relevance.
The importance of oil price effects on reserve replacement and reporting is particularly
relevant in the energy sector where reliance upon accounting return measures that
ignore the economic value of capital invested in oil and gas (O&G) reserves have been
shown to be potentially misleading (Antill and Arnott 2004; Osmundsen et al. 2006).
Rajgopal (1999) tested market risk effects in the O&G sector, acknowledging that
“while the SEC concludes that ‘quantitative disclosures should help investors better
understand specific market risk disclosures of different registrants’ market risk disclo-
sures are unlikely to be reliable and plagued with measurement problems” (SEC 1997,
No.6048, p.252). Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) also touch on the concept of reserve write
downs, but in the context of sharp oil price declines that necessitate reserve revision.
Despite findings by Clinch and Magliolo (1992) that reserves up to three years in the
future are associated with ruling oil price sensitivities, it is not possible from current
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SEC O&G financial reporting to assess the potential effect of oil price variability on
future SEC proven reserves and production entitlement. In other words the quantity of
underlying PSC oil and gas assets for corporates are themselves a function of oil price
levels and current disclosures provide no way of measuring this effect.
This chapter examines these price effects on disclosures, and the extent to which
oil sector reserve ownership is affected by previously the unstudied effects of high oil
prices driving down corporate reserve entitlement. The production sharing contracts
(PSC) that cause this effect are shown in this study to have price varying effects similar
to derivative contracts. The existence and price sensitivity of these contracts as they
relate to underlying oilfields, are an alternative to concession ownership structures, and
represent between 30% to 40% of emerging global reserve replacement opportunities.
The nature of these contracts is not well understood and nor are details available from
current SEC disclosures. As a result little academic work has been done on the effects
of oil price on these alternative ownership structures.
PSC agreements vary widely but typically provide oil companies with a guarantee
to cover a return on their capital costs and, in exchange, impose a reserve entitle-
ment structure. The contract generally escalates participation sharing by the local
government based on the price of oil and in some cases the volume of oil pumped.5
Specifically and contractually linking asset entitlement to a range of oilfield returns
generated primarily by commodity prices differentiates oilfields from other market sen-
sitive corporate assets. This chapter focuses on this trait by interpreting government
take as analogous to option claims against company reserves possessed by the field’s
local government - an interpretation that recognizes the contractual nature of possible
fiscal claims against oilfields. This interpretation provides a framework to consider
the disclosure requirements of underlying assets and financial instrument disclosures as
identified by Rajgopal (1999) and to compare oil price effects on oilfield asset disclo-
sures. The financial effects of production sharing contracts, driven by high oil prices,
are becoming widespread in the O&G sector. Exxon’s PSC production is expected to
5The contractual take by the local government can be interpreted as a form of taxation. In the
Oil and Gas sector the term fiscal take is used for the (present) value of all forms of government
taxation including any contractual take under the terms of a PSC.
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move from 18% to 38% by 2010, and BP from 8 to 20 percent over the same period
and, with the exception of Shell, other oil majors are showing similar trends.6
Rajgopal (1999) notes that there are problems with price risk data, the disclosure
of which provides inconsistent tabular information in his study. Rajgopal (1999) de-
rives a O&G equity value beta as a constant at 0.247% per 1% change in the oil price
(gas beta 0.072) and notes that beta “is subject to measurement error because they
are averages over the 1993-1996 period, whereas the theory suggests that oil and gas
price sensitivities depend on firm-specific and time period-specific stock of underlying
reserves and the derivative strategy sensitivities”(Rajgopal 1999, p.268). This observa-
tion by Rajgopal (1999) allows the contribution of this empirical study; I use a study of
extensive oilfield data to highlight the asymmetrical price sensitivities of O&G reserve
entitlement (and thereby SEC disclosures) to price sensitivity.
I use oilfields to measure oilfield disclosures under varying price conditions and con-
tribute to prior work on price risk disclosures. I find that O&G disclosures are sig-
nificantly more variable than the oil price beta for equity value noted by Rajgopal
(1999). Disclosure rules currently do not capture these price variant effects in financial
statements, an insight that perhaps goes some way toward explaining the conflicting
results in prior value relevance studies. Rules for supplementary information on un-
derlying reserves, SEC (SEC 1981) and FASB (FASB 1982)), are rooted in an era
dominated by concessionary oilfield ownership structures. In contrast to concession
ownership where reserves entitlement rests with the operator, PSC agreements provide
government regimes an entitlement to share oilfield production with producers. The
emergence of PSCs in the 1990s, means, however, that the nature and behavior of
price sensitive government claims are not reflected in SEC disclosures; nor have their
effects on disclosures been covered in previous research. I suggest that present SEC
disclosures do not reflect the potential ownership effects of price volatility on ‘bookable’
reserves. This work bridges this gap and builds upon previous work that examines the
importance of supplementary SEC disclosures in the context of concessionary arrange-
ments (Berry et al. 2004; Boone 2002; Alciatore 1993). I specifically examine reserve
6Shell is expected to reduce PSC production from nearly 50% to 30% - Anticipated PSC production
is sourced from Treynor and Cook (2004)
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entitlement structures, their response to price volatility, and the nature of variations
in SEC disclosures, comparing concession agreements to PSC contracts.
The results suggest that there should be separate PSC and concession reserve dis-
closures – based on the evidence that the two kinds of agreement behave significantly
differently in response to oil and gas price changes. In line with Rajgopal (1999), I rec-
ommend that supplementary information should disclose the effects of oil and gas price
changes on underlying reserve disclosures. Finally, given the variety of PSC terms in
use between countries, and even from field to field within the same country (Bindemann
1999), I propose that whenever PSC terms are unique, disclosures of claim terms should
be separately displayed whenever they are specifically part of the oilfield contract.
2.8. Market Literature
Many papers have sought to critique and refine the underlying approach of Fama
French. Lakonishok et al. (1994) for instance focus on growth rates of earnings and
the pricing of earnings growth,suggesting that the superior observed return from high-
book-to-market stocks are corrections of irrational pricing. Fama and French (1995)
refute this explanation and suggest that if size and BE/ME factors are the result of
rational pricing processes they are likely to be driven by factors common to expected
earnings. Fama French, are explicit and generous in their articulation of the open re-
search questions and suggest guidance for future research. In Fama and French (1995),
they identify and articulate the unanswered questions in inter-temporal asset pricing,
for which size and BE/ME are likely proxies for sensitivity to risk factors in returns.
Recent work by Petkova (2006) has begun to take up the challenge, examining pre-
dictive economic state variables that affect the yield curve and conditional distribution
of asset returns. This is certainly a valid approach but, one that overlooks the sec-
tor and country specific nature of state variables. The general expectation offered by
Petkova (2006) is that HML and SMB loadings should lose explanatory power when
predictive economic state variables are identified. I concur but suggest that future
work that add predictive state variables to Fama French will need to recognise the
two attributes of country and sector specificities. This chapter suggests that the Fama
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French Three-Factor Model for returns is likely to progress through the isolation of
sector and country specific macroeconomic state variables rather than global measures
of GDP or consumption growth. This approach combines industry importance findings
by Cavaglia et al. (2000) with country factors Bekaert and Harvey (2002). The ap-
proach suggests is that it is precisely sector specificities in state variables that provide
insights into underlying causes of risk and return premia in the Fama and French (1993)
Three-Factor Model.
Findings are aided by oil and gas sector attributes, state participation attaches to
the asset cash flows, as opposed to the corporate entity. The state participation is
calculated at or near the oilfield well-head. Country specific state oilfield participation,
in the context of Fama and French (1995), therefore, enables a direct link between field
taxation terms and corporate returns. I propose a country location factor to provide
sector insights into the first of two open questions by Fama and French (1995).
This work has two objectives. First, I build on work in chapter 4 wherein i identify
global variations in state participation in the oil and gas sector. The state participation
factor suggests that variation in global fiscal participation terms are able to forecast
future investment performance in the oil and gas sector. Second, I add a reserve location
factor (R-factor) to the Fama-French Three Factor Model as a proxy to show that the
inclusion of a sector specific state variable provides insights into causes of variation
behind size and BE/ME effects for companies with global oil and gas asset holdings.
My variable meets the Cochrane (2001) requirement of including only factors that
directly forecast future investment returns. The R-factor isolates a natural resource
sector variable that is able to explain the causes of unidentified risk and return premia
associated with the size and BE/ME factors defined by Fama and French (1995).
Candidate state variables of gross national product and consumption are noted to
have measurement problems that are overcome by isolating state asset participation
in the homogenous oil and gas sector. In this chapter, the state return from oilfield
assets is directly affected by the nature of fiscal state asset participation and draws
on prior findings in chapter 4 in which I demonstrate that the state variable of asset
participation varies widely depending on where oilfield assets are held and where reserve
replacement occurs. Specifically, emerging market assets in Non-OECD countries have
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state participation terms that differ from those applied to oilfield assets in OECD
countries. This enables the introduction of a proxy measure of state asset participation
captured by the R-factor. The use of a single sector to overcome endogeneity in the
measurement of risk and return variables has precedent in Jin and Jorion (2006) and
is used to isolate the effects of state participation in oilfield assets on the returns of
corporate oilfield operators.
Chapter 4 addresses the open Fama and French (1995) question and provide empirical
evidence in support of the effects of economic and state variables on the limits of
globalization. In the context of this market study, the R-factor considers all forms of
state participation in oilfield assets and simplifies insights into state variable effects.
I provide evidence that progressive state oilfield participation effectively limits the
corporate value of emerging market O&G investment relative to developed markets.
Findings support financial market results by Stulz (2005)proposes that all investors risk
expropriation by the state, and that outside investors additionally risk expropriation
by those who control firms and enables an analysis of conflicts implicit in regulatory,
fiscal and legal differences between global O&G markets..
In developed markets, the state generally participates in O&G assets in the form
of profit taxation, while in Non-OECD countries. State participation in the form of
Non-OECD production sharing O&G contracts are contrasted with concession state
participation structures in OECD countries. The R-factor is used to distinguish be-
tween global O&G markets and fits well with the state participation concept mooted by
Stulz (2005), who identifies redistributive taxation as a tool to facilitate expropriation
by the state.
Market findings contrast with prior equity market studies by Mehra and Prescott
(1985) and Bekaert et al. (2005) who suggest that emerging markets provide consistent
and compensatory value premia. Findings in this study mitigate against neoclassical
theory that anticipates large capital flows toward developing countries (Stulz 2005).
Emerging market O&G reserve entitlement limits the upside for company earnings,
with the potential for knock on effects into capital flows as the government participation
effect becomes apparent at higher oil prices. As oil prices increase, the relative operating
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costs of producing oil decreases and the reserve entitlement structure in O&G will
become the most important factor in future corporate cash flow entitlement.
Findings refine Fama and French (2002) and support work by Stulz (2005) providing
an important cautionary insight into limits to the corporate value of globalization in
the oil and gas sector. Evidence is provided that emerging market sovereign states
pursue their own interest more aggressively than developed market agents, effectively
limiting the corporate upside of asset values, and thereby, the benefits of globalization.
The limitation on corporate asset values in the context of progressive state participa-
tion in Non-OECD countries is capable of causing an inversion in corporate cash flow
participation. Additionally, global differences in the form of state participation are
shown to be capable of mitigating against asset valuation model convergence (Bekaert
and Harvey 2002).
This section has market oriented objectives that builds on empirical work that iden-
tifies global variations in state participation in the oil and gas sector. The state par-
ticipation factor suggests that variation in global fiscal participation terms are able
to forecast future investment performance in the oil and gas sector. Second, I add a
reserve location factor (R-factor) to the Fama-French Three Factor Model as a proxy to
show that the inclusion of a sector specific state variable provides insights into causes
of variation behind size and BE/ME effects for companies with global oil and gas asset
holdings. My variable meets the Cochrane (2001) requirement of including only fac-
tors that directly forecast future investment returns. The R-factor isolates a natural
resource sector variable that is able to explain the causes of unidentified risk and re-
turn premia associated with the size and BE/ME factors defined by Fama and French
(1995).
3. OECD vs Non–OECD Asset Pricing
Chapter Research Focus: The Potential of State
Participation to Invert Risk Return Convention
This chapter advances the low oil price paradigm advanced in prior oil and gas asset valuation studies.
Convention suggests that Non-OECD market investment, characterized by Non-OECD oil and gas
(O&G) sector assets, should provide either, commensurately lower risk or higher returns, than assets
in OECD countries. I provide specific evidence that global state agency participation terms have the
potential to invert this convention. In line with Ross (2004), I suggest that it is important to value
the future cash flows at valuation date and have regard to the price risk response of the field under
consideration.
Overview
Findings show that it matters where reserves are held, and where reserve replacement originates. Evi-
dence from 292 oilfields is used to demonstrate that if no regard is had to the differential price response
of oilfields, the characteristic of progressive state participation in Non-OECD market contracts has
the potential to negate ex ante operational oil sector advantage in Non-OECD countries. Oil price
linked Non-OECD government participation in assets is shown to occur at the expense of corporate
returns. Specifically, relative to OECD market O&G contracts, Non-OECD state participation regu-
lations are shown to have have progressive elements that limit corporate asset cash flow participation
under conditions of increasing oil prices. My O&G asset study provides evidence that global markets
contain state agent participation terms that challenge asset valuation model convergence, and under
high oil prices, potentially invert risk return convention.
Research Acknowledgements
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3.1. Background
The established equity market convention is that risk and return are positively corre-
lated in global markets. Mehra and Prescott (1985) note that when compared to OECD
markets, higher Non-OECD risks are compensated by higher return premia. The state
variable of participation in oilfield asset revenue is used to provide evidence that, under
rising oil prices, globally divergent forms of state participation have the potential to
invert this fundamental convention. In this chapter, the variable ‘state participation’
recognizes all forms of taxation and royalties as well as revenue and production shar-
ing claims against oilfields in favor of the local government. The claim interpretation
recognizes the contractual nature of state claims against oilfield assets, with corporate
producers sharing the value of residual cash flows. The isolation of economic state
variables for an extensive global sample of oilfield assets directly allows insights into
the outstanding Fama and French (1995) question relating to the effect of underlying
economic state variables on asset values.
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3.2. Research Approach
Detailed oil and gas sector data are used to analyze expected cash flows to oilfield
operators in the sector. Differential asset entitlement regulations between Non-OECD
and OECD O&G markets and standard measures of operating and fiscal efficiency
are used to compare state participation effects on OECD and Non-OECD O&G asset
values.
3.2.1. Data and Sample Selection
Detailed global information pertaining to oilfield asset risk and return exposures allows
me to compare the effects of state participation on asset values. I use the O&G industry
for which equivalent oil price exposure exists across both OECD (developed) and Non-
OECD (emerging) markets. Detailed data for oilfield reserve, production, extraction,
cost and taxation are used to overcome measurement limitations by facilitating a global
comparison of risk and return at the asset level. Through aggregation, a comparison
of sector risk and cash flow participation is undertaken at the country level.
Oilfield data are industry standard whole life field data compiled by leading energy
research house Wood Mackenzie. All data are derived from publicly available informa-
tion and operator interviews by Wood Mackenzie oil and gas research teams. Specialist
teams compile highly-detailed, full life field models, covering technical field develop-
ment, production and extraction patterns for each commercial oil and gas field. These
data contain industry standard oilfield production, oil price, detailed tax terms and
field cost data as estimated for the remaining life of the asset. The industry standard
data are typically subscribed to by all major banks and oil companies and are commer-
cially available in Wood Mackenzie’s Global Economic Model (GEM). This bottom-up
data creates a robust foundation for evaluating O&G fields and enables a comparative
global analysis.
In this chapter, I augment the random stratified sample of 211, increasing it to
292 oilfields from Gulf of Mexico (GoM), the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) and the
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), and three PSC regimes, Angola (ANG), Egypt
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Table 3.1. Data and Sample Summary
Table includes the number of fields analyzed per country and regime and the percentage of the total
population. It also reports the division between small (<100mmboe) and large (>100mmboe) fields.
All field data are provided by Wood Mackenzie GEM, containing remaining reserve estimates in a
full life field model. Values in parentheses show the actual number of fields in the selected sample.
For the following regression analysis 16 fields are excluded from the initial sample selection due
to idiosyncratic behavior attributable to large gas reserves (gas reserves are not exposed to com-
parable market risk). To compensate for these adjustments, six additional fields are selected randomly.
Regulatory Regime Population Number of Sample Fields
Total Producing % of Total <100mmboe >100mmboe
OECD Countries 615 154 (167) 25 % 94 60
Gulf of Mexico 130 41 (50) 32 % 28 13
Norwegian Cont. Shelf 105 45 (50) 43 % 19 26
UK Cont. Shelf 380 68 (67) 18 % 47 21
Non-OECD Countries 172 128 (125) 74 % 63 65
Angola 48 28 (28) 58% 11 17
Egypt 53 40 (42) 75 % 27 13
Indonesia 71 60 (55) 85 % 25 35
Total Sample Size 787 282 (292) 36 % 157 125
(EGY) and Indonesia (IDO).1 The sampling approach is informed by work by Jin and
Jorion (2006) who highlight the importance of sample selection in risk return analysis.
Selecting oilfield assets on an aggregated country and regime level within the oil and
gas sector limits the endogeneity exposures identified by Jin and Jorion (2006) in their
oil and gas sector study. Descriptive measures of the selection are presented in Table
3.1. In the study, oilfields are modeled at the “tax ring fence” level, an important factor
that allows the isolation of post-tax cash flows. Fields within a “ring fence” are all
subject to the same tax terms, a legal specificity of the O&G sector.
3.2.2. State Effects on Field Value and Stochastic Risk Measures
I model corporate and state agent participation in cash flow and risk and compare
assets between OECD and Non-OECD countries. My asset approach builds on models
by Kretzschmar and Kirchner (2007)who identify that asset values in response to price
1GoM, UKCS and NCS represent regions within the territorial waters of the USA, UK and Norway.
For improved readability and comparability to countries with PSC regimes, these concession regime
regions are also referred to by their country names.
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changes in Non-OECD countries differ from OECD countries. Non-OECD fields are
subject to progressive production sharing contract terms while OECD countries are
subject to concession terms. Whole field life annual estimates of oil and gas production,
oil price, operating costs, capital expenditure and fiscal terms are extracted at the
individual field level as at January 2006 (see Appendix A, Table A.1 for a sample
extract of actual field data). Calculations are based on proven and probable (2P)
reserves. The asset model values O&G fields based on conventional industry standard
discounted cash flows and incorporates present value calculation of operational and
market risks. I extend the whole field life model in chapter 4 to incorporate the present
value (PV l,b,h) of time variant revenues and costs for three different price decks. Risk
is modeled by the the probability of loss calculated on stochastic field present values,
defined later in this section. Oilfield reserve, production, extraction, cost and taxation
data are used to determine present values (PV ) for all fields, enabling a comparative
analysis of OECD and Non-OECD countries’ risk at the oilfield level.
All 292 fields are valued at three oil price decks of US$33.75/bbl (l), US$45/bbl and
US$90/bbl (h) with movements in value used as a measure of return, quantified by
corporate cash flow participation measured against the base deck valuation (b).2
l (LowDeck) = US$33.75/bbl
b (BaseDeck) = US$45.00/bbl
h (HighDeck) = US$90.00/bbl
(3.1)
For PV calculations the SEC prescribed discount rate of 10 percent is assumed as a








 with r = const. 10% and n = FieldLife (3.2)
2Price deck is defined as a series of future oil prices at, above or below current estimated oil prices.
3It is noteworthy that any discount premium for Non-OECD markets would significantly improve
the strength of the arguments for risk and return inversion in this work. For example, discounting
Non-OECD fields at higher rates would further reduce their net present value relative to OECD
market fields.
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The extended vector model is used to meet the first research objective and provides
insights on field cost structures. All cost variables are defined as time vectors. Present
values (PV l,b,h) of cost components are derived by multiplication of the transposed cost













opex = All operational and transport costs for the production
and extraction of oil and gas
capex = All capital costs related to investments for future
benefits and abandonment costs
opcap = opex+ capex
fiscal = All Government claims that reflects state participation in income
content of fiscal charges against field cash flows
totcost = opcap+ fiscal
The present value of field revenue PVrevenue is defined accordingly by
PVrevenue = (price • production)′ ×DF (3.4)
where the time variant vectors price and production are multiplied using the point-
product (Hadamard Product). I define price as a series (price deck) of forward oil
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prices as illustrated in Figure 3.1.4 The vector of production is defined according to
(3.5).
production =
totalproduction for OECD countriesentitledproduction for Non-OECD countries (3.5)
For OECD countries totalproduction refers to the variable annual production conces-
sions use of the total of oilfield remaining reserves. In Non-OECD countries entitled-
production applies to PSCs. Non-OECD terms vary with a contractual limit either on
their entitlement to an internal rate of return (IRR) or annual variable production.
As a consequence operators in Non-OECD areas are only entitled to a portion of total
remaining oilfield reserves, detailed insights are provided by Bindemann (2000). These
insights are combined in field valuation models with deterministic field value pre-tax
(PVpretax) and post-tax (PVposttax) at the US$45/bbl price deck defined by
PV bpretax = PV
b
revenue − PV bopcap (3.6)
PV bposttax = PV
b
revenue − PV bopcap − PV bfiscal = PV brevenue − PV btotcost (3.7)
To accommodate market risk in valuation models, I introduce oil price uncertainty.
Mean reversion is set to co-exist with spot price volatility in a refinement of Bessem-
binder et al. (1995).
Stochastic simulations (292 fields pre and post-tax) are used to measure the O&G
field response to exogenous price volatility and stochastic field risk.5 This analysis is
conducted using Monte Carlo6 simulations at the field level for the base price-deck b of
US$45/bbl. Figure 3.2 illustrates historic 30-day oil futures volatility and the current
(2006) implied 30-day oil futures volatility of 25%. Averaging over the period January
4Appendix A, Table A.1, columns 6, 7, 8 provides example insights. The price deck at US$45/bbl
starts at US$45/bbl in 2006, mean reverts to US$36.70/bbl in 2009 before increasing by inflation
set at 2.5 percent p.a. for the remainder of the field life
5‘Stochastic’ is used for oil fields whose behavior is non-deterministic in that the next state of field
value is partially but not fully determined by the previous state of valuation inputs, in this study,
the prior oil price. Annual changes in oil prices vary the state of the environment.
6I use Latin-Hypercube discipline in simulations, testing equal sides of the price distribution for 2,500
trials and 999 bins.
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Figure 3.1. Field Model Implied Oil Price Curve
This figure illustrates the movement of the future model-implied oil price derived from the individual
field data. Building on findings by Bessembinder et al. (1995), short-horizon mean reverting annual
prices are quoted for the three different initial price scenarios (US$33.75/bbl, US$45/bbl, US$90/bbl).
I incorporate recent findings by Geman (2005) and apply stochastic lognormally distributed exogenous
price volatility to each year’s price for US$45/bbl price scenario. The price downside in the lognormal
distribution is limited to US$25/bbl. The figure illustrates stochastic price volatility around the
US$45/bbl price scenario. Prices for the corresponding scenarios are described in Appendix A, Table
A.1, Columns 6 to 8.





































































































Brent 1-Month Futures Historical Volatility (1986-2006) Futures Implied Volatility (25%) Average Historic Volatility (37%)
Figure 3.2. Historic Oil Futures Price Volatility Curve
This figure illustrates historic 30-day oil futures volatility and current (2006, ivolatility.com) The
implied 30-day oil futures volatility is 25%. By contrast, for the period January 1987 to January 2006,
the average annual historic 30-day futures volatility is calculated as 37%. To provide insights into the
stochastic effects of market price uncertainty on whole life oilfield cash flows, I use a volatility figure
between these two rates, 30%.
1987 to January 2006, the annual historic 30-day futures volatility is calculated as 37%.
For the purpose of this study, a mean reverting oil price with σ = 30% price volatility
is assumed. The probability distribution function of stochastic pre- and post-tax field
value (PV xpretax, PV
x
posttax) is estimated by simulation within the field model. Each years












with µ = US$45/bbl σ = 30% (3.8)
The probability distribution function of stochastic pre- and post-tax field value (PV xpretax,
PV xposttax) is estimated by simulation within the field model.
Loss occurs when the estimated field value is below a predefined break-even point.
In this study, break-even is defined by the deterministic present value for PV bposttax at
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US$45/bbl. The benchmark of PV bposttax is applied to both pre- and post-tax stochastic
present value distributions. Probabilities of loss (Λ) for stochastic PV xpretax and PV
x
posttax
are calculated using Λ as the risk measure where PDF [PV x] represents the “best-fit”
probability distribution function of stochastic field value based on the Anderson-Darling










3.2.3. Isolating State Effects on Return and Risk Measures
To evaluate OECD and Non-OECD O&G sector performance, I subject the fields to
price changes and calculate cash flows (upside) and losses (downside) (3.10) in order
to compare regime sensitivity and price variability.
upside = PV hposttax − PV bposttax
downside = PV lposttax − PV bposttax
(3.10)
Each field has technical, geological and taxation idiosyncracies that influence field
valuation results and their interpretation. State tax terms are attached at the field
level and also linked to the oilfield’s stage of development. The regression analysis in
this study uses dummy variables to encapsulate size and state effects.
Analyses of field cost structures relative to revenue are performed. Regression models
isolate the oil price conditions under which sector risk and return conventions hold. The
expression of operating and fiscal costs as a percentage of expected revenue provides
a useful basis for analyzing the characteristics of the oil and gas fields. Relative cost
structures for the three price decks (l, b, h) are defined by PV l,b,h as a percentage of
PV l,b,hrevenue. I determine the drivers of cash flow upside for the US$45/bbl price deck
through linear (3.12) regression, using relative PV btotcost as the independent variable.
The regression model is used to provide insights into oilfield valuation for oil prices
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in the range US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl. Linear regressions on a country basis test for
regime specific trends in cash flow upside.




Additionally, dummy variables for Non-OECD regimes (Dnonoecd) and field size below
100mmboe remaining reserves (Dsize) enable differentiation between state environments
in OECD and Non-OECD markets, and large and small fields where large (small) fields
are classified as retaining more (less) than 100 mmboe of remaining reserves.




For robustness, I test for normality in the aggregate relative PV btotcost field sample
and test for interaction between the dummy variables and independent variables for
the regression analysis. Regression residuals are analyzed for heteroscedasticity. To
test for difference between descriptive sample measures t-tests are run for means.
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3.3. Empirical Analysis
3.3.1. State Participation Effects on Sector Operational Risk
Measures at US$45/bbl
Field present value (PV b,h,l) cost structures are analyzed as percentage of PV b,h,lrevenue
as between OECD and Non-OECD oilfield holdings. Ratios are calculated for the
three different price decks. This allows the isolation of the comparative pre-tax opera-
tional advantage between OECD and Non-OECD markets at each price level. Findings
demonstrate that when state participation is included, the comparative pre-tax oper-
ational advantage of Non-OECD Regimes is reversed. I use the US$45/bbl price deck
as a benchmark to illustrate that a higher total cost structure for PV btotcost results in a
greater probability of loss. The separation of pre- and post-tax cost structures isolates
the state participation effects on asset values.
Average country sector asset values at US$45/bbl are described in (3.3). Contrary
to findings by Haushalter et al. (2002), at US$45/bbl PVopex and PVcapex only comprise
18 percent and 8 percent of OECD PVrevenue respectively. Fiscal take by contrast com-
prises 47 percent of PVrevenue. This trend is mirrored in Non-OECD areas. Average
field cost present values are calculated relative to PV brevenue to derive the corresponding
relative field cost structures for PV b. Cost structures provide insight into the opera-
tional risks. Table 3.2 shows that for US$45/bbl, the average OECD market PV bopcap
is 26 percent, significantly above Non-OECD markets of 21 percent suggesting a com-
parative Non-OECD market operating advantage.
PV bfiscal in Table 3.2 highlights that in OECD countries state participation is 47
percent of PV brevenue versus 57 percent in Non-OECD. This is opposite to the higher
PV bpretax for Non-OECD markets of 79 percent compared to 74 percent for OECD mar-
kets. However, when taxation is added to operating and capital costs, the comparative
advantage in Non-OECD sector O&G oilfields is reversed where the Non-OECD market
PV btotcost increases to 78 percent compared to the OECD market average, comparatively
lower at 73 percent (3.2). This state participation effect shows that any shift in com-
parative advantage pre and post-tax between OECD and Non-OECD assets is directly
caused by state participation. Two-sided t-tests with adjustments for heteroscedas-
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ticity at the individual field level indicate highly significant differences (99% level) in
means between OECD and Non-OECD oilfield asset holdings for PV bopcap, PV
b
fiscal and




fiscal are likely to be important
independent variables in natural resource valuation.
State participation directly increases the probability of loss (Λposttax) for Non-OECD
countries. The OECD Λposttax is 20.44% versus 42.95% for Non-OECD (Table 3.2).
This cost effect on the post-tax asset value at US$45/bbl is consistent throughout the
sample. The loss effect is noteworthy in that fiscal costs comprise the greater proportion
of total costs which, in turn, directly affect Λposttax.
3.3.2. State Participation and Price Variability from US$45/bbl to
US$33.75/bbl and US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl
Price response findings findings provide insights into the effect of oil price increase on
cash flow participation in OECD and Non-OECD regimes. To provide insights into the
role of state participation in field valuation, I calculate the field values at US$33.75/bbl,
US$45/bbl and US$90/bbl. I do this to enable insights into the effect on cost ratios
and to isolate the effect of taxation regulation on asset return profiles between OECD
and Non-OECD regions. Table 3.3 illustrates a cross-sectional analysis of movements in
revenue and total cost structures for oil prices at US$33.75/bbl and US$90/bbl. OECD
costs reduce from 76 to 68 percent of total revenue over the price range in panels A
and B, compared to an increase from 78 to 80 percent over comparable ranges for
Non-OECD market fields.
Tests for difference in responses between OECD and Non-OECD assets are conducted
based on individual field data underpinning Table 3.3. Significant differences occur in
the changes in cost structures relative to PVrevenue for OECD and Non-OECD assets.
The strength and consistency of tests for difference as between OECD and Non-OECD
O&G countries are supportive of early observations by Bekaert and Harvey (2002),
that legal and fiscal environments in Non-OECD markets are likely to mitigate against
model convergence.
Figure 3.3 shows the effect of price variability on PVpretax and PVposttax for OECD
and Non-OECD markets. OECD markets show a uniform response relation between
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Table 3.3. Price variability effect on OECD and Non-OECD revenue and cost components
at US$33.75/bbl - US$90/bbl
The table columns contain average country field revenues and costs calculated at US$33.75/bbl and
US$90/bbl. Additionally, the last column shows the absolute (relative) change in PVposttax for the
two price changes. Panel A summarizes at US$33.75/bbl (l) and Panel B the US$90/bbl (h). All
absolute numbers stated in US$M. Relative cost structures presented in parentheses.
Average PVrevenue PVopex PVcapex PVfiscal PVtotcost PVpretax PVposttax ∆PVposttax
Panel A: Costs and Cost Structures as percentage of PVrevenue at $33.75/bbl
OECD 2963 695 328 1233 2256 1941 707 -359
(100 %) (23 %) (11 %) (42 %) (76 %) (65 %) (24 %) (-34 %)
GoM 2446 241 283 825 1349 1923 1097 -463
(100 %) (10 %) (12 %) (34 %) (55 %) (79 %) (45 %) (-30 %)
UKCS 1372 339 131 514 984 902 389 -194
(100 %) (25 %) (10 %) (37 %) (72 %) (66 %) (28 %) (-33 %)
NCS 5838 1646 666 2693 5005 3526 833 -515
(100 %) (28 %) (11 %) (46 %) (86 %) (60 %) (14 %) (-38 %)
Non–OECD 2471 360 310 1258 1928 1801 543 -159
(100 %) (15 %) (13 %) (51 %) (78 %) (73 %) (22 %) (-23 %)
Angola 5067 494 753 2558 3805 3820 1262 -202
(100 %) (10 %) (15 %) (50 %) (75 %) (75 %) (25 %) (-14 %)
Egypt 1424 112 68 892 1072 1244 352 -118
(100 %) (8 %) (5 %) (63 %) (75 %) (87 %) (25 %) (-25 %)
Indonesia 1957 463 264 895 1623 1229 334 -167
(100 %) (24 %) (14 %) (46 %) (83 %) (63 %) (17 %) (-33 %)
Panel B: Costs and Cost Structures as percentage of PVrevenue at $90/bbl
OECD 7800 695 328 4303 5326 6777 2474 1407
(100 %) (9 %) (4 %) (55 %) (68 %) (87 %) (32 %) (132 %)
GoM 6510 241 283 2575 3099 5986 3411 1851
(100 %) (4 %) (4 %) (40 %) (48 %) (92 %) (52 %) (119 %)
UKCS 3532 339 131 1717 2187 3062 1345 762
(100 %) (10 %) (4 %) (49 %) (62 %) (87 %) (38 %) (131 %)
NCS 15424 1646 666 9785 12097 13112 3327 1978
(100 %) (11 %) (4 %) (63 %) (78 %) (85 %) (22 %) (147 %)
Non–OECD 6347 360 310 4393 5063 5677 1284 582
(100 %) (6 %) (5 %) (69 %) (80 %) (89 %) (20 %) (83 %)
Angola 12420 494 753 9083 10330 11174 2090 626
(100 %) (4 %) (6 %) (73 %) (83 %) (90 %) (17 %) (43 %)
Egypt 3789 112 68 2687 2867 3609 922 452
(100 %) (3 %) (2 %) (71 %) (76 %) (95 %) (24 %) (96 %)
Indonesia 5218 463 264 3341 4068 4490 1150 648
(100 %) (9 %) (5 %) (64 %) (78 %) (86 %) (22 %) (129 %)






Price Developed GoM UKCS NCS Emerging Angola Egypt Indonesia
Pre-tax at US$33.75/bbl Post-tax at US$33.75/bbl Pre-tax at US$90/bbl Post-tax at US$90/bbl
Figure 3.3. Pre- and post-tax PV inversion in corporate cash flow participation in response
to oil price changes for OECD and Non-OECD asset holdings
The figure shows the relative change in PVpretax and PVposttax for OECD and Non-OECD countries.
The benchmark is US$45/bbl, the intercept. Bars below the benchmark reflect the valuation response
to price changes from US$45/bbl to US$33.75/bbl. Movement above the benchmark reflect valuation
response from US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl on the y-axis. The scale of the y-axis reflects the price upshock
from US$45/bbl (b) to US$90/bbl (h), illustrated as a 100% increase in price. The downshock to
US$33.75/bbl (l) is reflected as a 25% decrease in price (negative on y-axis). For all columns, the
x-axis reflects PV (pre and post tax) movements for individual underlying countries. Aggregates for
OECD and Non-OECD asset holdings are shown.
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PVpretax and PVposttax. For a price increase from US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl there is a sig-
nificant difference between PVpretax and PVposttax in Non-OECD regimes. Non-OECD
countries do not reflect the same difference in PV movements pre- and post-tax. Sig-
nificant potential exist between OECD and Non-OECD country responses and provide
evidence of the potential for inversion in corporate cash flow participation. Findings
suggest that regulatory and fiscal differences challenge asset valuation convergence.
When the fields are revalued at US$33.75/bbl, Table 3.3 shows that Non-OECD
markets have an 8 percent PVpretax advantage (74 percent vs 65 percent). This changes
to a PVposttax disadvantage of 2 percent (22 percent vs 24 percent) when state par-
ticipation is included. This effect is directly caused by higher levels of Non-OECD
state participation of 51 percent as compared to 42 percent in OECD countries. Figure
3.4 illustrates the component cost changes for oil price movement from US$45/bbl to
US$33.75/bbl. Relative cost structures for PVopex and PVcapex increase relative to field
revenue for OECD countries. For Non-OECD asset holdings, the decrease in oil price
actually decreases the total cost percentage, a direct result of state participation terms
that allow cost recovery by producers. The exception is Indonesia with mature pro-
duction sharing contracts recognizing that producers have completed cost recovery and
now entered flat state profit splits.
At US$90/bbl (Table 3.3), the effect of progressive state participation is more no-
ticeable. Non-OECD markets experience a 2 percent PVpretax advantage (89 percent
vs 87 percent). PVposttax, Non-OECD markets experience a 12 percent adverse swing
(20 percent vs 32 percent). Again, the reversal of the pre-tax operational advantage
in Non-OECD asset holdings is directly caused by state participation being higher (69
percent) in Non-OECD countries, compared to 55 percent in OECD countries. Findings
suggest that during periods of increasing oil prices, the progressive nature of produc-
tion sharing and their inclusion in the cost structure has a direct effect on total cost of
Non-OECD market oilfields. Insights are provided in Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 which
deconstruct the component cost changes for oil price movement from US$45/bbl to
US$33.75/bbl and US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl. The percentage of total cost for OECD
asset holdings reduces for an increase in oil price. This is because an exogenous increase
in oil price is not usually accompanied by associated increase in operating costs and
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Figure 3.4. Component Cost structure change, US$45/bbl to US$33.75/bbl
The figure shows the relative change in cost structures PVopex, PVcapex, PVfiscal and PVtotcost for
OECD and Non-OECD countries as a percentage of PVfiscal on the y-axis in response to a price
downshock from US$45/bbl (b) to US$33.75/bbl (l). The x-axis reflects cost structure movements for
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Figure 3.5. Component Cost structure change, US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl
The figure shows the relative change in cost structures PVopex, PVcapex, PVfiscal and PVtotcost for
OECD and Non-OECD countries as a percentage of PVrevenue on the y-axis in response to a price
upshock from US$45/bbl (b) to US$90/bbl (h). The x-axis reflects cost structure movements for
individual underlying countries and aggregates for OECD and Non-OECD asset holdings.
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OECD fiscal costs are not progressive. An increase in relative total cost in response to
oil price increase can therefore only be driven by fiscal participation terms. This effect
is observable for Non-OECD asset holdings, the increase in oil price actually increases
total cost, a direct result of progressive state participation. An exception is Indonesia,
which as result of its maturity as a producing country has completed the stage of cost
recovery.
3.3.3. Regression Analysis of State Effects on Cash Flow and Risk
Regression analysis is used to lift out the extent of state and operational cost structure
on the directionality of O&G sector return and risk measures. When interpreting
results, it is noteworthy that no prior academic global asset study exists that compare
OECD and Non-OECD market asset performance to the level of detail in this study.
The isolation of economic state variables also allows insights into the outstanding Fama
and French (1995) question relating to the effect of underlying economic and state
variables on asset values. The regressions analyze the effect of operational and capital
expenditure on potential field return represented by the relative cost structure for
PV btotcost and Upside respectively. Inputs are derived from the detailed field models
that are used to underpin field value variations. Regression analyses demonstrate the
progressive tax nature and limited upside for Non-OECD fields, and the higher gain for
OECD markets. This suggests a direct inversion in corporate cash flow participation
relative to OECD assets Mehra and Prescott (1985).
The regression model (3.11) analyzes the relation between static cost structures and
field performance measured by cash flow upside. The regime specific total cost effect
on cash flow upside is used in the regression model as specified in (3.11). The country
analysis provides evidence for an aggregate discussion. The regime effect loading in the
regression quantifies directionality at the country level (Table 3.4) where the OECD
grouping has a positive loading in excess of the Non-OECD grouping, reflecting the
stronger upside directionality in response to price changes for OECD countries.
Notwithstanding the high loading for OECD countries, OECD regimes also experi-
ence country factor significance at the 99% level. To capture OECD and Non-OECD
state effects I introduce a dummy variable for Non-OECD asset holdings Dnonoecd incor-
3. OECD vs Non–OECD Asset Pricing 60
Table 3.4. Regression results, cash flow upside US$45/bbl – US$90/bbl, country level
Regression results for cash flow upside directionality are based on (3.11). Fiscal cost structures are
included in relative total cost structure represented by the independent variable X1. The table presents
the key regression statistics for cash flow upside (Upside) on a country basis. Significance at a 95%
level is indicated by *, at a 99% level by ** respectively; p-values are quoted in parentheses.
Upside = α + β1X1 with X1 = PV btotcost/PV
b
revenue
Sample Size Coefficient Value t-Stat p-Value F R2
Panel A: OECD field upside US$45/bbl - US$90/bbl
OECD 131 α -0.2927 -2.0692* (0.0405) 175.2564 0.5760
β1 2.7380 13.2384** (0.0001)
GoM 41 α -0.4910 -11.9187** (0.0001) 1811.2281 0.9789
β1 3.2681 42.5585** (0.0001)
NCS 42 α -9.8643 -11.90162** (0.0001) 203.02047 0.8354
β1 13.81165 14.24853** (0.0001)
UKCS 48 α -0.8985 -8.3199** (0.0001) 478.3644 0.9140
β1 3.7653 21.8715** (0.0001)
Panel B: Non-OECD field upside US$45/bbl - US$90/bbl
Non-OECD 112 α -0.0745 -0.2178 (0.8280) 10.6528 0.0883
β1 1.4249 3.2639** (0.0015)
Angola 19 α -0.8810 -1.9664* (0.0658) 9.6455 0.3620
β1 1.7745 3.1057** (0.0064)
Egypt 38 α 0.8655 4.5942** (0.0001) 0.0957 0.0027
β1 0.0748 0.3094 (0.7588)
Indonesia 55 α -0.3906 -1.1621 (0.2504) 25.5372 0.3252
β1 2.1570 5.0534** (0.0001)
Table 3.5. Regression Results for Cash Flow Upside US$45/bbl – US$90/bbl
Regression results for cash flow upside directionality are based on (3.12). Fiscal cost structures are
included in relative total cost structure represented by the independent variable X1. I isolate effects of
fiscal regulations by using dummy variables for Non-OECD regimes (Dnonoecd) and field size (Dsize).
Significance at a 95% level is indicated by *, at a 99% level by ** respectively; p-values are quoted in
parentheses.
Upside = α + β1X1 + β2Dnonoecd + β3Dsize with X1 = PV btotcost/PV
b
revenue
Coefficient Value t-Stat P -Value F -Statistic R2
α -0.1947 -1.4077 (0.1605) 95.2384 0.5445
β1 2.5183 13.1514** (0.0001)
β2 -0.7665 -14.7374** (0.0001)
β3 0.0759 1.5763 (0.1163)
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porating findings by Kretzschmar and Kirchner (2007). A second dummy variable Dsize
isolates size effects for field with remaining reserves less than 100mmboe incorporat-
ing findings by Kretzschmar and Moles (2006). The regression model (3.12) shows the
cash flow upside response with respect to price over the range US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl.
Table 3.5 reports a positive and significant loading on X1 indicating that fields with
initially high relative total cost structures are able to cover their costs. The regression
produces a significant negative loading on Dnonoecd illustrating Non-OECD markets are
limited in the upside as they are subject to production sharing. I find a positive, al-
though not significant, loading on Dsize suggesting a limited ability of small fields to
generate higher returns on cash flow, consistent with Kretzschmar and Moles (2006).
This result is best understood by considering a field that is previously at or close to
break even in terms of its relative total cost structure. Any increase in price, in the
case from US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl, would shift the field in to a profitable position as
the incremental revenues cover cost with cash flow benefiting directly from the upside.
Table 3.5 isolates the effects of regime on cash flow upside.
Visual inspection of the data distribution at the aggregate level indicates a differ-
ent cash flow responses for OECD and Non-OECD countries (Figure 3.6). The most
important factor to highlight is that OECD assets (left column) have the ability to
experience an exponential increase in value as result of flat state participation. The
top left graph in Figure 3.6 shows distinct OECD state effects. These effects are dis-
aggregated by regime type. Columns in Figure 3.6 distinguished between OECD and
Non-OECD respectively. OECD asset holdings particularly display distinct character-
istics suggesting that the Upside in response to price movements (as measured by the
y-axis) is directionally significant. Values increase as prices increase. This is consistent
with findings at the aggregate level, except that county level de-construction leads to
increased significance in the quality of directionality. The first column of Figure 3.6
illustrates highly interesting trends. The GoM has the lowest spread of operational
cost structures ranging from approximately 45 percent to 70 percent. This results in
an average increase in cash flows between 75 percent and 150 percent as oil price in-
crease occurs. A result reflected in the GoM regime regression by a R2 of 98 percent,
the highest for the sample. The R2 for the NCS in Figure 3.6, Graph E, lifts out two
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Figure 3.6. Response of Field Upside to an Increase in Oil Price
Figure illustrates the response in cash flow upside directionality relative to total relative cost structure,
PV btotcost, x-axes, effect on (Upside), y-axes. Column 1 reflects the OECD assets characteristic of
upside participation, graph (A) shows the aggregate OECD market sample, graph (C) the GoM,
graph (E) the NCS, and graph (G) the UKCS. The OECD concession state taxation terms enables
assets to respond to oil price increases. Column 2 reflects the progressive Non-OECD state variable
effect of production sharing. The asset upside is limited, and reflected in graphs (B), (D), (F), and (H)
which display the aggregate Non-OECD market sample, Angola, Egypt, and Indonesia respectively.
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important principles; The first relates to the fact that OECD cash flows are extremely
responsive to high oil prices when the cost structure for the field is high. The second
important principle is OECD assets do not have progressive taxation and therefore
corporate owners participate in asset value upsides in response to positive price shocks.
The Non-OECD column provides an insightful counterpoint to the OECD state par-
ticipation characteristics. Progressive state participation is apparent in that the price
increase attracts progressive taxation against field values. The most notable effect
is that for Non-OECD countries the upside in the sample overview is limited. Total
field cost structures on average above 60%. At high prices, the corporate the cost of
conducting business in Non-OECD O&G sector markets is significantly above OECD
sectors, but more significantly taxation is progressive with the result that the corporate
benefit of oil price increase is limited. Figure 3.6 illustrates a distinguishing feature
in Non-OECD (in the case US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl) cash flow upside is limited by
progressive state participation. Angola reflects the same trend with a 36 percent R2.
Egypt displays the least explanatory power in its total cost structures with a R2 of 0.3
percent (Figure 3.6, Graph F). I assess residuals in order to determine heteroscedas-
ticity for regression results. OECD markets exhibit high variances between small and
large fields. In contrast Non-OECD markets show little sign of heteroscedasticity. The
analysis of the residuals confirm that OECD assets have a non linear response to oil
price variability.
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3.4. Concluding Remarks
This chapter examines the country effects on risk return characteristics between OECD
and Non-OECD oil sectors. In response to oil price increase, Non-OECD assets have
progressive taxes that increase their total cost structures. In comparison, assets in
OECD countries experience a reduction in total cost structure as oil prices increase.
My sector findings indicate that, despite an initial operational cost advantage in Non-
OECD countries, the progressive nature of state participation reverses the comparative
advantage at higher oil prices. This result shows the limits to the benefits of emerging
market investment, findings consistent with Stulz (2005). Regression results provide
empirical evidence of state effects on field valuation in response to price changes. A
significant negative effect of Non-OECD regulations on field upside is observable. These
divergent findings go some way to providing empirical support for the intuition of
Bruner et al. (2002), that regulatory differences are likely to mitigate against global
asset valuation model convergence.
This first chapter includes the effects of country specific regulatory and fiscal id-
iosyncracies anticipated by Bruner et al. (2002) and allows insights into contractual
and taxation effects on oil and gas sector asset prices. Evidence of potential risk and
return inversion as between OECD and Non-OECD market oilfield assets is provided.
State participation specificities are found to mitigate against model convergence. I
suggest that it is insufficient to analyze natural resource assets in Non-OECD markets
while ignoring state participation (Bekaert and Harvey 2002). There is need for future
bottom-up studies of emerging market assets holdings and whether market idiosyn-
crasies are reflected in lower stock returns. This expanded work is undertaken in the
following two chapters where field simulations are undertaken at each price level. In the
oil and gas sector my ex ante expectation is that high oil prices will begin to increase
value divergence between emerging and developed market asset carrying values.
Given the importance of the role of asset values in the book to market measure
proposed by Fama and French (1992) the expectation is that as oil prices increase,
corporates with high Non-OECD asset holdings are likely to begin to experience share
price under-performance relative to corporates with low Non-OECD asset holdings, this
expectation is tested in the final chapter of this thesis. Based on bottom-up evidence,
3. OECD vs Non–OECD Asset Pricing 65
state contractual participation is shown to be extraneous to the asset and potentially
capable of inverting the risk return convention proposed by Mehra and Prescott (1985).
I suggest that valuation model convergence will, to a large extent, be driven by empirical
studies that provide both the insights into differences in underlying Non-OECD assets
and method for dealing with global idiosyncracies. For the purposes of this and the
following two chapters, the economic state variable framework proposed by Fama and
French (1995) enables a robust method for dealing with global differences in state
participation in oilfield assets. The following two chapters allow further insights into
the limits to the corporate benefits of globalization in the context of sector assets.
4. Stochastic Asset Analysis
Chapter Research Focus
Oil price expectations and volatility levels directly and differentially affect asset pricing in the sector. I
use global oil and gas (O&G) sector assets to expand the previous chapter demonstrating that oilfields
operated under concession and production sharing contracts respond differently to oil price shocks.
This chapter expands the previous valuation and risk chapter, as stochastic analyses are undertaken
at three oil prices, revising findings from prior low oil price studies.
Overview
This chapter build on the fact that for financiers of global oil transactions, it matters what expectations
are for oil price. Under low oil prices, the gap between OECD and NON-OECD assets is small, but di-
verges under high oil prices as result of the progressive nature of Non-OECD state agent participation.
I subject 211 oilfield assets to price shocks, introduce stochastic price volatility, and measure value
and risk response at each price level. This asset based approach allows insights into reserve responses
to oil sector price risk. Oilfield valuation risk metrics are used to provide evidence that country spe-
cific reserve ownership contracts cause heterogenous value response to price changes. I conclude that
the valuation of natural resource assets requires complete information about the price sensitivities of
operator entitlement structures, and that under upward oil prices, ceteris paribus, OECD assets have
more upside for corporate field participants.
Research Acknowledgements
This chapter is based on a conference paper accepted at the 2007 Journal of Banking and Finance:
Gavin L. Kretzschmar and Axel Kirchner, Commodity Price Shocks and Economic State Variables –
Empirical Insights into Asset Valuation and Risk in the Oil and Gas Sector, (Kretzschmar and Kirchner
2007). The Real Options implications of these findings are published together with my supervisor Dr
Moles in Kretzschmar and Moles (2006).
4. Stochastic Asset Analysis 67
4.1. Background
Finance theory recognizes that efficient markets require sufficient information to enable
the valuation of assets and their associated risks. I extend the previous chapter and
provide insights into differing forms of oilfield contracts analyzing their price responses
over an extensive range of oil prices, from US$22.5/bbl to US$90/bbl.
Stochastic value distributions are shown to be directly affected by oilfield asset con-
tracts. Additionally, risk, as measured by simulations of expected value, kurtosis,
standard deviation, and price response delta are directly affected by regulations that
pertain to asset ownership. Price effects, not observable at low prices, affect PSC and
concession field asset behaviors differently at higher prices. Evidence is found that
constant equity value Beta results in prior oil and gas studies may not hold at high oil
prices. This chapter provides insights into difficulties of valuing cash flows noted by
Ross (2004), intrinsic asset values are a function of expected future cash flows. They are
also a function of the uncertainty associated with them. In Oil and gas, my findings
demonstrate that under conditions of price volatility, entitlement to concession and
production sharing cash floes, and the risks associated with them, are not homogenous.
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4.2. Why Asset Value Responses to Commodity Price
Changes are Important
Oilfield contracts are material in determining asset valuation response to oil price move-
ments. Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) account for between 30% and 50% of
global reserves. As exploration opportunities decrease, corporate reserve replacement
is increasingly set to come from regions with production sharing with production based
government take. In an application of the agency problem of state ruler discretion pro-
posed by Stulz (2005), state representatives increase state welfare by participating in
oilfield asset upside by reducing corporate asset returns. Total, ENI and Shell already
have PSC reserves in excess of 30% of current holdings, with each of these companies
expected to increase PSC holdings to 40% and 50% in the next ten years. Exxon’s
PSC production is for instance expected to move from a low PSC base of 18% to 36%
by 2010 and other oil majors show similar trends (Treynor and Cook 2004). Oilfield
data is used to show that as production sharing oilfields come onstream, the heteroge-
nous response of asset holdings will be important in pricing asset value and risk. The
findings are likely to have wide application in the sector.
Firm level risk studies in the O&G sector have been characterized by two factors.
First, research has tended to relate to a period of oil prices between US$18/bbl and
US$35/bbl, and market volatility characteristics were low. Haushalter et al. (2002)
and Jin and Jorion (2006) for instance focus on the effect of price volatility for periods
covering very low prices for oil (1992–1994) and (1998–2001) respectively.
Second, due to a lack of ownership disclosures, prior studies have been unable to iso-
late the influence of oilfield ownership structures on market risk. Data attributes allow
an extension of prior work by examining O&G asset ownership behavior in volatile,
high price commodity markets.
The research objectives address the above two characteristics of prior studies. First I
examine the O&G assumption of homogenous oil reserve entitlement response to price
shocks. All 211 oilfields are valued at three oil price levels; US$22.5/bbl, US$45/bbl,
US$90/bbl. Stochastic simulations are introduced to isolate the influence of oilfield
ownership structures on market risk at each price level. Secondly, I address the general
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lack of attention given to price varying asset responses in prior studies. In practice,
isolating the oil price response of producer asset holdings is particularly difficult where
oilfield cash flows are subject to the simultaneous effects of complex and undisclosed
ownership contracts and market uncertainties. This price effect is discussed in depth
by Kretzschmar et al. (2007), and directly affects the valuation response of oil pro-
duction and oil reserves. By conducting analyses over a price range of US$22.5/bbl
to US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl I isolate the response ranges that cause progressive PSC
contractual clauses to affect valuation response.
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4.3. Research Approach
4.3.1. Global Sample of 211 Oilfield Assets
Differences in price responses characteristics between concessions and PSC assets are
illustrated using a comparative analyses across a global sample of oilfield assets. Fields
with remaining reserves below the threshold of 5 mmboe are omitted due to idiosyn-
cratic responses caused by abandonment costs at the end of each field’s life cycle. The
total proportional amounts of fields per regime and country represented by the sample
are depicted in Table 4.1. The cross-section of field data represents fields with varying
remaining reserves ranging from 5 million barrels of oil equivalent (mmboe) up to 7042
mmboe. Fields in the UKCS subject to Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) are omitted
as they pay special taxation premia. From an available population of 440 producing
oil fields, the sample of 211 fields is selected comprising 103 fields from three conces-
sion regimes; the Gulf of Mexico (GoM), the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) and the
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), and 108 fields from three PSC regimes, Angola
(ANG), Egypt (EGY) and Indonesia (IDO). Country and size strata contain an amount
of fields relative to their proportional representation within the population, thus ensur-
ing representativeness of the selection. To preserve statistical significance for country
analyses, the strata comprise at least 29 fields per country.1 The stratification and size
of the sample allows detailed and extensive insights into regime and country asset price
response behavior.
An example of whole life field data is illustrated for a GoM field in Appendix A,
Table A.2. To my knowledge, no other academic study of oilfield asset behavior has
analyzed samples of a similar size. The six global oil and gas regimes were selected
for their fiscal homogeneity. The field valuations are conducted as at January 2006.
According to research by Kretzschmar and Moles (2006), size of remaining reserves is a
key determinant and significantly impacts a field’s behavior. Hence, in line with their
findings, fields with remaining reserves below 60mmboe were categorized as being small
as opposed to large fields yielding reserves of at least 60mmboe.
1A full list of fields selected is available from the authors on request.
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Table 4.1. Description of Randomly Selected Stratified Sample by Regime and Country
This table describes the selection for 211 producing oil fields. The percentage of total field population
is calculated on the basis of the sample relative to the total number of fields per country. PRT
fields in the UKCS and fields with remaining reserves below 5mmboe have been excluded from the
population due to idiosyncratic effects. The table additionally reports the number of fields with
reserves below and above 60mmboe.
Number of Percentage of Total Number of Fields with Reserves
Observations Field Population below 60mmboe above 60mmboe
Concession Regimes 103
Gulf of Mexico 31 32% 24 7
UK Cont. Shelf 43 27% 35 8
Norwegian Cont. Shelf 29 43% 8 21
PSC Regimes 108
Angola 29 100% 11 18
Indonesia 43 91% 18 25
Egypt 36 88% 23 13
Total Sample Size 211
4.3.2. Research Objectives
A comprehensive sample allows differentiation between concession and PSC asset price
response behavior under commodity price uncertainty for oilfields ‘in production’. The
existence of low technical and exploration risk for producing fields enables a view of
asset responses to oil price changes in isolation of factors of production uncertainty.
Also, the sample permits detection of country-specific cost structure and entitlement
effects that could otherwise challenge the generalization of obtained results. This asset
based approach offers a distinctive advantage over single-field examples or case studies.
Tax terms are field- and ownership structure specific. Contractual terms for each field
are embedded in models, allowing the simulation of effects that could have implications
on risk management and hedging strategies.
Using detailed field models, I set benchmark valuations at US$45/bbl. Exogenous
price shocks are approximated for each field by valuing them under oil prices ranging
from US$22.5/bbl and US$90/bbl (relative range of 400%). Three initial price scenarios
are analyzed to capture the fluctuations in valuation and cost structure for each field.
This is done by revaluing field assets at each price scenario, US$22.5/bbl, US$45/bbl
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and US$90/bbl. The US$22.5/bbl valuation covers periods of low oil prices and low
exogenous price volatility comparable to that analyzed by Jin and Jorion (2006) and
Haushalter et al. (2002). I extend their studies by investigating field value responses to
a +100% price up-shock from US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl. I also test field value responses
to price down-shocks by −50% relative to the US$45/bbl benchmark. This split of the
analysis into two sub intervals allows a test of whether asymmetries in price responses
can be identified. A deterministic present value analysis gives important insights into
how oil fields respond in general to exogenous price shocks.2
The fields’ ability to cope with market price uncertainty is analyzed by introducing
oil price volatility for each price scenario at the asset level. I simulate each field at
each price scenario (211 fields at US$45/bbl, US$22.5/bbl, US$90/bbl) pre- and post-
tax. This allows the extraction of pre- and post-tax risk information about the expected
mean value of the field, the standard deviation around the mean, skewness and kurtosis.
These descriptive measures allow a comparison of the regime effects of exogenous price
volatility at each price scenario.
4.3.3. Whole Life Field Model
I develop a whole life oilfield valuation model based on the detailed remaining life field
data provided by Wood Mackenzie. The model is driven by remaining asset estimates
of components affecting field value; production (Production), price (Price), cost (Cost)
and taxation terms (Tax) under both concession and PSC regimes. Estimates are
annualized.
CashF lowt = Productiont × Pricet − Costt − Taxt (4.1)
with
Productiont =
TotalProductiont for Concession RegimesEntitledProductiont for PSC Regimes (4.2)
2I use the term ‘deterministic’ as representing a present value computation for the oilfield field asset,
that given an initial state of valuation of the field, will produce the same final value when given
the same valuation inputs
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and
Pricet = Market price per bbloe t, subject to exogenous volatility
Costt = OPEXt + CAPEXt
Taxt = ProfitOilt × taxrate
(4.3)
Oilfield present values (PV) as to January 2006 are computed based on discounted
annual cash flows (CashFlow) at time t with a constant time invariant annual discount
rate of 10%.3 For pre-tax present values (PreTaxPV ), zero taxes with Taxt = 0 ∀ t are
assumed in (4.1). Post-tax oilfield present value estimates (PostTaxPV ) are subject to
the corresponding taxation rules.
Foreign oil companies (FOC) in concession regimes are entitled to total remaining
reserves (TotalProductiont) , as opposed to FOCs in PSC regimes. The annual entitled









TotalProductiont × Pricet × Uplift−Deprt +OPEXt
(4.5)
whereas the resulting Profit Oil share of total profit after cost recovery is subject to the
foreign oil company’s contractual agreements. In the case of an internal rate of return
(IRR) contract with a specified IRR%, the achievable annually compounded rate of
return (ROR) is measured recursively by
RORIRRt = ROR
IRR
t−1 × (100% + IRR) + CashF lowt (4.6)
Together with
TotalProfitt = TotalProductiont × Pricet − CostOilt, (4.7)
3A discount rate of 10% p.a. is recommended by FASB supplemental disclosures required by SFAS
No. 69 (FASB 1982) and applied to all discounted cash flow calculations in this paper.
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the FOC’s Profit Oil share is defined by specified profit splits. For a typical Angolan
field, (4.8) shows the progressive nature of staged profit splits.
ProfitOilt =

75% TotalProfitt if ROR
15%
t < 0
65% TotalProfitt if ROR
15%
t ≥ 0 > ROR25%t
45% TotalProfitt if ROR
25%
t ≥ 0 > ROR30%t
25% TotalProfitt if ROR
35%
t ≥ 0 > ROR40%t




The proposed field model enables the computation of the present value price response
by varying annual exogenous oil prices in (4.2) on a field basis. The remaining depen-
dent variables Production, Cost and Tax are then populated according to consensus
estimates from oil field operators.
4.3.4. Field Valuation and Risk Analysis
I run separate Monte Carlo simulations at the field level. To estimate frequency distri-
butions of field present value responses pre- and post-tax, I perform 1266 Monte Carlo
simulations (211 fields at three price scenarios, pre- and post-tax) with 2500 trials to
estimate statistical response measures for each field.4 Although discrete deterministic
analyses provides preliminary insights, it fails to capture important dynamics in physi-
cal asset responses to price volatility. As stochastic simulation enables risk attribution
at its points of origin, discrete price shocks are extended to price shocks with stochastic
price volatility as illustrated in Figure 4.1. Following insights into the term structure
of oil futures prices for the period January 1982 to December 1991, by Bessembinder
et al. (1995) I model oil price as a mean reverting function but accommodate recent
findings by Geman (2005), who suggests that arithmetic Brownian motion prevails for
the period January 1999 – October 2004. I combine both insights by amalgamating a
short-horizon mean reverting oil price trajectory (followed by constant inflation adjust-
4Monte Carlo simulations using the Latin-Hypercube sampling method with 999 bins are performed
over the log-normal price distribution. For all countries apart from the UKCS, each individual field
is run with 2500 trials. UKCS fields, in turn, demand intensive and complex taxation calculations
and half year cash flow data. Computational intensity forced a reduction of trials to 1000. The
error terms remain less than 1% for all simulations
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ment) with annual lognormally distributed stochastic price volatility. These random
price fluctuations are applied to each annualised step of cash flow calculation. I perform
this process at each level of price jump as schematically displayed in Figure 4.1 for the
price scenario of US$45/bbl. For stochastic whole life field simulation, exogenous price
volatility follows the continuous probability distribution function of a lognormal price
distribution.





exp(−(lnxt − µt)2/2σ2t ) (4.9)
The distribution parameters (4.10) for the mean µt are linked to the set of three different
initial price scenarios for µ0 at time t = 0. Expected future prices µt follow the
corresponding mean reverting curve for time t (years) as depicted in Figure 4.1. Future
mean reverting oil prices are derived from the individual field data. A constant relative
standard deviation σt of 30% is applied to retain comparability between simulations.
5
Down-Shock Price Scenario µ0 = US$22.5/bbl σt = 30%
Base Case Price Scenario µ0 = US$45/bbl σt = 30%
Up-Shock Price Scenario µ0 = US$90/bbl σt = 30%
(4.10)
Stochastic simulation enables analysis of field responses to changes in price together
with variations in moments relative to price movement. I provide information about
how the descriptive parameters (mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis) of the esti-
mated present value frequency distribution functions react to changes in oil price and
induced exogenous volatility. Insights from cross-sectional analyses are expected to
have distinct implications regarding risk management and hedging strategies.
5Price volatility is based on the one month FOB futures contract implied volatility – for the period
January 1986 to January 2006. Annualised volatility showed two distinct periods, pre 2000 (low
volatility) and post 2000 (high – above 35%) (Geman 2005). I select 30% for this study.
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22.5$/bbl (SD=20%) 45$/bbl (SD=20%) 90$/bbl (SD=20%)3 33
Figure 4.1. Field Model Implied Oil Price Curve
This figure illustrates the movement of the future model-implied oil price derived from the individual
field data. Building on findings by Bessembinder et al. (1995), short-horizon mean reverting annual
prices are quoted for the three different initial price scenarios (US$22.5/bbl, US$45/bbl, US$90/bbl).
I incorporate recent findings by Geman (2005) and apply stochastic lognormally distributed exogenous
price volatility to each year’s price for all price scenarios under consideration. The figure illustrates
stochastic price volatility around the US$45/bbl price scenario as a stylized example, annual stochastic
simulations are performed for all three scenarios. Prices for the corresponding scenarios are described
in Appendix A, Table A.2, Columns 6, 7 and 8. Only one column is applied at a time.
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4.4. Oilfield Price Response Results
4.4.1. Empirical Asset Valuation Insights and Price Response
Analysis
In this section I report insights into whether oilfield asset price responses are specific to
ownership contract type or whether oilfield values and risk measures respond heteroge-
neously to price shocks and volatility. As reported in prior firm level studies, there is
a sensitivity of equity values to changes in oil price uncertainty (Strong 1991). Differ-
ential response rates at the asset level would provide evidence that firm value studies
that treat O&G reserve responses as a homogenous calculation (Jin and Jorion 2006)
may not hold across all price ranges. I test the response to price variability and use an
oil price range of US$22.5/bbl to US$90/bbl to straddle the benchmark of US$45/bbl.
The lower part of range covers periods of low oil prices and low oil price volatility
comparable to previous studies by Jin and Jorion (2006) and Haushalter et al. (2002).
Fields in different regimes with identical cost structures respond differently to oil
price variability, an insight that extends previous findings by Haushalter et al. (2002).
Present value responses suggest that oilfields are directly influenced by the tax regime
that they are subject to, a factor not covered in previous finance studies. Table 4.2
illustrates that GoM and Angola have, on average, identical pre-tax PV cost structures
of 60% at the US$22.5/bbl price scenario. When oil price increases to US$90/bbl (a 4
times increase), the GoM pre-tax PV increases from US$M 395.37 to US$M 2377.77,
an oil price response of 6 times. The value increase for Angola over the same oil price
range is comparable with change in pre-tax PV of 6 times (US$M 1792 to US$M 10796).
Value responses are comparable pre-tax. The comparison changes post-tax, and this
is where the differences in entitlement structures are most apparent for oilfield assets.
Assets in the GoM have an average post-tax PV response rate of 6.3 times(US$M 216.55
to US$M 1353.68). The progressive Angolan regime shows a price response of 3.1 times
(US$M 658.67 to US$M 2017.22).
The second asset response insight occurs when I compare UKCS pre- and post-tax
present values for a change in price from US$22.5/bbl to US$90/bbl. Pre-tax PV price
response is 7.67 times (US$M 266 to US$M 2041) and 7.7 times (US$M 138 to US$M
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Table 4.2. Average Cost Structure of Randomly Selected Stratified Sample by Regime
and Country
Panel A describes the absolute and relative cost and tax structure for producing oil fields at an
oil price of US$22.5/bbl. Panel B and Panel C reflect the same data at prices of US$45/bbl and
US$90/bbl respectively. Each panel reflects concession (GoM, UKCS, NCS) and PSC (ANG, IDO,
EGY) regimes separately. Absolute figures are presented in US$M.
Average Gross Revenue OPEX CAPEX PreTaxPV Tax PostTaxPV
Panel A: Price of US$22.5/bbl
GoM 661.85 122.90 143.57 395.37 178.82 216.55
(100%) (19%) (21%) (60%) (27%) (33%)
UKCS 598.19 234.64 97.37 266.18 128.08 138.10
(100%) (38%) (16%) (44%) (21%) (23%)
NCS 4277.39 1773.51 612.52 1891.36 1592.82 298.54
(100%) (42%) (14%) (44%) (37%) (7%)
ANG 2996.97 478.36 726.59 1792.03 1133.36 658.67
(100%) (16%) (24%) (60%) (38%) (22%)
IDO 1405.95 380.36 297.11 728.48 524.96 203.52
(100%) (27%) (21%) (52%) (37%) (14%)
EGY 932.71 106.40 67.94 758.36 544.08 213.28
(100%) (12%) (7%) (81%) (58%) (23%)
Panel B: Price of US$45/bbl
GoM 1325.20 122.90 143.57 1058.72 462.21 598.16
(100%) (9%) (11%) (80%) (35%) (45%)
UKCS 1176.66 234.64 97.37 844.65 399.74 444.91
(100%) (20%) (8%) (72%) (34%) (38%)
NCS 8439.08 1773.51 612.52 6053.04 4658.83 1394.21
(100%) (21%) (7%) (72%) (55%) (17%)
ANG 6000.78 478.36 726.59 4795.83 3383.66 1412.17
(100%) (8%) (12%) (80%) (56%) (24%)
IDO 2582.68 380.36 297.11 1905.22 1356.33 548.89
(100%) (14%) (12%) (74%) (53%) (21%)
EGY 1864.41 106.40 67.94 1690.06 1238.62 450.44
(100%) (5%) (4%) (91%) (66%) (24%)
Panel C: Price of US$90/bbl
GoM 2644.25 122.90 143.57 2377.77 1024.08 1353.68
(100%) (5%) (5%) (90%) (39%) (51%)
UKCS 2373.81 234.64 97.37 2041.80 977.46 1064.34
(100%) (10%) (4%) (86%) (41%) (45%)
NCS 16762.45 1773.51 612.52 14376.42 10875.38 3501.04
(100%) (10%) (4%) (86%) (65%) (21%)
ANG 12001.55 478.36 726.59 10796.60 8779.38 2017.22
(100%) (4%) (6%) (90%) (73%) (17%)
IDO 5125.15 380.36 297.11 4447.69 3201.09 1246.60
(100%) (7%) (6%) (87%) (62%) (24%)
EGY 3727.81 106.40 67.94 3553.47 2669.58 882.88
(100%) (3%) (2%) (95%) (72%) (24%)
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Table 4.3a. Relative Present Value Oil Price Responses (Pre-Tax compared to Post-Tax)
Panel A (Table 4.3a) describes relative price response for pre- and post-tax present values for a
relative change in oil price over the range of US$22.5/bbl to US$90/bbl. Panel B and Panel C (Table
4.3b) reflect the same data at price changes from US$45/bbl to US$22.5/bbl and US$45/bbl to
US$90/bbl respectively. Each panel reflects concession (GoM, UKCS, NCS) and PSC (ANG, IDO,
EGY) regimes separately. The existence of significant differences between pre- and post-tax responses
is verified through paired 2-tailed t-tests run at the field level of the selected sample. Significance at
a 95% level is indicated by *, at a 99% level by ** respectively; p-values are quoted in parentheses.
Observations Reserves ∆ Pre-Tax PV ∆ Post-Tax PV t-test
Panel A: Price change from US$22.5/bbl to US$90/bbl in Relative Terms
GoM 31 all fields 1.5369 1.5975 (0.7920)
24 <60mmboe 1.3354 1.2928 (0.1257)
7 >60mmboe 1.3851 1.3622 (0.9454)
UKCS 43 all fields 1.9603 1.9696 (0.3489)
35 <60mmboe 2.7973 5.0117 (0.3268)
8 >60mmboe 1.6881 1.4836 (0.3653)
NCS 29 all fields 1.9425 2.9970 (0.3116)
8 <60mmboe 3.0010 5.7150 (0.5258)
21 >60mmboe 1.9291 2.9696 (0.3328)
ANG 29 all fields 1.5397 0.7827 (0.1476)
11 <60mmboe 1.4452 0.9873 (0.0699)
18 >60mmboe 1.5434 0.7798 (0.2673)
IDO 43 all fields 1.5603 1.5653 (0.6793)
18 <60mmboe 1.9156 1.6202 (0.3293)
25 >60mmboe 1.5432 1.5621 (0.2272)
EGY 36 all fields 1.1975 1.0579 (0.0384)*
23 <60mmboe 1.1978 1.0452 (0.1307)
13 >60mmboe 1.1974 1.0598 (0.1783)
1063.34) respectively. This greater sensitivity and price response is directly in response
to higher oil prices allowing a coverage of higher costs in UKCS fields.
Table 4.3a measures the relative change in PVs for a relative change in price from
US$22.5/bbl to US$90/bbl. The t-test estimates the significance of the difference be-
tween pre-tax PV price response and post-tax PV price response. At the 95% signifi-
cance level, difference can only be observed for one country, Egypt. When I separate
the price response analysis into two ranges (Table 4.3b), it is apparent that the price
response is asymmetrical and significant differences are obtained for both ranges.
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Table 4.3b. Relative Present Value Oil Price Responses (Pre-Tax compared to Post-Tax)
Observations Reserves ∆ Pre-Tax PV ∆ Post-Tax PV t-test
Panel B: Price change from US$45/bbl to US$22.5/bbl (relative ∆ for 1% change in price)
GoM 31 all fields 0.7469 0.7241 (0.3361)
24 <60mmboe 0.8304 0.8483 (0.3433)
7 >60mmboe 0.8018 0.8112 (0.6682)
UKCS 43 all fields 0.6303 0.6208 (0.0105)*
35 <60mmboe 0.4866 0.2874 (0.0117)*
8 >60mmboe 0.6972 0.7620 (0.5571)
NCS 29 all fields 0.6249 0.4282 (0.0389)*
8 <60mmboe 0.4366 0.2141 (0.1928)
21 >60mmboe 0.6284 0.4326 (0.0218)*
ANG 29 all fields 0.7473 0.9329 (0.8561)
11 <60mmboe 0.7736 0.7037 (0.8102)
18 >60mmboe 0.7463 0.9371 (0.6153)
IDO 43 all fields 0.7647 0.7416 (0.0815)
18 <60mmboe 0.6318 0.6625 (0.2139)
25 >60mmboe 0.7725 0.7467 (0.1890)
EGY 36 all fields 0.8974 0.9470 (0.6295)
23 <60mmboe 0.8973 0.9459 (0.4200)
13 >60mmboe 0.8975 0.9471 (0.8983)
Panel C: Price change from US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl in Relative Terms
GoM 31 all fields 1.1229 1.1315 (0.3422)
24 <60mmboe 1.0848 1.0728 (0.3505)
7 >60mmboe 1.0864 1.0810 (0.5864)
UKCS 42 all fields 1.2087 1.1961 (0.0567)
35 <60mmboe 1.3316 1.4089 (0.0560)
8 >60mmboe 1.1514 1.1060 (0.9973)
NCS 29 all fields 1.1875 1.2556 (0.1247)
8 <60mmboe 1.2817 1.1970 (0.3377)
21 >60mmboe 1.1858 1.2568 (0.0182)*
ANG 29 all fields 1.1256 0.7142 (0.0000)**
11 <60mmboe 1.0938 0.6797 (0.0000)**
18 >60mmboe 1.1268 0.7149 (0.0000)**
IDO 43 all fields 1.1672 1.1356 (0.7144)
18 <60mmboe 1.1841 1.0500 (0.0168)*
25 >60mmboe 1.1662 1.1411 (0.3469)
EGY 36 all fields 1.0513 0.9800 (0.0000)**
23 <60mmboe 1.0514 0.9672 (0.0000)**
13 >60mmboe 1.0513 0.9820 (0.0492)*
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For the range from US$45/bbl to US$22.5/bbl, a range comparable to the prices cov-
ered by Haushalter (2000), Rajgopal (1999) and Jin and Jorion (2006), a 1% downward
change in oil price leads to a relative drop in post-tax PV for all assets. When prices
fall, concession pre-tax PV respond to a 1% decrease in price by a PV decrease of 0.75%
in GoM, 0.63% in UKCS and 0.62% in NCS. For PSC regimes, pre-tax PV respond
to a 1% decrease in price by a PV decrease of 0.75% in Angola, 0.76% in Indonesia
and 0.90% in Egypt. Significant changes from pre- to post-tax response (relative to oil
price movement) are experienced in the UKCS and NCS as prices go down. For PSC
regimes, pre- to post-tax changes are relatively insensitive to falling oil prices, reflected
in the 0.93% post-tax change for Angola showing little variation out of line with oil
price changes.
Under upward price conditions, measured by a move from US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl,
response rate is 1.3 for the GoM. This field value response is asymmetrical and approx-
imately 1.8 times greater than the relative response under downward price conditions
(0.72). For Angola, upward price movements see a relative change in post-tax PV from
0.9 under downward shocks to 0.7 under upward shocks, indicating an asymmetrical
PSC present value response. PSC fields share less in the asset value increase caused
by the change in price. Asset responses under high oil prices are significantly different
between pre- and post-tax for PSC regimes. This is indicative of progressive production
sharing contracts that result in government participation in the oil field when agreed
returns have been earned by the operator (see Kretzschmar et al. 2007). The exception
is Indonesia where a number of mature fields have already completed their cost recov-
ery. Flat profit oil splits in the early Indonesian production sharing contracts cause
fiscal behavior similar to concessions.
4.4.2. Response Analysis under Stochastic Price Volatility
Differences for Changes in Price
The above deterministic analysis indicates that pre- and post-tax PVs behave differ-
ently in response to price changes for both contractual regimes. When oilfields are
simulated I also observe distinct differences between pre- and post-tax simulation be-
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havior. Figure 4.2 links pre-tax PV with post-tax PV in the top left and right chart for
GoM and Angola respectively. Pre-tax results for both GoM and Angola respond in
a comparably linear fashion for price scenarios under consideration. Pre-tax response
rates are characterized by the steeper gradient for Angola, indicative of higher initial
CAPEX overcome by lower ongoing OPEX in Angolan fields (Haushalter 2000). The
flatter gradient in the Angolan post-tax PV response curve is attributable to progres-
sive profit splits particularly at higher prices. Tax take as a percentage of gross revenue
moves for GoM from 27% at US$22.5/bbl to 35% US$45/bbl up to 39% at US$90/bbl.
Angola tax take increases from 38% at US$22.5/bbl to 56% US$45/bbl to 73% at
US$90/bbl (see Table 4.2 for numerical values).
A comparison of stochastic simulations at US$22.5/bbl shows a distinctive overlap in
the lower tail of the pre-tax present value frequency distribution and the upper tail of
the corresponding post-tax PV frequency distribution. I illustrate this using the GoM
and Angolan field as depicted in the center graphs in Figure 4.2. At low oil prices of
US$22.5/bbl, these characteristics are attributable to low tax-loss offset ratios (Lund
2000). When comparing the overlay charts at US$22.5/bbl and US$90/bbl (center
and bottom charts in Figure 4.2), it is apparent that pre- and post-tax frequency
distributions for the GoM exhibit a similar shape, reflecting the linear tax rate of
concession regimes. In the case of Angola the same pre- and post-tax ‘concession’
symmetry is reflected at US$22.5/bbl. PSC fields at low prices are likely to remain in
the stage of cost recovery without triggering progressive profit splits. The distinctive
and progressive nature of PSC regimes becomes apparent at high prices. These are
depicted in the overlay chart for the Angolan field at US$90/bbl. The distance from the
pre-tax mean is influenced by the tax rate and the difference between the distribution
means pre- and post-tax.
Table 4.4 highlights the progressive nature of PSC regimes at higher oil prices. A
comparison of concession and PSC Post-Tax
Pre-Tax
in Panels A, B and C indicate a marginally
increasing trend in mean for concession post-tax PV. This is in sharp contrast to a
degressive trend for PSC fields. When the trend in mean is read together with trends in
standard deviation and distribution-width, it is apparent that concession ratios of 38%
to 35% remain fairly consistent for all three price scenarios. For PSCs the progressive
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Figure 4.2. Price Response Connection between Deterministic Present Values and
Stochastic Simulations
This figure displays in the left column the connection between deterministic and stochastic present
values pre- and post-tax for the Gulf of Mexico. The top left chart describes deterministic country
average pre- and post-tax compared over the three price scenarios (The plot points marked on the
graphs represent the pre- and post-tax PVs at US$22.5/bbl, US$45/bbl and US$90/bbl). Then the
center and bottom left overlay charts describe pre- and post-tax simulation results at a year-end price
scenarios of US$22.5/bbl and US$90/bbl for a representative GoM field. The movement between
the US$22.5/bbl and US$90/bbl stochastic graphs reflect simulated oilfield response to the combined
effects of exogenous price shocks, price volatility and taxation terms. The right column depicts results
for Angola and a comparable Angolan field respectively.
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tax effect on the trend in standard deviation and width results in a relative tightening
of distribution bandwidth.
A comparison of the 633 detailed post-tax simulation results for three price scenarios
indicate price variant effects of field size and contractual regime. Skewness measures
at US$22.5/bbl suggest that NCS, Angola and Indonesia exhibit similar cross-sectional
characteristics displaying a skewness measure below 0.1 approximating normality. Sim-
ulating post-tax PVs at US$45/bbl results in skewness for NCS (0.34) and Indonesia
(0.31) converging to approximating those obtained for UKCS (0.33) and Egypt (0.35)
respectively. Angola, however, shows a distinctive shift towards negative skewness
−0.18 caused by extremely high progressive taxes for small fields in Angola −0.63.
This effect is overridden for the Angolan sample where small field effects are compen-
sated for by large field positive skewness.
To provide granularity I summarize pairwise field movements between key abso-
lute descriptive metrics for each regime. Table 4.5 displays tests for differences in
changes of stochastic simulation results for post-tax PV frequency distributions at three
price intervals (US$22.5/bbl to US$90/bbl, US$45/bbl to US$22.5/bbl, US$45/bbl to
US$90/bbl). Panels A and C display significant differences for all but one descriptive
measure over the entire price range. Only kurtosis for concession regimes does not differ
significantly if price moves from US$22.5/bbl to US$90/bbl (Panel A) and US$45/bbl
to US$90/bbl (Panel C). Panel B displays signage representing directionality of abso-
lute value changes relative to price movements. For changes in price from US$45/bbl
to US$22.5/bbl, mean responses differ significantly for both regimes. Standard devia-
tion and skewness differ significantly only for concession regimes. PSC regimes exhibit
significant differences in kurtosis, a feature lifted out in Figure 4.2 for an post-tax PV
frequency distribution of an Angolan field simulated at US$22.5/bbl and US$90/bbl.
All mean responses in Table 4.5 display an increase in absolute value for an increase in
price. The opposite trend holds for responses in standard deviation (with the exception
of PSC fields in the price range from US$45/bbl US$22.5/bbl).
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Table 4.4. Statistical Properties for Simulated Pre- and Post-Tax Present Value Fre-
quency Distributions in Concession and PSC Regimes
Table 4.4 describes results extracted from 1266 simulated pre- and post-tax present value distributions
for concession and PSC regimes at three price scenarios (US$22.5/bbl, US$45/bbl, US$90/bbl).
Regime averages of descriptive statistic measures for distribution mean, standard deviation and
distribution-width (maximum–minimum) are compared pre- and post-tax. Absolute differences and
comparative ratios Post-TaxPre-Tax are computed. Panel A examines descriptive stochastic measures for
an oil price of US$22.5/bbl. Panel B and Panel C reflect the same analysis at prices of US$45/bbl
and US$90/bbl respectively. Each panel in Table 4.4 reflects the arithmetic sample average for all
concession (GoM, UKCS and NCS) and all PSC (ANG, IDO and EGY) regimes. Tables B.1 and
B.2 in Appendix A provide detailed additional descriptive statistics for 633 post-tax PV simulations
(country averages) of GoM, UKCS, NCS and Angola, Indonesia, Egypt.
Regime Mean (US$M) SD (US$M) PV Distribution-
Width Max-Min
Panel A: Price of US$22.5/bbl
Concession Pre-Tax 762.47 121.79 864.80
Post-Tax 204.15 46.85 331.60
Difference 558.32 74.94 533.20
Post-Tax
Pre-Tax 27% 38% 38%
PSC Pre-Tax 1029.68 135.73 948.61
Post-Tax 326.63 53.39 350.09
Difference 703.05 82.34 598.52
Post-Tax
Pre-Tax 32% 39% 37%
Panel B: Price of US$45/bbl
Concession Pre-Tax 2375.18 243.66 1730.49
Post-Tax 758.83 85.30 604.56
Difference 1616.36 158.36 1125.93
Post-Tax
Pre-Tax 32% 35% 35%
PSC Pre-Tax 2610.40 268.39 1874.62
Post-Tax 749.19 54.85 398.21
Difference 1861.21 213.55 1476.41
Post-Tax
Pre-Tax 29% 20% 21%
Panel C: Price of US$90/bbl
Concession Pre-Tax 5615.09 489.31 3474.63
Post-Tax 1839.46 171.54 1215.00
Difference 3775.62 317.77 2259.63
Post-Tax
Pre-Tax 33% 35% 35%
PSC Pre-Tax 5854.14 536.05 3742.12
Post-Tax 1343.93 99.42 741.49
Difference 4510.21 436.63 3000.63
Post-Tax
Pre-Tax 23% 19% 20%
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Table 4.5. Statistical Properties of Absolute Stochastic Oil Field Price Responses –
Overview for Concession and PSC regimes
In Table 4.5, Panel A describes the change of descriptive stochastic measures for a change in oil price
in the range from US$22.5/bbl to US$90/bbl. Panel B and Panel C reflect the same comparisons
at price changes from US$45/bbl to US$22.5/bbl and US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl respectively. Each
panel in Table 4.5 reflects the arithmetic average for all concession (GoM, UKCS and NCS) and all
PSC (ANG, IDO and EGY) regimes. Tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix A provide detailed descriptive
statistics for 633 post-tax PV simulations (country averages) of GoM, UKCS, NCS and Angola,
Indonesia, Egypt. The existence of significant differences between descriptive measure changes with
respect to price changes is verified through paired 2-tailed t-tests run at the field level. Significance
at a 95% level is indicated by *, at a 99% level by ** respectively; p-values are quoted in parentheses.
∆Mean (US$M) ∆SD (US$M) ∆Skewness ∆Kurtosis
Panel A: Price change from US$22.5/bbl to US$90/bbl
Concession 1635.3178 124.6944 0.1176 -0.0380
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0001)** (0.3115)
PSC 1017.2980 46.0347 0.1449 0.6297
(0.0000)** (0.0001)** (0.0138)* (0.0008)**
Panel B: Price change from US$45/bbl to US$22.5/bbl
Concession -554.6789 -38.4488 -0.1104 0.0385
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0002)** (0.3052)
PSC -422.5592 -1.4561 -0.0374 -0.2560
(0.0000)** (0.7961) (0.4573) (0.0010)**
Panel C: Price change from US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl
Concession 1080.6389 86.2456 0.0072 0.0005
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0146)* (0.7488)
PSC 594.7388 44.5786 0.1076 0.3736
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0005)** (0.0059)**
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Differences for Changes in Regime
Regime differences in absolute value responses of descriptive measures with respect
to price changes are shown in Table 4.5. For ease of interpretation I aggregate prior
country based absolute measures according to regime (Table 4.6). I test deterministic
absolute present values and descriptive statistics under each price scenario 4.6. In
Panels A and C significant differences between concessions and PSCs are observable for
the 3rd and 4th moment of the post-tax present value frequency distribution functions.
The exception is Panel B where kurtosis behaves similarly regardless of contract. With
Table 4.6 I construct six charts to display the price varying relationship of deterministic
and stochastic measures between contractual regimes in Figure 4.3.
The top left chart of Figure 4.3 displays the present value post-tax PV for both
regimes at three price scenarios. Asset values increase with commodity price increases
(Strong 1991). The absolute value of PSC assets is above the value for concession
fields at US$22.5/bbl. The US$45/bbl price scenario sees convergence between these
two average regime values. The linear post-tax increase of concession fields and the
degressive response of PSC fields results in concessions having higher absolute value
than PSC fields at US$90/bbl. This trend is emphasized in the ratio PostTaxPV
PreTaxPV
depicted
in the middle graph of the left column. The progressive nature of production sharing
in PSC contracts reduces the ratio significantly for an increase in price (for supporting
numerical values see Table 4.7 Panel B and Panel C). Post-tax PV responses shown in
the bottom left chart support the degressive PV response rate for PSC assets. This
phenomenon is expected to become increasingly noticeable in the oil and gas indus-
try under high oil prices. It is demonstrated that concession response rates increase
above those of PSC regimes in the range US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl. Replicating the
above response rates (analogous to delta hedging ratios) requires detailed oilfield asset
price response data and information about the composition of company asset holdings.
Specifically, calculating the second, third and fourth moments represented by standard
deviation, skewness and kurtosis respectively are important risk attributes. The second
moment is significantly different as regards its rate of change between price scenarios
measured in Table 4.7. The top figure in the right column indicates the convergence in
standard deviation as between concessions and PSCs as does the middle figure for skew-
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Table 4.6. Comparison of Price Response Differences as between Concessions and PSCs
This table reflects a comparison of price response differences as between important valuation and
risk measures for concession and PSC regimes. Panel A presents a combination deterministic present
value results, descriptive statistics for stochastic simulations at a price of US$22.5/bbl. Panel B and
Panel C reflect the same information for prices of US$45/bbl and US$90/bbl respectively. Significance
at a 95% level is indicated by *, at a 99% level by ** respectively; p-values are quoted in parentheses.
Concession PSC t-test
Panel A: Price of US$22.5/bbl
Pre-Tax PV 762.64 1024.02 (0.3244)
Post-Tax PV 206.88 328.99 (0.1757)
Post-Tax PV (% of Pre-Tax PV) 27.13% 32.13%
Mean 204.15 326.63 (0.1729)
SD 46.85 53.39 (0.5653)
SD (% of Mean) 23.00% 16.34%
Skewness 0.28 0.15 (0.0071)**
Kurtosis 3.37 3.19 (0.0093)**
Panel B: Price of US$45/bbl
Pre-Tax PV 2375.52 2609.68 (0.7383)
Post-Tax PV 758.31 747.88 (0.9559)
Post-Tax PV (% of Pre-Tax PV) 31.91% 28.63%
Mean 758.83 749.19 (0.9594)
SD 85.30 54.85 (0.0536)
SD (% of Mean) 11.21% 7.22%
Skewness 0.39 0.19 (0.0000)**
Kurtosis 3.33 3.45 (0.0778)
Panel C: Price of US$90/bbl
Pre-Tax PV 5615.77 5854.42 (0.8810)
Post-Tax PV 1837.48 1332.29 (0.2104)
Post-Tax PV (% of Pre-Tax PV) 32.75% 22.94%
Mean 1839.46 1343.93 (0.2204)
SD 171.54 99.42 (0.0206)*
SD (% of Mean) 9.29% 7.37%
Skewness 0.40 0.30 (0.0489)*
Kurtosis 3.33 3.82 (0.0049)**
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Figure 4.3. Summary of Concluding Findings for Deterministic and Stochastic Analyses
This figure compares concessions to PSCs over a consistent price range in all graphs and illustrates
the range dependent specificity of deterministic and stochastic findings. To aid joint interpretation of
price scenarios and price change intervals I connect results under each price scenario linearly. In the
top graph of the left column the increasing average oilfield post-tax present values (in absolute $M)
for the three price scenarios of US$22.5/bbl, US$45/bbl and US$90/bbl on the x-axis are described.
The center graph of the left column shows the decreasing average post-tax PV percentage
characteristic of reduced production entitlement in progressive tax PSCs (increase for linear tax
concession regimes) as a percentage of pre-tax PV. The bottom left graph illustrates the oilfield
post-tax price response rate. The right hand column depicts key stochastic data. The tightening
range of post-tax standard deviations as a percentage of post-tax means is reflected in the top graph.
The chart in the center right shows the increasingly positive skewness for both regimes as prices
increase (as cost structures are covered). Finally, in the bottom right corner the crossover in kurtosis
response for increasing prices is reflected.
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ness (except for the price range US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl where significant differences
are observable). The positive skewness measured in the middle figure occurs as fields
‘overcome’ their underlying cost structures indicating a higher likelihood of achieving
mean present value. In the bottom right chart, the most telling kurtosis difference
between regimes is observable. The progressive nature of PSC regime taxation occurs
at US$90/bbl with production sharing on price upside and reserve recoupment by the
operator on price downside. Panels A and C in Table 4.6 illustrate that this relation
is significant. Table 4.7 shows with high significance that the same relation holds for
price responses.
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Table 4.7. Comparison of Price Response Differences as between Concessions and PSCs
This table isolates price response differences as between important valuation and risk measures for
concession and PSC regimes. Panel A presents a combination deterministic present value price
response changes and changes in descriptive statistics for stochastic simulations for a change in price
from US$90/bbl to US$22.5/bbl. Panel B and Panel C reflect the same information for price changes
from US$45/bbl to US$22.5/bbl and US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl respectively. Significance at a 95%
level is indicated by *, at a 99% level by ** respectively; p-values are quoted in parentheses.
Concession PSC t-test
Panel A: Price change from US$22.5/bbl to US$90/bbl
∆ Pre-Tax PV 1.88 1.46 (0.3211)
∆ Post-Tax PV 2.27 1.03 (0.2329)
∆ Mean 2.30 1.05 (0.0729)
∆ SD 0.94 0.48 (0.0007)**
∆ Skewness 0.36 0.50 (0.6726)
∆ Kurtosis 0.25 0.31 (0.0005)**
Panel B: Price change from US$45/bbl to US$22.5/bbl
∆ Pre-Tax PV 0.64 0.78 (0.0014)**
∆ Post-Tax PV 0.55 0.88 (0.0499)*
∆ Mean 0.54 0.87 (0.2780)
∆ SD 1.10 1.95 (0.0000)**
∆ Skewness 1.43 1.60 (0.2080)
∆ Kurtosis 2.02 1.85 (0.0006)**
Panel C: Price change from US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl
∆ Pre-Tax PV 1.18 1.12 (0.0746)
∆ Post-Tax PV 1.21 0.89 (0.0037)**
∆ Mean 1.21 0.90 (0.0320)*
∆ SD 1.01 0.91 (0.0079)*
∆ Skewness 0.51 0.79 (0.0011)**
∆ Kurtosis 0.50 0.55 (0.0059)**
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4.5. Chapter Concluding Remarks
This study uses deterministic and stochastic analyses of oilfields to refine the low oil
price paradigm covered in prior valuation and risk studies. I note that research works
performed by Haushalter et al. (2002) and Jin and Jorion (2006) relate to a period
when oil prices range between US$18/bbl and US$35/bbl. Their studies specifically
cover the years 1992 to 1994, and 1998 to 2001 respectively, periods comparable to the
US$22.5/bbl to US$45/bbl price range in this study. Findings are therefore likely to
remain valid but limited to oil prices in this range.
I add context to the participation study by Stulz (2005). The conclusion is that
country specific oilfield contractual terms cause divergent and heterogenous asset val-
uation and risk responses to oil price movement. Based on this chapter, I suggest that
the country and risk and valuation findings for low prices may not hold under higher oil
prices. Indeed, high oil price effects go so far as to invert the valuation and risk relation-
ship between PSC and concession countries for key valuation and risk metrics. I show
that at low oil prices, US$22.5/bbl, post-tax present values for PSC oilfields are higher
than for concession fields. Additionally, oil prices in the range US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl
cause the metrics of: present value response, post tax absolute value, the percentage of
post-tax relative to pre-tax and kurtosis to invert when compared to identical metrics
between US$22.5/bbl and US$45/bbl. My findings combine the industry emphasis of
Cavaglia et al. (2000) with the country factors favored Stulz (2005). I suggest that
detailed information about industry specific entitlement terms and the geographical
location of resource holdings is necessary for an accurate valuation of global natural
resource assets.
5. Longitudinal Asset Risk
Chapter Research Focus
This chapter extends the previous – oil price shocks are shown to cause shifts in the timing and
quantum of risks in physical Oil and Gas (O&G) assets. I provide evidence that time-unbounded risk
measures understate the periodicity of price risk implicit in depleting assets.
Overview
This chapter was informed by a HBOS consultancy. The question asked by the risk team was whether
they should hedge by selling forward all production over the traditional 5 year period, or whether it is
preferable to construct a rolling three year hedge. Hedging Information recovery is demonstrated to
be regime specific and varies heterogeneously in response to the combined effects of oilfield entitlement
contracts and price shocks. Timing effects embodied in oilfield entitlement contracts cause asset cash
flows, volatility horizons and minimum variance hedge ratios to vary in response to oil price. I conclude
that the timing of physical O&G asset risk factors is unable to be directly recovered from market oil
prices. Temporal variance for physical assets is shown to be a hidden dimensional outcome of price
risk and that rolling hedge construction is optimal.
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5.1. Background
Asset valuation in the oil and gas sector is a function of the risks and rewards associated
with future reserve entitlement. As noted earlier, this accepted oil industry view fits
neatly with the body of theory that holds that ‘finance is about the valuation of cash
flows that extend over time and are usually uncertain’ (Ross 2005). The empirical study
of temporal linkages between risk, return, and entitlement for physical assets extends
the prior chapter’s cross sectional work on the same sample. Difficulties in linking risk,
return and time have, in prior studies, been ascribed to differences in global regula-
tory operating environments (Bekaert and Harvey 2002) and discontinuous information
flows (Geman et al. 2001). I show that for physical oil and gas (O&G) assets, both
are relevant. Oil and gas physical asset risks are increasingly associated with the re-
lationship between oil prices and operator reserve entitlement contracts. Geman et al.
(2001) suggest that continuous market prices accurately, instantaneously and contin-
uously equilibrate to information flows, a behavior that I suggest does not extend to
physical assets. The existence of two very different forms of reserve ownership, produc-
tion sharing and concessions, are shown to result in oil reserve entitlement profiles that
respond very differently to oil price variability (Kretzschmar et al. 2007). I demonstrate
that physical asset responses to oil market prices depend on hidden contractual field
tax terms that are not continuous.
This empirical study supports hidden time work by Geman et al. (2002, p.73) who
seek to “discover the law of the time change conditional on the observation of the com-
posite process”. Detailed global oilfield data are used to show that variance minimizing
hedges depend on ex ante contractual field parameters which are unobservable, analo-
gous to hidden hedging effects identified by Sercu and Wu (2000). Undisclosed oilfield
contract terms are shown to cause changes in cash flow timing. In O&G studies, the
composite oilfield asset valuation process depends on the relationship between revenue,
operating expenses, capital expenditure and “government take”. I note that global tax
take terms vary, and that the asset response to price shocks is not a constant function
with respect to taxation (Kretzschmar and Moles 2006). I show that price shocks in-
teract with producer entitlement contracts to cause shifts in the quantum and timing
of oilfield cash flow response. Unlike the general Geman et al. (2002) recovery problem,
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hidden time changes in physical O&G assets are shown to be contractual and oil price
dependent.
For producing oil assets, the past is different from the future for two simple reasons.
First, the asset depletes as oil is extracted. Second, recent work suggests that since
2000, there has been a structural shift in global energy markets. The result is that
mean reversion models by Bessembinder et al. (1995) will increasingly need to coexist
with random walk pricing behavior (Geman 2005). I accommodate this using findings
from the cross-sectional study in chapter 4 using stochastic simulation. I isolate the
temporal effects of price changes with all other factors equal. Backward looking delta
regressions are inappropriate for depleting physical assets. I suggest that price based
delta hedging programmes cannot ignore the interaction of oil prices with oilfield asset
contracts. I propose that forward looking delta rules require a detailed analysis of the
price response attributes for underlying assets. In this study, whole–life field cash flows
are subject to market risk at the field level surrogated by subjecting fields to differing
levels of oil price. Detailed field data are used to calculate field cash flows at oil prices
of US$45/bbl, US$22.5/bbl and US$90/bbl. I isolate periodicity of oil price effects on
the oilfield asset cash flows. The oilfield focus of this study isolates discrete annual
payoff changes in cash flow quantum, timing, standard deviation and hedge ratios.
This empirical asset risk study is underpinned by detailed data for 211 producing
oilfields. I use an asset-up approach to demonstrate that, at the oilfield level, oil price
variability is capable of affecting both the quantity and the timing of risk. Oilfield
responses are shown to differ depending on the field entitlement structure. Differential
oilfield cash flow responses are shown to be a composite function of oil price and enti-
tlement regime. In this study, I lift out an added dimension of oil and gas risk; time.
Natural resource assets deplete over time and risk measures lack the defining attribute
of an indefinite period going concern assumption. This finite life limitation requires a
time-bounded view of risk. Time boundaries allows an isolation of the quantum and
timing of risk measures caused by oil price variability acting in concert with field enti-
tlement structures. I use this framework to provide evidence that oil price shocks cause
temporal and quantitative shifts in oil and gas sector asset risks.
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5.2. Why Temporal Risk Matters in O&G Assets
O&G sector settings facilitate the isolation and study of risk measurement (Jin and
Jorion 2006). Following Moshirian and Szegö (2003), the management of global risk
variance is set to become more prevalent. Oilfield assets are subject to differential tax-
ation and diverse state participation regimes but homogenous commodity price shocks
and therefore are well suited for the study. An ex ante analysis of whole-life field
cash flow entitlement describes timing adjustment and shifts in rolling hedge ratios in
response to oil price shocks.
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Table 5.1. Description of Randomly Selected Stratified Sample by Regime and Country
This table describes the sample selection for 211 producing oilfields. The percentage of total field
population is calculated relative to the total number of available producing fields per country. The
table additionally reports total reserves and total remaining reserves on an average country level.
The ratio RemainingTotal represents a proxy for the stage of maturity for the average oilfield on a country
and regime level.
Number of % of Field Avg. Reserves per Field (mmboe)
Observations Population Total Remaining RemainingTotal
Gulf of Mexico 31 32% 98.29 55.94 57%
UK Continental Shelf 43 27% 160.69 55.98 35%
Norwegian Continental Shelf 29 43% 790.28 345.35 44%
Concessions 103 314.55 135.40 43%
Angola 29 100% 359.77 297.94 83%
Egypt 36 88% 404.08 150.45 37%
Indonesia 43 91% 522.14 254.80 49%
Production Sharing Contracts 108 439.19 231.60 53%
5.3. Longitudinal Oilfield Analysis
5.3.1. Oilfield Cash Flow Analysis
Comparative longitudinal analyses of oilfield cash flows and related risk risk measures
are performed. Analyses of timing and quantity of cash flow risk measures are based
on the oilfield asset data used in the previous chapter. 1 Annual net field cash flows
are extracted for the whole field life as at January 2006.
For this analysis I select a sample of producing oilfields consistent with the strat-
ified random sample used in chapter 4. Table 5.1 describes the sample selection for
211 producing oilfields. The analyzed fields’ stage of development and their maturity
are approximated in Table 5.1 as a percentage of remaining reserves relative to total
reserves.
I extend the previous whole–life oilfield study by computing and extracting under-
lying forward looking annual field cash flow data. This is in line with the evidence
provided by Sercu and Wu (2000) who highlight the superior performance of forward
1Appendix A, Tables A.2 and A.3 show a single-field example of the data available for each oilfield
under analysis.
5. Longitudinal Asset Risk 98
looking price-based risk measures, in their case hedge ratios, over regression-based esti-
mates computed from historic data. For the longitudinal analysis I derive annual field
cash flows from the field model (5.1) developed in chapter 4:
CashF lowt = Pricet × Productiont −OPEXt − CAPEXt − Taxt (5.1)
Tax calculations are field specific and of time- and value-discrete nature, annual future
production and costs are determined based on operators’ estimates. For concession
fields, production entitlement remains unaffected by changes in oil price. Entitled
production for PSC fields, in turn, is affected by oil price as contractually agreed shares
of remaining profit (ProfitOil) after costs recovery (CostOil) vary with price and tax
regime (Bindemann 1999).
The longitudinal analysis is focused on temporal and quantitative shifts in the re-
sponse of oilfield cash flow and corresponding risk measures to oil price changes. For
each sample oilfield, series of relevant annual cash flows are obtained by evaluating
(5.1). To lift out differential effects of oil price changes on field cash flow, each oilfield
is subjected to a price down-shock (−50%) and a price up-shock (+100%) relative to
a benchmark price of US$45/bbl. In absolute price terms, the following three different
initial oil price scenarios (5.2) are computed.
Price = {US$22.5/bbl, US$45/bbl, US$90/bbl} (5.2)
In weak-form efficient oil and gas markets, participants translate all publicly available
continuous time information flows into market oil prices reflecting corresponding risk
and return characteristics (Ross 2005). The underlying oil price model incorporates
findings by Bessembinder et al. (1995) and approximates mean reversion in oil prices
over a short time horizon.2 Geman et al. (2002) provide extended insights into financial
pricing models and target composite valuation processes. When empirically analyzing
2A single field example in Appendix A, Table A.2, Columns 6 to 8, shows how prices drop from
the initial price scenario to a floor over the next few years before they mean revert with a linear
increase following an inflation assumption of 2.5% (see Figure 5.1). Capital expenditure (CAPEX ),
operational costs (OPEX ) and taxes (TAX ) are also obtained from operators’ estimates on an
annualised basis as described in Appendix A, Table A.2.
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22.5$/bbl (SD=20%) 45$/bbl (SD=20%) 90$/bbl (SD=20%)
Figure 5.1. Field Model Implied Forward Curve
This figure illustrates the movement of the model implied oil forward price derived from the field
data. Deterministic mean reverting annual prices are quoted for the three different price scenarios at
initial prices of US$22.5/bbl, US$45/bbl and US$90/bbl incorporating findings by Bessembinder et al.
(1995). Exemplary longitudinal prices for the corresponding price scenarios are described in Appendix
A, Table A.2, Columns 6, 7 and 8.
oilfields, I evaluate the response of real assets to price shocks. Oilfields as commodities
comprise exposure to different factors influencing asset value. Physical characteristics
as finite field life (as opposed to the ‘going concern’ assumption when dealing with
entities) and stages of development, extraction costs and differential tax regimes are
important factors constituting a composite oilfield valuation process. However, most
asset characteristics are not directly recoverable from market oil price information.
Following theoretical insights into this “recovery problem” provided by Geman et al.
(2002), I provide empirical evidence that unrecovered hidden factors in composite pro-
cesses introduce random variation which is likely to cause temporal and quantitative
shifts in cash flow and risk measures.
5.3.2. Longitudinal Cash Flows Minimum Variance Hedge Ratio
I analyze series of discrete cash flows over selected time intervals at the individual field
level which isolates the effects caused by stage of development of the oilfield under ob-
servation. Analyses of longitudinal cash flows, cash flow standard deviation and hedge
ratios address different interests of operators, risk managers and financiers. I examine
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annual net cash flows for oil producers with differential asset holdings as between con-
cession and production sharing contracts. Real asset holdings with finite life time have
however, implications on model selection. Oilfield life-cycle specific expenditures add
field cash flow idiosyncracies, thus causing difficulties in measurement. The longitudi-
nal characteristics of operational costs, capital expenditures and taxation are described
in Appendix A, Table A.2, Column 11 to 24. Initial CAPEX requirements at the begin-
ning and abandonment costs at the end of the field life adversely affect the magnitude
of cash flow. Cash flow behavior is linked to different stages of field life. When com-
paring fields cross-sectionally at certain points in time incompatibilities arise as high
negative cash flow peaks are caused by initial field development and final abandonment.
Field specificities violate stationarity constraints on the basis of logarithmic differences
for autoregressive time series and volatility models which inform model selection, and
preclude models from the GARCH model family (Gourieroux 1997).
Also, time varying changes in amplitude and temporal occurrence of variable re-
sponses to price changes are interpreted. I compute time varying minimum variance
hedge ratios to support the implementation of a sequence of selective hedges over a
specified time horizon in field life. Brealey and Kaplanis (1995) highlight the impor-
tance of boundaries for hedge ratios. In the context of this study, I build on insights
provided by Brealey and Kaplanis (1995) and define time-unbounded risk measures as
minimum variance hedge ratios over the whole field life, approximated by a 30 year dis-
crete time interval. Time-bounded hedge ratios, in turn, are represented by sequential
five year forward looking discrete intervals and semi-time-bounded three year forward
looking sliding windows. I am guided by James (2003) in selecting a sliding window
based on futures contracts that are traded up to 36 months in the case of Brent Crude
Futures and 30 consecutive months for WTI Light, Sweet Crude Futures. Field life
in the sample extends from 3 to 30 years and I calculate 3 year rolling measures for
volatility and hedge ratios in line with the time frames of frequently traded futures
contracts. For financier insights, who are exposed to discrete time period risk during
the field’s stage of life, sequential 5 year discrete financing periods are applied and
contrasted to rolling hedges.
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The objective is to illustrate the time variant characteristics of hedging at the oilfield
asset level. I derive minimum variance hedge ratios for one unit (in US$M) of spot
position at price St and β
∗
t0
units of futures contracts at price Ft (in $). The futures
price Ft is assumed being equal to the mean reverting futures price assumption implicit
in the field model and incorporates insights by Bessembinder et al. (1995). These model
implied futures prices (see Figure 5.1) are derived from the field data (see example
in Appendix A, Table A.2, Columns 6, 7 and 8) reflecting the three different price
scenarios respectively. For ease of interpretation, futures prices are treated as a certain
occurrence and are assumed to be equated by the spot oil prices. With the objective
of hedging oilfields at the asset level, the derived spot oil price is applied to the oilfield
valuation model. The model overlays the individual oilfield’s production profile, cost
structure and the regime-dependent fiscal structure (OPEX, CAPEX, TAX ) and sets
the spot position St equal to the annual post-tax field cash flow with St = CashF lowt.
3
Following Brooks et al. (2002) and Hull (2006) I describe the conditional expected
return E(Rt) of the hedged position at time t0 by
Et0(Rt) = Et0(St − St0)− βt0Et0(Ft − Ft0) (5.3)






σ2F,t − 2βt0ρSFσS,tσF,t (5.4)
with ρSF representing the Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient between the
spot and the futures position. Maximizing the expected returns with a given degree of




SF,t) = Et0(Rt)− ψσ2SF,t (5.5)
3Cash flows are calculated in US$M (spot position). To match the units of spot with the those of
futures contracts quoted in $, hedge ratios are calculated based on 106 units of futures contracts.
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With (5.3) and (5.4) I solve for the conditional minimum variance hedge ratio β∗(t0)





with covSF,t representing the conditional covariance between spot and futures price
and σF,t the conditional variance of the futures price within the following sequential
intervals and rolling ranges
30 year discrete hedge t = (t0, tn) = {(1, 30)} (5.7)
5 year discrete hedges t = (t0, tn) = {(1, 5), (6, 10), . . . , (26, 30)} (5.8)
3 year rolling hedges t = (t0, tn) = {(1, 3), (2, 4), . . . , (28, 30)} (5.9)
Minimum variance hedge ratios are derived continuously as proven for example by
Hull (2006, p.73). Analyzing real assets however, means that assets are exposed to
limited field life – as opposed to ‘going concern’ for a corporate entity. Also, time-
and value-discrete taxation applies to physical oilfield assets. To isolate timing and
quantity of risk exposure, I focus the analyses in the following section on sequential 5
year discrete and 3 year rolling measures.
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5.4. Regime Effects on O&G Asset Value Responses
This section specifically examines the temporal nature of risk by disagreggating whole–
life oilfield present values of producing fields in annual cash flows. Risk measures
allocated into 5 year discrete and 3 year rolling time periods are derived from time
discrete cash flows series at prices of US$22.5/bbl, US$45/bbl and US$90/bbl. As Ross
(2005) notes, the starting point in asset valuation is an estimation of future attributable
cash flows and their risks. Insights in these two measures are undertaken in Table 5.2
where observations for concessions and PSCs are analyzed by regime and country.
5.4.1. Asset Cash Flow – Response to Price Shocks
(Benchmark US$45/bbl)
First, I analyze price variant average annual cash flows on a country and regime level.
As described in Table 5.2 cash flows (over whole field life) are highly responsive to
changes in oil price with concessions increasing from US$M 6.59 at US$22.5/bbl to
US$M 31.92 at US$45/bbl to US$M 80.23 at US$90/bbl. This change represents a
12.1 times increase in average cash flow for a four times price increase. For PSCs the
average cash flow response is distinctively lower with a move from US$M 23.57 to US$M
47.83 ending at US$M 83.19 for comparable prices, a 3.6 times increase. At the sample
overview level, concession fields demonstrate a negative cash flow at US$22.5/bbl in
the period 2021 to 2025. Insights into temporal movements become apparent when oil
price increases cause negative annualized cash flows to shift into future discrete periods.
In Table 5.2 this is demonstrated by a five year period shift in negativity for concession
fields from years 2021-2025 to years 2026 to 2030. This shift is caused solely by a price
movement from US$22.5/bbl to US$45/bbl, no time shift occurs for a change in price
to US$90/bbl. For PSCs the effect is also interesting in that negative cash flows occur
in the period 2026 to 2030 at US$22.5/bbl but negativity does not recur at higher price
levels.
Temporal insights displayed in Table 5.2 suggest that regime specific price response
insights should become a feature of risk analysis in oil and gas. Following findings
by Geman et al. (2002), I show that regime dependent price responses are an integral
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Table 5.2. Country and Regime Cash Flows Annualised
Panel A illustrates in the first column the 1 to 30 year annualized time bounded field cash flows on
an average country and regime level for an oil price of US$22.5/bbl. In the following columns, this
cash flow is disaggregated to six sequential discrete intervals of 5 years each. Panel B and Panel C
















Panel A: Price of US$22.5/bbl
GOM 11.9257 32.4679 28.6074 9.6017 1.3959 -0.0312 -0.4878
UKCS 5.7835 30.4025 10.2213 -0.4102 -3.7027 -1.8097 0.0000
NCS 1.9337 41.0730 52.8058 4.4808 -20.5539 -48.1465 -18.0569
CON 6.5934 33.9594 27.4991 3.9753 -6.7789 -13.9891 -5.1051
ANG 50.1444 24.1895 183.7118 86.6291 19.5364 -9.9239 -3.2764
IDO 14.0604 22.3258 28.6759 18.6398 13.0859 0.9999 0.6352
EGY 13.5475 30.1017 22.4725 15.8474 10.2003 1.9356 0.7274
PSC 23.5787 25.4182 68.2381 35.9654 13.8561 -1.6214 -0.3844
Panel B: Price of US$45/bbl
GOM 31.7985 98.2298 64.9669 22.4299 4.3815 1.0421 -0.2591
UKCS 21.5777 84.0172 35.4304 9.3743 1.6044 -0.9601 0.0000
NCS 47.9552 190.3121 116.5787 42.3737 -3.2319 -40.5266 -17.7750
CON 31.9249 117.5157 66.6832 22.4008 1.1208 -11.2130 -4.9582
ANG 87.3322 170.2239 243.7136 91.4362 28.6354 -6.7394 -3.2764
ID 37.9079 65.5144 69.9851 48.0803 32.6901 9.5201 1.6573
EGY 27.8678 66.4857 43.9684 30.9208 20.8849 3.9347 1.0125
PSC 47.8326 93.9546 107.9622 54.0023 27.6663 3.2923 0.1176
Panel B: Price of US$90/bbl
GOM 71.2185 227.6314 138.1405 48.0506 10.3524 3.0748 0.0614
UKCS 52.6682 195.1059 84.1409 27.5835 9.5087 -0.3298 0.0000
NCS 132.5252 479.4397 234.5688 109.8839 25.1070 -36.6367 -17.2111
CON 80.2276 283.0435 141.8465 56.3961 14.0470 -9.2617 -4.7060
ANG 113.2619 305.6589 257.8702 90.9740 33.2920 -4.9471 -3.2764
IDO 86.3088 151.9608 150.1170 114.4477 75.9464 22.5826 2.7983
EGY 55.2551 128.4926 86.2019 62.8089 43.4546 8.4733 2.0993
PSC 83.1950 185.4089 157.7457 90.9316 53.6623 10.4873 0.9341
5. Longitudinal Asset Risk 105
part of the composite oilfield valuation process. Regime characteristics are, however,
unrecoverable from oil price information and induce variation in cash flow timing and
quantity. In the following paragraph, I use discrete and rolling standard deviation risk
measures to lift out the importance of price shocks on the timing of underlying asset
cash flows.
5.4.2. Asset Standard Deviation – Response to Price Shocks
(Benchmark US$45/bbl)
Secondly, I analyze price variant average annual standard deviations. I measure this
as a percentage of mean and in absolute values on a country and regime level. Inter-
esting insights are provided into price induced relative standard deviation movements.
For concessions, these movements occur from a standard deviation measure of 3.67
(US$22.5/bbl) to 1.51 (US$45/bbl) to 1.38 (US$90/bbl). For PSCs the move is less,
from 1.14 to 0.94 to 0.89, approximately half the reduction in standard deviation ex-
perienced by concession fields when calculated on the approximated whole field life of
30 years.
It is instructive to analyze the differences in standard deviations for changes in price.
The price effect on the discrete oilfield cash flow standard deviation is significant across
all countries for all price changes with the exception of Norway form US$22.5/bbl to
US$45/bbl and Angola from US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl (Table 5.3). Approximately
the same behavior holds for the three years rolling standard deviation except that the
rolling measure smoothes the differences for Norway at US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl.
After t-tests for differences in standard deviation with respect to price changes I now
test for difference between concession and PSC regimes (Table 5.4). Sequential 5 year
discrete standard deviation and 3 year rolling standard deviation are investigated for
the three different price scenarios. For 5 year discrete risk exposure in the oil and gas
sector I observe significant differences in cash flow standard deviation between regimes
for two price scenarios, US$22.5/bbl and US$90/bbl. This has direct implications for
current trading conditions in oil and gas commodity markets where prices are trading
in the range US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl, precisely the range for which I expect to see
specific differences emerge between concession and PSC oilfield assets. For all three
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Table 5.3. Test for Difference in Cash Flow Standard Deviation for Variations in Price
(5 Year Discrete and 3 Year Rolling)
This Table highlights the expectation that cash flow SD would differ from one price scenario to
another (US$22.5/bbl to US$45/bbl, US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl). The objective is to isolate the
standard deviation of cash flows at comparable points in time under different prices. Tests for
differences (t-tests for difference in mean with adjustments for heteroscedasticity) are conducted
at the individual field level. Significance at a 95% level is indicated by *, at a 99% level by **
respectively; p-values are quoted in parentheses.
5 Years Discrete SD 3 Years Rolling SD
$22.5/bbl to $45/bbl $45/bbl to $90/bbl $22.5/bbl to $45/bbl $45/bbl to $90/bbl
GOM (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
UKCS (0.0188)* (0.0000)** (0.0374)* (0.0005)**
NCS (0.1195) (0.0033)** (0.8092) (0.0509)
CON (0.2936) (0.0005)** (0.7033) (0.0052)**
ANG (0.0060)** (0.0428) (0.0470)* (0.2851)
EGY (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
IDO (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0003)** (0.0000)**
PSC (0.0022)** (0.0013)** (0.0202)* (0.0092)**
price scenarios, no significant differences between regimes are evident for the 3 year
rolling standard deviation. This suggests that the 3 year rolling measure does not trap
the periodicity of risk exposure.
5.4.3. Oilfield Asset Value Risk – Response to Price Shocks
(Benchmark US$45/bbl)
When cash flow insights (Figure 5.2, top left and right graph) are pulled together with
standard deviation calculations (middle two graphs) the combination reflects the price
response relation between concession and PSC regimes. It is apparent in the top left
graph that price plays a significant effect in post tax cash flows for concession fields,
with cash flows increasing across the entire time series if prices increase. The cash
flows of concessions and PSCs at US$45/bbl shows a similar concave curvature. For an
oil price of US$90/bbl, however, the tax terms applicable to concession regimes allow
producers to participate in the upside of the field at higher prices. This results in
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Table 5.4. Test for Difference between Concession and PSC Regimes in 5 Year Discrete
SD and 3 Year Rolling SD for Three Price Scenarios
This Table highlights the expectation that cash flow SD would differ from one regime to another
(Concession and PSC). The objective is to isolate the standard deviation of cash flows at comparable
points in time under different prices. Tests for differences (two-sided t-tests with adjustments for
heteroscedasticity) are conducted at the individual field level. Significance at a 95% level is indicated
by *, at a 99% level by ** respectively; p-values are quoted in parentheses.




a change in shape to a convex cash flow profile for concession fields. The progressive
nature of PSC taxation, however, results in upward parallel shift across the entire curve.
What is notable for concession fields in the middle left graph of Figure 5.2 is that
the cash flow standard deviation maximum shifts. At US$22.5/bbl and US$90/bbl, the
maximum is found in the first 5 year period. The maximum, however, shifts to the
period 2011-2015 at US$45/bbl. This is indicative of the price varying relation between
revenue and field costs in oil and gas assets. The oil price effect on PSC field standard
deviation is indicated in the middle right chart of Figure 5.2. It is observable that
the PSC cash flow standard deviation maxima shift different compared to concessions.
The maximum at prices of US$22.5/bbl and US$45/bbl is evident in the first 5 year
period. Shifts to the period 2011-2015 occur at US$90/bbl. This comparative analysis
demonstrates the price varying relation between concession and PSC oil and gas asset
behavior.
In the bottom left chart in Figure 5.2 I show the rolling 3 year cash flow standard
deviation for concession fields. Cash flow standard deviation now moves within a
sliding window time frame, as distinct from being constraint within a fixed period
of discrete 5 year standard deviation. This characteristic is apparent in the graphical
representation of 3 year rolling cash flow standard deviation in Figure 5.2. Concession
regimes experience rolling standard deviation at US$22.5/bbl and US$90/bbl and two
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Figure 5.2. Cash Flow and Standard Deviation 5 Years Discrete Sequentially and 3
Years Rolling for Three Different Price Scenarios (US$22.5/bbl, US$45/bbl,
US$90/bbl)
The top graph in the left column reflects concession field post-tax cash flows. The center left graph
illustrate the concession post-tax standard deviation for six sequential 5 year discrete intervals. The
bottom left chart shows 3 year rolling standard deviation calculated on the same underlying cash flow
data. All measures are computed for the three different price scenarios (US$22.5/bbl, US$45/bbl,
US$90/bbl). The right column reflects the same analyses for PSC regimes. Absolute figures are pre-
sented in US$M. Cash flow and standard deviation responses to price shocks (US$22.5/bbl, US$90/bbl,
shaded and solid bars) are shown relative to the benchmark of US$45/bbl (solid black line).
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later sets of variation at US$45/bbl. PSC regimes, in turn, indicate early SD for the
US$45/bbl cash flow and ad-hoc rolling volatility at US$90/bbl and US$22.5/bbl.
The distinction between the trapped discrete standard deviation for the 5 year mea-
sure in that for the 3 year rolling is an important characteristic for depleting natural
resource assets. For ‘going concern’ assets it is unlikely that commodity price volatility
would affect entity cash flows in the same way, cash flows are expected to continue in
perpetuity.
The combination of longitudinal oilfield price response (Panels A, B, C in Table 5.2;
Figure 5.2, top two graphs) and time variant standard deviation measures (Figure 5.2,
bottom four graphs) has considerable implication for valuation of assets in the oil and
gas sector. I provide evidence that finite life physical assets have characteristics that
causes heterogenous asset price response behavior. Market oil prices incorporate con-
tinuous flows of information available to market participants. Discrete annual oilfield
production profiles, field costs and tax terms, however, are not recursively recoverable
from oil price. Linking these results to research by Geman et al. (2002) I expect hidden
asset response factors to translate into a necessary implementation of divergent risk
management strategies. To investigate this expectation, I compute sequential 5 year
discrete and sliding 3 year minimum variance hedge ratios.
5.4.4. Time Varying Hedge Ratios – Response to Price Shocks
(Benchmark US$45/bbl)
The drivers of return (cash flows) and risk (standard deviation), are combined to com-
pute hedge ratios. The calculations are performed using the minimum variance hedge
ratio derived in Section 5.3, based on the initial model of expected risk and return as
described in (5.3). Equation (5.6) solves for the minimum variance hedge ratio β∗(t0),
representing the optimal number of futures contracts. This amount minimizes the vari-
ance of the total hedged position as described by (5.4) under the objective function of
total return maximization (5.5). This relation holds, proven by Hull (2006, p.73).
As described in Section 5.3, Figure 5.1, the futures price is treated as a certain
occurrence. For ease of interpretation, this futures price is assumed to equate the
current spot price. The spot price is applied to the oilfield valuation model which
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overlays the individual oilfield’s cost and regime-dependent fiscal structure (OPEX,
CAPEX, Tax ). Therefore, in absence of production, cost and tax, a lock-step relation
between spot and futures price with a constant covariance of 1 is ensured over the
whole field life. The incorporation of detailed oilfield asset data causes time varying
idiosyncracies in the hedge ratios. The detailed field models allow an isolation of the
temporal occurrence of risk.4
The first column in Table 5.5 shows the whole–life field hedge ratio calculated based
on (5.6) together with (5.7). A distinct decreasing trend for concessions is observable
over the 30 year time frame as hedge ratios decrease from 5.55 at US$22.5/bbl (Panel
A) to 2.97 at US$45/bbl (Panel B) to 1.57 at US$90/bbl (Panel C). The same reducing
trend is reflected in PSC regimes where hedge ratios move from 5.32 to 4.34 to 3.14
over comparable price intervals. The 30 year period is disaggregated into sequential
5 year discrete hedge ratios in adjacent six columns. These are determined by (5.6)
under the time intervals described in (5.8). Idiosyncratic trends emerge as between
concessions and PSCs with concessions moving from 15.86 (US$22.5/bbl, Panel A) to
−0.06 (US$45/bbl, Panel B) to −7.95 (US$90/bbl, Panel C).
This compares to consistently positive hedge ratios over the same price range for
PSCs of 9.07 to 4.61 to 0.79. For the first 5 year interval at oil prices US$45/bbl and
US$90/bbl, negative hedge ratios suggest that concession regimes carry distinctively
lower risks compared to PSC regimes. This is consistent with the overview of cash
flow where PSC response rates to oil prices are lower than for concession fields. This
is for reasons of unrecoverable factors affecting the composite risk response process.
Firstly, concession regimes are not exposed to progressive tax terms. Secondly, fields
in concession regimes have, in general, already recovered their initial costs. These
developed and mature fields in production enjoy an immediate benefit if price increase.
PSC regimes (e.g. Angola) do not experience the same immediate benefit from oil price
increases as they are still under early stage development. At these price scenarios, the
concession cash flow profiles relative to oil price movements allow producers to sell
futures; not selling forward would increase variance. The variance of the total hedged
position (5.4) is minimized under the objective of maximized returns (5.3) by shorting
4Appendix A (Table A.2 and A.3) shows a single-field example for annual cash flow profiles incorpo-
rating field specific Production, OPEX, CAPEX and Tax profiles
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Table 5.5. 5 Year Discrete Hedge Ratios Annualised
Panel A illustrates in the first column the 1 to 30 year annualized time bounded minimum variance
hedge ratio on an average country and regime level for an oil price of US$22.5/bbl. In the following
columns, this ratio is disaggregated to six sequential discrete intervals of 5 years each. Panel B and















Panel A: Price of US$22.5/bbl
GOM 3.3018 2.3635 12.1690 4.4731 0.7083 0.2260 -0.1290
UKCS 2.6059 6.6342 7.3679 0.0562 2.5822 -1.0052 0.0000
NCS 13.3713 44.9579 24.5585 8.6027 10.4296 2.2418 -10.5626
CON 5.7726 15.8565 13.5460 3.7447 4.1669 0.2603 -2.9388
ANG 15.4289 34.4735 21.6115 26.6226 12.2237 0.8723 -3.2302
EGY 0.8132 -0.9967 2.6317 1.8563 0.6665 0.3042 0.4170
IDO 2.2635 0.3727 5.0834 2.2624 3.6142 1.6873 0.5607
PSC 5.3152 9.0729 8.7043 8.6682 4.9435 1.0074 -0.5051
Panel B: Price of US$45/bbl
GOM 2.8750 0.0324 11.3008 4.8592 0.8470 0.1876 0.0231
UKCS 1.6615 0.4527 7.2968 1.2265 1.1998 -0.2069 0.0000
NCS 5.0819 -0.9474 18.5553 8.5200 6.4062 2.8348 -4.8773
CON 2.9693 -0.0594 11.6043 4.3327 2.5218 0.7480 -1.3318
ANG 12.1265 19.7657 35.7288 11.2439 6.3656 1.2699 -1.6151
EGY 0.6918 -1.9102 2.5072 1.5533 0.8011 0.9203 0.2792
IDO 2.1364 -0.1445 4.8115 2.3120 3.7207 1.4273 0.6916
PSC 4.3374 4.6132 12.3452 4.4575 3.4577 1.2161 -0.0653
Panel B: Price of US$90/bbl
GOM 2.6993 -1.1936 11.1633 5.0409 0.9163 0.1955 0.0733
UKCS 1.3263 -2.4771 7.6417 1.7707 1.0046 0.0177 0.0000
NCS 0.6934 -23.8315 14.1448 9.2377 4.5071 2.1370 -2.0346
CON 1.5698 -7.9490 10.4972 4.8144 1.9392 0.6535 -0.5362
ANG 8.0993 6.7187 33.6396 4.8138 3.3174 0.9142 -0.8076
EGY 0.6144 -2.3122 2.4252 1.3413 0.8532 1.0905 0.2886
IDO 1.8975 -0.6158 2.9484 2.4429 4.1628 1.8776 0.5689
PSC 3.1351 0.7882 11.0151 2.7124 2.8326 1.3566 0.1059
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Futures contracts. This concession trend reverses for the four subsequent 5 year discrete
intervals at US$45/bbl and US$90/bbl with hedge ratios reaching their peak in the years
2011 to 2015 under all three price scenarios.
The top graphs in Figure 5.3 show comparable discrete concession and PSC regime
hedge profiles over the years 2011 to 2025. A distinguishable difference in magni-
tude of the hedge ratios for changes in price is observable. For whole–life hedge ra-
tios (2006-2035) an increase in price from US$22.5/bbl to US$45/bbl and US$45/bbl
and US$90/bbl, hedge ratios reduce by approximately 50% for concessions, a behavior
broadly followed by PSC regimes but at a lesser rate (see Table 5.5).
The sequential 5 year discrete hedge ratios and 3 year rolling minimum variance
hedge ratios follow approximately the same profile. These hedge ratios are computed
following Equation (5.6); the rolling 3 year intervals are defined in (5.9). For concession
and PSC regimes, the lowest 3 year rolling hedge ratios (with the smallest divergence
between the highest positive and lowest negative observation) are evident for prices of
US$90/bbl (Figure 5.3, middle two graphs). At prices of US$22.5/bbl, distinctively
larger minimum variance hedge ratio are computed which also show a higher distance
from smallest to largest. The hedge ratio for the base price scenario of US$45/bbl
moves most of the time in between the observations for US$22.5/bbl and US$90/bbl.
For concessions in 2007, hedge ratios for US$90/bbl are considerably lower (negative)
than for 45$ (less negative), a pattern consistent with PSC reserves. Temporal shifts
are indicative of the varying nature of risk exposure in oilfield assets. The differences
between 3 year sliding periods and 5 year discrete are the result of the discrete periods
effectively trapping the periodicity of volatility in the analysis.
The differences between 5 year discrete and 3 year rolling hedge ratios for concession
regimes are lifted out in the bottom left graph in Figure 5.3. Notable differences occur
in the early years of the analysis where the three year rolling hedge ratios dominate the
5 year discrete. This relation causes negative hedge ratios for the initial period from
2006 to 2010. The trend reverses for PSC fields where 3 year rolling hedges ratios are
dominated by the 5 year discrete hedges.
Table 5.6 illustrates that high oil prices increase cash flows for both concession and
PSC fields, but at different rates. Additionally, higher prices accelerate the timing of the
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Figure 5.3. Minimum Variance Hedge Ratios for Concession and PSC Regimes at Price
Scenarios US$22.5/bbl, US$45/bbl and US$90/bbl (5 Year Discrete, 3 Year
Rolling and Differences)
The top graph in the left column reflects concession field minimum variance hedge ratios for 5 year
discrete intervals at three different price scenarios. The center left chart illustrates concession minimum
variance hedge ratios 3 years rolling. The bottom left depicts the difference between 5 year and 3 year
rolling concession delta minimum variance hedge ratio. The right column reflects the same analyses
for PSC regimes. Hedge ratio responses to price shocks (US$22.5/bbl, US$90/bbl, shaded and solid
bars) are shown relative to the benchmark of US$45/bbl (solid black line).
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Table 5.6. Time Variance in Cash Flows, Standard Deviations and Hedge Ratios
The left column of this Table reflects movements in time for key cash flow, standard deviation and
hedge ratio movements for concessions. The right column reflects the same analyses for PSC regimes.
Absolute figures are presented in US$M.
Concession PSC
US$22.5/bbl US$45/bbl US$90/bbl US$22.5/bbl US$45/bbl US$90/bbl
Cash Flow (max) 55.85 126.40 414.75 77.88 136.15 226.24
Year 2009 2007 2006 2011 2011 2010
Cash Flow (min) -35.66 -24.13 -27.86 -8.36 -5.06 -1.17
Year 2006 2029 2029 2029 2029 2029
5 Year SD (max) 39.13 22.65 76.25 27.45 29.17 44.07
Years 2006–2010 2011–2015 2006–2010 2006–2010 2006–2010 2011–2015
5 Year SD (min) 4.38 4.69 3.82 1.44 1.10 1.30
Years 2016–2020 2031-2035 2031-2035 2031-2035 2031-2035 2031-2035
3 Year SD (max) 48.24 16.30 85.77 22.86 26.03 36.85
Year 2006 2011 2006 2008 2008 2011
3 Year SD (min) 0.47 1.70 1.63 0.18 0.28 0.58
Year 2020 2030 2030 2033 2033 2033
5 Year HR (max) 15.86 11.60 10.50 9.07 12.35 11.02
Years 2006–2010 2011–2015 2011–2015 2006–2010 2011–2015 2011–2015
5 Year HR (min) -2.94 -1.33 -7.95 -0.51 -0.07 0.11
Years 2031-2035 2031-2035 2006-2010 2031-2035 2031-2035 2031–2035
3 Year HR (max) 15.07 11.39 10.57 2.07 1.04 0.52
Year 2006 2010 2010 2011 2011 2010
3 Year HR (min) -6.70 -3.69 -6.87 -27.53 -8.78 -4.14
Year 2026 2026 2006 2009 2009 2009
cash flow maxima in both PSC and concession regimes. At US$22.5/bbl the maximum
concession cash flow occurs in 2009 (2007 for US$45/bbl, 2006 at US$90/bbl). The same
occurs for PSCs but with less marked movement from 2011 to 2010. Interpreting the
cash flow minima meaningfully is more difficult as they are skewed by the abandonment
costs, an insight supported by Figure 5.2.
The standard deviation in concession regimes is widely variable for both the 3 year
rolling and the 5 year discrete periods. For these measures, the concession standard
deviation is highest for the US$90/bbl, but drops for US$45/bbl and increases again
for US$22.5/bbl. PSC fields by comparison demonstrate a continuous increase for
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both discrete and sliding windows of standard deviation from lowest to highest price.
The temporal behavior of maximum standard deviation measures is widely variable
as between concession and PSC regimes and price scenarios. The minimum measure
seems in the main to be constrained to the low cash flow abandonment period at the
end of field life.
The hedge ratios for both 5 year discrete and 3 year rolling windows are sensitive to
oil price variation. The difference between concession and PSC fields HR (max) is small
for all price scenarios in the 5 year discrete measure, for the HR (min), the comparative
difference increases. Concession hedge ratio is highest at 22.5 in the years 2006–2010.
For PSCs, price shocks cause a temporal shift in hedge ratio with the highest hedge
ratio experienced for 45$/bll in the period 2011 to 2015. The pattern is quite different
for the 3 year rolling hedge ratio, where the hedge ratio is highest for concessions and
PSCs at US$22.5/bbl. For concession the highest 3 year rolling hedge ratio occurs in
2006 at US$22.5/bbl. This maximum hedge ratio shifts at higher prices to 2010. For
PSCs it occurs in 2011 at US$22.5/bbl.
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5.5. Chapter Concluding Remarks
This chapter provides asset and regime specific insights into price shock effect on the
quantum and timing of risk. I show that an analysis of the combined effects of contin-
uous oil price information and regime entitlement terms are important when hedging
physical oilfield assets. Evidence is provided that the variance minimizing hedges de-
pend on asset specific tax terms. The findings are that the two very different forms
of oil reserve ownership, production sharing and concession directly affect cash flow
responses to oil price.
I propose that future studies into forward looking hedging deltas require a detailed
analysis of operator entitlement to underlying asset cash flows. Specifically and im-
portantly for risk measurement, asset price responses are shown to have the ability
to trap volatility in discrete hedge ratios. Future scope exists to expand the work of
this chapter by including price volatility within the term structure of the asset. The
chapter contribution concerns empirical insights into the ability of price volatility to
act in concert with asset specific taxation terms to affect the timing of risk. Temporal
variance is shown to be a hidden dimensional outcome of price risk for depleting natural
resource assets.
6. Accounting for Assets
Chapter Research Focus
The findings in the previous three chapters demonstrate heterogenous asset responses to price volatility
and state agency participation. This chapter illustrates that SEC disclosures of O&G price risk of
these effects are inadequate. 292 oilfields are used to provide evidence that Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) supplementary disclosures do not capture the price sensitivities of O&G disclosures
implicit in the two main forms of oilfield ownership, concession and production sharing contracts
(PSCs).
Overview
SEC present value disclosures for both forms of ownership are shown to be significantly more responsive
to oil prices than stock return sensitivities noted by Rajgopal (1999). Importantly, I show that
unlike concessions, reserve and production disclosures vary in response to oil price movements for
PSC regimes. The results highlight the need to differentiate PSC disclosures from concession fields,
and to fully reflect price risks implicit in oilfield ownership contracts. I extend findings by Rajgopal
(1999) and propose refinements necessary to capture contractual price risk effects on SEC disclosures
for assets in the O&G sector.
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6.1. Background
This chapter provides evidence that current disclosures lack detailed asset data per-
taining to ownership structures and their exposures to oil price volatility.
In the next section I provide background in the form of the historical development
of the SEC and FASB disclosure rules, the emergence of PSCs and a brief review of
the literature that has tested these rules. In particular I emphasize the contingent and
contractual nature of PSC terms and the importance of disclosing these separately from
concession holdings. I conclude with a discussion of these results and emphasize the
need for responses from policy makers in relation to shortfalls in disclosure practice.
6. Accounting for Assets 119
6.2. Background And Prior Research
6.2.1. Current SEC Disclosures ‘presume’ Concession Reserve
Structures
SEC disclosures do not differentiate between oilfield ownership structures, notwith-
standing the very different nature of their legal entitlement to underlying reserves.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, an era dominated by concession oilfield reserve
ownership, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a series of standards dealing with the accounting
and disclosure of underlying oil and gas activities. First, the Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 19, (FASB 1977, SFAS19), required oil and gas compa-
nies to account for their oil and gas activities at historical cost using successful efforts
method (SE) instead of the full cost method (FC). Additionally, SFAS19 required the
disclosure of (1) costs incurred in production activities, (2) capitalized costs relating to
production activities, and (3) proved reserve quantities. However, the SEC unhappy
that neither the SE nor the FC methods were appropriate for communicating oil and
gas firms’ underlying asset and reserve values, developed a new method of accounting
for values of oil and gas reserves.
As a result, the SEC issued Accounting Series Releases No.253 (SEC 1978, No.253)
and No.269 (SEC 1979, No.269) through which it proposed Revenue Recognition Ac-
counting (RRA) valuing the reserves directly from estimated cash flows rather than
past incurred costs. Additionally, oil and gas firms were permitted to use either of the
SE and FC methods, which in turn instigated the FASB to issue Statement of Finan-
cial Accounting Standards No. 25 (FASB 1979, No.25), which effectively suspended the
historical cost accounting method requirement in SFAS19. Furthermore, the RRA did
not gain wide support and a few years later the SEC dropped the concept of pure cash
flow estimation (SEC 1981), handing over the issue to the FASB who were developing
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 69 (FASB 1982, No.69).
This standard, issued in 1982, established the set of reserve disclosures which to this
day determine the information content of SEC filings and financial reports. Specifically,
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neither contractually specified claims, nor the price risk exposures of physical reserves,
have historically been subject to disclosure.
To overcome this SEC shortfall, disclosure recommendations build on principles con-
tained highlighted by Rajgopal (1999) and contained in SEC ruling of 1997. Justifica-
tion for this approach is found in the SEC (SEC 1997, 6044) definition which specifically
defines market risk as the risk of loss arising from adverse changes in market rates and
prices, such as interest rates, foreign currency rates and similar market rate or price
changes.
6.2.2. The Relevance of Market Risk in Supplementary Oil and
Gas Disclosures
There is a body of literature that tests accounting measures and supplementary disclo-
sure of reserves in the oil and gas industry. I suggest that the debate in these studies
have been in part caused by the lack of data about the type of oilfield assets held by
the companies under analysis. Early researchers, for instance, hampered by the lack of
access to oilfield data and the applicable contractual terms cast doubt on the reliabil-
ity of the value relevance of historic cost and even the ‘present values’ of oil and gas
reserves (Magliolo 1986; Harris and Ohlson 1987; Shaw and Weir 1993), (Spear, 1993;
1996). Only recently have several researchers, using revised methodologies, provided
evidence supporting the value relevance of present values (Berry et al. 2004; Bryant
2003; Boone 2002). None of these studies, however, covers the distinction between the
concession and PSC contracts. Nor do they cover the relative effects of market risk (oil
price volatility) on reported reserves.
Likewise, there is little research support for the notion that contractual claims under
PSCs might require contingency disclosure under Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No.5 (FASB 1975, SFAS5). Scope for PSC disclosure may also be offered
by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.133 (FASB 1975, SFAS133) and
Financial Reporting Release No.48 (SEC 1997, No.58), which introduced a requirement
for commodity price risk disclosures. No studies have until this point applied these
statements to contingent claims against underlying oilfield assets, preferring to focus
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on their application to derivative disclosures which involve using one of three alternative
formats: tabular disclosure, response analysis or value at risk.
Rajgopal (1999), for instance, studying the informativeness of commodity price risk
financial instrument disclosures required by FR-48 (SEC 1997, FR-48), cast doubt on
claims that the new market risk disclosures do not reflect firms’ risk exposure in the oil
and gas sector. The sensitivity analysis format of the FR-48 requires firms to report
explicit estimates of fair value gains and losses on derivative positions due to changes in
the underlying commodity. In addition, it encourages firms to voluntarily present fair
value gains and losses on the underlying exposure to changes in prices. Rajgopal (1999)
did find that proxies for the fair value response of the underlying exposure (oil and gas
derivatives) were positively (negatively) associated with oil and gas betas. Moreover,
the tabular and response formats each possessed incremental utility in explaining oil
and gas betas. Currently in the O&G sector, estimates of the potential fair gains and
losses on underlying oilfield contracts are not subject to similar reporting requirements.
Rajgopal (1999) is not alone in his price risk findings, Ahmed et al. (2006), com-
pared the valuation implications of derivative fair value information – in the banking
sector. Importantly, their findings suggest that FASB (1975, SFAS133) has increased
transparency of the nature of derivative financial instruments. Again, I anticipate that
similar disclosure requirements for underlying O&G reserves would result in a trans-
parency of the contingent nature of underlying PSC contracts.
To account for uncertainty surrounding future reserves it has been recommended
(Arnott 2004) that there should be a simple adjustment to SEC rules on reserves re-
porting to require companies to show reserves booked on a field by field basis. Whilst
such finely grained tabular information might be regarded as confidential by companies
I show that, at a minimum, disclosures should distinguish between PSC and concession
reserve entitlement. This chapter adopts a position similar to that proposed for price
risk by Rajgopal (1999), establishing the need for price response disclosures of underly-
ing oilfield assets. This proposal recognizes the existence of price sensitive contractual
conditions and emphasizes the need for the commodity price responsiveness of present
values, reserves and production sharing to be disclosed.
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6.2.3. Principal differences between PSC and Concession Market
Risk Disclosures
Traditional oilfield concession ownership is found in the Gulf of Mexico, Europe, and
Australasia (amongst others). Under these royalty structures, if producers generate
a profit from ongoing extraction, they pay corporation tax, sometimes supplemented
with revenue, royalty or other taxes. In this instance, producers own the underlying
reserves, with reported reserves being the recoverable reserves from the reservoir in
total, and future physical reserve entitlement is unaffected by price volatility.
By contrast, early cost recovery production sharing contracts were signed in Indonesia
in 1965 and now exist in many of the world’s newer oil producing and Non-OECD
regions including West Africa, Kazakhstan, Indonesia and Egypt. The proliferation
of these agreements in the 1990s has been a direct result of government desire to
reclaim control of natural resources once a fair return has been earned by the corporate
producers. The PSC allows contractual contingent claims (often in forms of taxation
or production sharing) to be made against producer reserves when an agreed threshold
of return is met and costs have been covered.
At present the SEC requires a simple disclosure of price risk, measured by the re-
sponse of profits to changes in oil/gas prices. I use findings above to show that this
approach focuses on the immediate ‘income effect’ without reference to effects on sus-
tainable reserves, future production entitlement or NPV. For instance Exxon Mobil’s
2006 SEC disclosures of total price risk state:
“Crude oil, natural gas, petroleum product and chemical prices have fluc-
tuated in response to changing market forces. The effect of these price fluc-
tuations on earnings from Upstream, Downstream and Chemical operations
have varied. In the Upstream, based on the 2005 worldwide production lev-
els, a $1 per barrel change in the weighted-average realized price of oil would
have approximately a $400 million annual after-tax effect on Upstream con-
solidated plus equity company earnings. For any given period, the extent
of actual benefit or detriment will be dependent on the price movements of
individual types of crude oil, taxes and other government take effects, price
adjustment lags in long-term gas contracts, and crude and gas production
volumes. Accordingly, changes in benchmark prices for crude oil and nat-
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ural gas only provide a broad indicator of changes in earnings experienced
in any particular period.”
Conspicuously no price response is declared for disclosed SEC reserves in terms of
either quantity of reserves or production entitlement or present value. The distinction
in market risk on government take has a direct bearing on the two main components
of supplementary SEC disclosure requirements of: (1) disclosures of proved oil and gas
reserve quantities and annual changes therein, and (2) disclosures of proved oil and
gas reserve values (using a standardised measure) and annual changes therein. Proved
reserves of oil and gas1, production2 (an important element in the changes in proved
reserves) and the expected net present value of the proved oil and gas reserves (the
standardized measure3) have all been shown to be value relevant, I therefore focus on
these three SEC measures in the analysis.
The primary research question in the study is whether disclosure requirements for
price sensitive contractual claim terms should be differentiated from the SEC disclosures
1FASB (1982) defines proved oil and gas reserves as “Net quantities of an enterprise’s interests in
proved reserves and proved developed reserves of (a) crude oil (including condensate and natural
gas liquids) and (b) natural gas shall be disclosed as of the beginning and the end of the year.
‘Net’ quantities of reserves include those relating to the enterprise’s operating and nonoperating
interests in properties as defined in paragraph 11(a) of Statement 19. Quantities of reserves relating
to royalty interests owned shall be included in ‘net’ quantities if the necessary information is
available to the enterprise; if reserves relating to royalty interests owned are not included because
the information is unavailable, that fact and the enterprise’s share of oil and gas produced for those
royalty interests shall be disclosed for the year. “Net” quantities shall not include reserves relating
to interests of others in properties owned by the enterprise.”
2FASB (1982) includes production of oil and gas in its definition of the changes in proved reserves:
“Changes in the net quantities of an enterprise’s proved reserves of oil and of gas during the year
shall be disclosed. Changes resulting from each of the following shall be shown separately with
appropriate explanation of significant changes; (a) Revisions of previous estimates, (b) Improved
recovery, (c) Purchases of minerals in place, (d) Extensions and discoveries, (e) Production and (f)
Sales of minerals in place.”
3FASB (1982) defines the standardized measure as “A standardized measure of discounted future net
cash flows relating to an enterprise’s interests in (a) proved oil and gas reserves (paragraph 10)
and (b) oil and gas subject to purchase under long-term supply, purchase, or similar agreements
and contracts in which the enterprise participates in the operation of the properties on which the
oil or gas is located or otherwise serves as the producer of those reserves (paragraph 13) shall
be disclosed as of the end of the year. The standardized measure of discounted future net cash
flows relating to those two types of interests in reserves may be combined for reporting purposes.
The following information shall be disclosed in the aggregate and for each geographic area for
which reserve quantities are disclosed in accordance with paragraph 12; (a) Future cash inflows,
(b) Future development and production costs, (c) Future income tax expenses, (d) Future net cash
flows, (e) Discount and (f) Standardized measure of discounted future net cash flows.”
6. Accounting for Assets 124
designed for concession entitlement. I find it instructive to isolate the price variable
nature of oilfields by using the sample to examine both the amount and the response
of SEC disclosures to oil price variations. Expectations are clear, if SEC concession
and PSC supplementary disclosure responses across the empirical sample prove to be
differentially responsive to market risks, then as noted by Rajgopal (1999) there would
be justification for their separate disclosure.
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6.3. Research Design
I conduct an empirical study of how, when subject to commodity price variability,
ownership disclosures differ across ownership regimes, and even within regimes. The
first test is for the significance of response differences between PSC and concession
SEC disclosure requirements. A comparative empirical analysis of PSC and concession
oil and gas price responses against GoM concession benchmarks allows me to achieve
two insights; firstly, I conduct an analysis of concession oil price responses relative to
the GoM – identifying regime differences between concessions and PSCs. Secondly,
PSC fields were compared to GoM – identifying the extent of inter sample differences.
This approach provides consistent and comparable country insights for all three SEC
disclosures, testing whether Corporate SEC PSC and concession disclosures for oil and
gas reserves, production and NPV responses differ by country – when compared to
GoM concession disclosures.
The second test lifts out the potential differences between PSC regimes by comparing
PSCs against each other. This enables the determination of whether it is sufficient to
disclose PSC as a homogenous group or whether the wide range of PSC terms illustrated
in Appendix 2.1 make it necessary to disclose PSC terms individually.
6.3.1. The Model – Demonstrating Differences in SEC Disclosures
for PSC and Concession
Taxation models are computationally intensive and differ (in line with tax terms) from
regime to regime and indeed from field to field. The strength of my analysis is that
field by field taxation computations are individually performed for the actual taxation
terms applicable for each of the 292 oilfields for each of the five prices. Country tax
protocols are programmed into GEM and used to underpin an empirical comparison
of differential SEC disclosures as between actual PSC and concessionary ownership
structures for oilfields in the sample.
To provide the reader with an understanding of the method and details of PSC
oilfield calculations, an example of one actual field’s calculations at a base case price
of US$45/bbl are shown in Appendices 1 and 2. Due to the practical difficulties of
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disclosing detailed PSC tax calculations on a field by field basis for all fields at all
price decks, I do not show these separately, but provide an overview of the range of
concession and PSC terms applicable to fields in the sample in Appendix, Table 2.1.
I use an actual Angolan field (with the production profile altered to preserve con-
fidentiality) to provide a simplified insight into the differences that the application of
the P45 price deck to different concession and PSC terms cause.
4 Firstly, I treat the
field as if it is held under a domestic Angolan PSC agreement (Appendix 2.2) and
then under GoM concession terms (Appendix, Table 2.6). I use the specimen field to
derive and calculate each figure in the P45 columns of Table 6.1. This gives the PSC
disclosures for reserves (408 mmboe), production (9000 boe/day) and NPV (US$3182
million) figures for an oil price scenario of US$45/bbl in 2006, Appendix 1. Similarly,
I calculate the three SEC measures for the same hypothetical field - identical to the
specimen PSC field in every respect save that it is subject to concessionary terms. For
purposes of the comparison, I have used the terms applicable to a GoM deepwater field.
Appendix, Table 2.7 gives the SEC calculation of reserves (700 mmboe), production
(9000 boe/day) and NPV (US$6545 million).
The price response analysis of disclosures, as supported by taxation computations
for each field, is presented over 5 price ranges. As the benchmark I set US$45/bbl
as the base case price deck, with the US$45/bbl price deck analogous to the year end
price used in current SEC disclosures. The choice of price range is judgemental based
on recent (2006) oil prices and their potential option implied volatility; I calculate
SEC disclosures at US$45/bbl, the base case price, two upside price decks US$67.5/bbl
and US$90/bbl, as well as two downside decks of US$33.75/bbl and US$22.5/bbl to
demonstrate the price variable response of SEC disclosures.
Table 6.1 sets out an analysis of disclosure performances on either side of the P45 price
deck, and provides a summary of how Angolan field disclosures look as at January 2006
under different price assumptions. The P22.5 – P45 comparison illustrates the effect that
price variability can have upon ownership SEC disclosures, and serves to demonstrate
the motivation for this study. The first point to note is that concession reserves remain
constant at 700mmboe while reserves vary from 240mmboe to 659mmboe under PSC
4The production profile has been changed to preserve confidentiality.
6. Accounting for Assets 127
Table 6.1. Angolan Oilfield Calculated under Angolan and GoM Tax Terms
Angolan Field Oil and gas reserves, oil and gas production and net present value of reserves at
January 2006 – Under Angolan domestic tax terms and Gulf of Mexico concession tax terms.
Absolute figures are presented in US$M.
Angolan Field under Angolan Field under
Domestic PSC Tax Terms GoM Concession Tax Terms
P22.5 P33.75 P45 P67.5 P90 P22.5 P33.75 P45 P67.5 P90
Reserves 659 550 408 293 240 700 700 700 700 700
(mmboe)
Production 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
(’000boe/d)
Remaining NPV 1989 3053 3182 3842 4334 2659 4769 6545 11053 15227
(US$ millions)
terms. Table 6.1 shows that even at a low initial oil price, US$22.5/bbl, production
sharing commences.
As the oil price increases, PSC contract terms result in reserves being recouped by
government claims, reducing corporate entitlement to 240mmboe at US$90/bbl, less
than half the original entitlement. Production appears to remain constant under both
regimes. This will be shown to be a short term effect; while concession production does
in fact remain constant under differing price scenarios, PSC production terms would
vary over time - see Figure 6.1. A PSC phenomenon that would occur if higher prices
were to persist and result in operators earning their contracted returns through price
increases rather than production volumes.
Finally, while the NPV of the specimen field does vary under both structures –
concession fiscal take only increases as a result of price movement, while the PSC
reserve claw back is dictated by fiscal terms in Appendix, Table 2.1, where NPV is a
composite of price and quantity of oil reserves, discounted at a rate of 10%, in line with
SEC regulations.
6.3.2. Empirical Tests of SEC Disclosure Responses
I present tests for differences – as to how actual SEC disclosures respond to price
changes across the oilfield sample in three parts; first I reflect the rate of change for the
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Figure 6.1. Expected Development of Production Entitlement Over Time for a Hypothet-
ical Angolan Oil Field under Conditions of Oil Price Volatility
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price intervals, then I reflect statistical tests of difference between PSCs and concessions
as represented by GoM. Specifically, disclosure responses are calculated for each field
within five specific prices (two on either side of US$45/bbl) to give an indication of
the magnitude of change in the SEC disclosures per one percent change in the oil and
gas price. For instance, I simulate the response of reserves, production and remaining
PV when the oil prices fall from the P45 to the P33.75 scenario. Reserve entitlement
responses between two price scenarios (referred to as P1 and P2) are calculated for
each field in all six countries as follows5:




where RP1 and RP2 refer to the entitled SEC reserves R22.5, R33.75, R45, R67.5 and
R90 (in mmboe) under P1 and P2, respectively, under each of the stylised five price
scenarios. For instance, the reserve response between the P45 (P2) and P33.7 (P1)
price decks would be calculated as (R33.75−R45)/R45
(P33.75−P45)/P45 Production entitlement responses are
calculated as follows:




where QP1 and QP2 refer to the entitled SEC production Q22.5, Q33.75, Q45, Q67.5 and
Q90 (in mmboe) under P1 and P2, respectively, under each of the stylised five price
scenarios. PV responses are calculated as follows:




where NPVP1 and NPVP2 refer to the remaining PVs: NPV22.5, NPV33.75, NPV45,
NPV67.5 and NPV90 (in mmboe) under P1 and P2, respectively, under each of the
stylised five price scenarios.
The above allow an analysis of whether the commodity price responses of SEC disclo-
sures in the concession regimes NCS and UKCS, and the PSC regimes Angola, Egypt
5Formulae are applied such that when P1<P45, the P1 is further from P2, and when P1 is greater
than P45 then P1 >P2
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and Indonesia are statistically different from the equivalent responses in the concession
countries US GoM, NCS and UKCS. The use of t-tests for difference are based on un-
derlying field data. This approach introduces the principle that differential responses
of SEC measures is based on ownership structures an demonstrate material variations
in current disclosure between PSC and concession fields.
6.3.3. Sample Selection and Data
The sample represents oilfields containing between 80% and 90 percent of the total
remaining oil and gas reserves in GoM, NCS, Angola, Egypt and Indonesia and ap-
proximately 50% of the reserves in UKCS. I am guided in stratification by the findings
of Kretzschmar and Moles (2006) who in their study of real option models found that
fields displayed size varying characteristics. Fields with less than 6 million barrels of
remaining oil and gas equivalent were therefore eliminated as abandonment expenses
introduce idiosyncratic behaviour that would focus on the tax relief of abandonment
costs rather than reserve disclosures for the predominantly producing fields in the study
(see Table 6.2). To my knowledge, no other academic study of oilfield ownership be-
haviour have analysed samples of a similar size. Each of the six regimes in the sample
was selected for their fiscal homogeneity (Appendix, Table 2.1).
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Table 6.2. Sample and Population Overview
The table describes the sample with regards to the number of oilfields and the total sample size
(measured by total remaining oil and gas reserves), by country and by fiscal regime (concession vs
PSC). For comparison, the number of oilfields and total size of reserves in the total population are
shown. Fields are presented in absolute numbers, reserve figures are presented in mmboe.
Sample Population Sample % of Population
# Fields Reserves # Fields Reserves # Fields Reserves
Panel A: Concession
GOM 50 6063 130 7467 38.5% 81.2%
NCS 50 25851 105 27311 47.6% 94.7%
UKCS 67 5431 380 10127 17.6% 53.6%
CON 167 37345 615 44905 27.2% 83.2%
Panel B: PSC
Angola 28 8636 48 10755 58.3% 80.3%
Egypt 42 6123 53 6712 79.2% 91.2%
Indonesia 55 10722 71 12426 77.5% 86.3%
PSC 125 25481 172 29893 72.7% 85.2%
Total Sample 292 62826 787 74798 37.1% 84.0%
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6.4. Empirical Results
In this section I report the results of tests for differences between field disclosure re-
sponses to price movements. GoM fields are used as a concession benchmark for differ-
ential responses of fields in the UKCS and NCS. Similarly Angola, Egypt and Indonesia
responses are in turn tested against GoM in order to compare PSC SEC disclosure re-
sponses with concessions. I also test for differences between individual countries.
6.4.1. SEC Reserve Disclosure Responses to Oil Price Variations –
Comparisons to the GoM Benchmark
Concession reserve entitlement does not move in response to oil price changes (upper
half of Table 6.3). The UK and Norway concession reserve responses are identical to
GoM in showing no response to changing prices in Panel A. By contrast, the lower
half of Panel A provides insights into the price response of reserve entitlements for oil
companies with reserves in PSC regimes. t-tests reported in Table 6.3 Panel B show
that PSCs are (all) significantly different from GoM responses at the 0.1 percent level.
The results layout allows readers to break reserve responses into price ranges and
show that the PSC sample measured by Angolan, Egyptian and Indonesian fields are
substantially influenced by changes in oil and gas prices. This reflects the intuition of
Rajgopal (1999) that beta responses depend on the periodicity and price ruling for the
measurement interval. Jin and Jorion (2006) also mentioned the locality of oilfields
as having an effect on prices obtained for resources, findings supported by out tabular
analysis. For instance, when the oil price (and similarly the gas price per boe) decreases
by 33.3% from US$33.75/bbl to US$22.5/bbl, the reserve response as per the formula
is −0.253 for Egypt, −0.324 for Indonesia, and −0.451 in the case of Angola (Table 6.3,
Panel A). This means, for example, that the reserve entitlement for Egypt increases by
25.3% of 33.3%, an increase in actual physical reserves of 8.4 percent. Thus, over the
price range, the impact on reserve entitlement is approximately a quarter the size of
the price change. Similarly the impact for Indonesia is 32.4% of the price change and
for Angola it is 45.1%. The negative signs of the reserve responses in Table 6.3 indicate
that reserves move in the opposite direction to price. The movement encapsulates
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the response of disclosures to moves in oil prices – away from the year end levels of
US$45/bbl – that would be shown using SEC guidelines. There is for PSCs therefore
an increase in reserve entitlement as price falls and vice versa. It is also noteworthy
that, in the case of Egypt and Angola the reserve responses peak in the price range
US$45/bbl to US$33.75/bbl whereas for Indonesia the most response is in the lower
price range of US$33.75/bbl to US$22.5/bbl. The pattern of reserve responses is a
function of the terms of the PSC with the older Indonesian agreements being crafted
in an era of lower oil price expectations.
When the oil price increases by 33.3% from US$67.5/bbl to US$90/bbl, Table 6.3
shows a response in reserve entitlement of 0.130 (of 33.3%) for Indonesia, 0.132 for
Egypt and 0.388 in the case of Angola. These responses represent decreases in reserve
entitlement as price rises. In all three cases the rate of decrease is moderated as prices
rise (in the case of Angola from a response of 0.405 over the range from US$45/bbl to
US$67.5/bbl to 0.388 over the range US$67.5/bbl to US$90/bbl). Importantly, rate of
change is dependent on PSC contract terms as they apply to the field and again varies
by price range, depending on the contract terms.
6.4.2. SEC Reserve Disclosure Responses to Oil Price Variations –
Comparisons between PSC Regimes
PSCs in turn demonstrate a wide range of responses between different PSC contracts in
response to the same price change. Angola has the most aggressive production sharing
terms, resulting in a 0.405 (of 50%) reserve decrease for the 50% increase in price from
US$45/bbl to US$67.5/bbl. (Egypt and Indonesia are both at 0.154). It is relevant to
note that this effect is opposite on the downside, with reserves disclosed increasing for
Angola by a rate of 0.684 of 33.3% in response to a 33.3% fall in price from US$45/bbl
to US$33.75/bbl.
The significant differences in reserve responses between Angola and both Egypt and
Indonesia support the proposal that not only should there be separate reserve disclo-
sures for PSCs in the first instance, but also separate disclosure by contract type.
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Table 6.3. Responses of Reserve Entitlement to Oil and Gas Price Change
Panel A denotes reserves disclosure response in reaction to price movements. In Panel B, t-tests
are carried out between GoM (benchmark) and UKCS, NCS, Angola, Egypt and Indonesia to test
if responses of production SEC disclosures are significantly different from those of GoM oilfields.
In Panel C, tests for difference are also carried out between individual countries. The existence of
significant differences is verified through 2-tailed t-tests run at the field level of the selected sample.
Significance at a 90%, 95% level and 99% level are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively; n.s.
denotes non-significance; p-values are quoted in parentheses. Absolute figures are presented in US$M.
P22.5/P33.75 P33.75/P45 P67.5/P45 P90/P67.5
Panel A: Reserve Response
Concession
GoM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NCS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
UKCS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PSC
Angola -0.451 -0.684 -0.405 -0.388
Egypt -0.253 -0.271 -0.154 -0.132
Indonesia -0.324 -0.297 -0.154 -0.130
Panel B: Statistical Analysis (Concession vs PSC)
GoM vs Angola *** *** *** ***
GoM vs Egypt *** *** *** ***
GoM vs Indonesia *** *** *** ***
Panel C: Statistical Analysis (Intra-Regime Comparison)
Concession
GoM vs NCS — — — —
GoM vs UKCS — — — —
NCS vs UKCS — — — —
PSC
Angola vs Egypt * *** *** ***
Angola vs Indonesia ns *** *** ***
Egypt vs Indonesia ns ns ns ns
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6.4.3. SEC Production Disclosures – Responses to Oil Price
Variations – Comparisons to the GoM Benchmark
Production results deconstruct reserve entitlement into annualised production, provid-
ing evidence that production in concession regimes is unaffected by changes in oil and
gas prices. The production volumes that oil companies are entitled to report remain
constant at 100%, Table 6.4, Panel A.
6.4.4. SEC Production Disclosure Responses to Oil Price
Variations – Comparisons between PSC Regimes
On the other hand, production entitlement in Angola, Egypt and Indonesia are consid-
erably affected. For example, a 33.3% decrease in oil and gas prices from US$33.75/bbl
to US$22.5/bbl increases production entitlement by 0.205 (of 33.3%) for Egypt, by
0.291 for Angola and by 0.466 in the case of Indonesia. Likewise, a 33.3% increase in
the commodity price from US$67.5/bbl to US$90/bbl will lead to reserve decreases of
0.064 (of 33.3%) for Indonesia, 0.106 for Egypt and 0.181 in the case of Angola. The
negative signs assigned to reserve responses in Table 6.4 indicate that production enti-
tlement moves in the opposite direction to price. The responses for Egypt and Angola
are all significantly different from those in GoM at either the 1% or the 0.1% level.
Table 6.4 shows that the three PSC countries of Angola, Egypt and Indonesia are
not significantly different from each other in terms of the 2006 production response to
2006 price change. However, Figure 6.1 demonstrates that such a price change does
differentially change the pattern of production entitlement for PSC countries in the
longer term. It is this longer term differential impact on production that is picked up
in the forthcoming paragraphs which examine PV responses to price change.
6.4.5. SEC PV Disclosure Responses to Oil Price Variations –
Comparisons to the GoM Benchmark
Table 6.5, Panel A reports responses in oilfield PV to changing oil and gas prices. As
before, Panel B also reports the results of t tests to responses between each country and
6. Accounting for Assets 136
Table 6.4. Responses of Production Entitlement to Oil and Gas Price Change
Panel A denotes production disclosure response in reaction to price movements. In Panel B, t-tests
are carried out between GoM (benchmark) and UKCS, NCS, Angola, Egypt and Indonesia to test
if responses of production SEC disclosures are significantly different from those of GoM oilfields.
In Panel C, tests for difference are also carried out between individual countries. The existence of
significant differences is verified through 2-tailed t-tests run at the field level of the selected sample.
Significance at a 90%, 95% level and 99% level are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively; n.s.
denotes non-significance; p-values are quoted in parentheses. Absolute figures are presented in US$M.
P22.5/P33.75 P33.75/P45 P67.5/P45 P90/P67.5
Panel A: Production Response
Concession
GoM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NCS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
UKCS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PSC
Angola -0.291 -0.348 -0.162 -0.181
Egypt -0.205 -0.169 -0.087 -0.106
Indonesia -0.466 -0.142 -0.173 0.064
Panel B: Statistical Analysis (Concession vs PSC)
GoM vs Angola *** ** *** ***
GoM vs Egypt *** *** ** ***
GoM vs Indonesia * n.s. *** n.s.
Panel C: Statistical Analysis (Intra-Regime Comparison)
Concession
GoM vs NCS — — — —
GoM vs UKCS — — — —
NCS vs UKCS — — — —
PSC
Angola vs Egypt ns ns ns ns
Angola vs Indonesia ns ns ns ns
Egypt vs Indonesia ns ns ns ns
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the GoM benchmark and between individual countries. The difficulty in interpreting
causality behind changes in the PV measure stems from the fact that it is a composite
of price and production, discounted at the SEC rate of 10%. Thus the effect of oil
prices upon PV is somewhat more difficult to interpret, possibly contributing to the
need for Boone (2002) to revisit previous value relevance studies. It can be seen from
Table 6.5 that for all countries the PV response increases as prices fall with the largest
responses being to a fall in price from US$33.75/bbl to US$22.5/bbl. For example, in
GoM such a 33.3% fall induces an even bigger percentage fall in PV being 1.306 times
33.3%. Nevertheless there are significant differences between the PV responses.
Table 6.5 shows that for price changes from US$33.75/bbl to US$22.5/bbl, Indonesia,
a PSC field and NCS, a concession field, have PV response that is significantly different
(at the 1% level) from the GOM benchmark. However at higher prices (P67.5/P45 and
above it is Angola and Egypt that have the significantly higher PV price response
compared to the GOM benchmark.
6.4.6. SEC PV Disclosure Responses to Oil Price Variations –
Comparisons between PSC Regimes
At high oil prices all oilfields experience an increase in PV if prices rise but those of
Egypt, and in particular Angola, rise at a significantly lower rate. This is a reflection
of the claw-back of reserves by the Angolan/Egyptian government under their PSC
terms. Angola has the most aggressive claw-back. For example, a 50% increase in price
from US$45/bbl to US$67.5/bbl results in a PV increase of only 0.33 of 50%. Table
6.5 shows that Angola PV responses are significantly different from Egypt at all price
ranges and from Indonesia at the higher price ranges, once again supporting the need
for separate SEC disclosures for the individual PSC fields.
6.4.7. Price and SEC Disclosures - Assessing Current Reserves,
Production and NPV Reporting
At present the SEC requires a simple disclosure of price risk, measured by the response
of profits to changes in oil and gas prices. Conspicuously no price response is declared
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Table 6.5. Responses of Remaining Oilfield PV to Oil and Gas Price Change
Panel A denotes PV disclosure response in reaction to price movements. In Panel B, t-tests are
carried out between GoM (benchmark) and UKCS, NCS, Angola, Egypt and Indonesia to test if
responses of production SEC disclosures are significantly different from those of GoM oilfields. In
Panel C, tests for difference are also carried out between individual countries. The existence of
significant differences is verified through 2-tailed t-tests run at the field level of the selected sample.
Significance at a 90%, 95% level and 99% level are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively; n.s.
denotes non-significance; p-values are quoted in parentheses. Absolute figures are presented in US$M.
P22.5/P33.75 P33.75/P45 P67.5/P45 P90/P67.5
Panel A: NPV Response
Concession
GoM 1.306 1.197 1.196 1.121
NCS 2.159 1.288 1.243 1.071
UKCS 1.603 1.401 1.352 1.240
PSC
Angola 1.587 0.713 0.330 0.332
Egypt 1.190 0.974 0.964 0.972
Indonesia 1.976 1.318 1.266 1.125
Panel B: Statistical Analysis (Concession vs PSC)
GoM vs Angola n.s. *** *** ***
GoM vs Egypt n.s. *** *** ***
GoM vs Indonesia ** * n.s. n.s.
Panel C: Statistical Analysis (Intra-Regime Comparison)
Concession
GoM vs NCS * n.s. n.s. n.s.
GoM vs UKCS n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
NCS vs UKCS n.s. n.s. n.s. *
PSC
Angola vs Egypt *** *** *** ***
Angola vs Indonesia ns * *** ***
Egypt vs Indonesia ns *** *** ***
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Table 6.6. Reserves Entitlement (mmboe) and Changes in Reserves (Relative to Base
Case, US$45/bbl)
Corporate entitlement to oil and gas reserves is calculated for five specific oil price decks (US$22.5/bbl,
US$33.75/bbl, US$45/bbl, US$67.5/bbl and US$90/bbl) for each oilfield in the sample (292 in total).
For instance, a P45 price deck (and base case) represents the case where the expected oil price (Brent
blend) for 2006 is US$45/bbl, and results in a reserve entitlement of R45. The values in the table
above show both the total corporate reserve entitlement for all the oilfields by country, for each of
the five price decks, and the changes in total country reserve entitlement compared to the US$45/bbl
of oil base case. Absolute figures are presented in US$M.
P22.5 P33.75 P45 P67.5 P90
Price Change relative to P45 -50% -25% 0% 50% 100%
Panel A: Concession
GoM Reserves entitlement 6123 6123 6123 6123 6123
Response to oil price change relative to P45 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
NCS Reserves entitlement 25851 25851 25851 25851 25851
Response to oil price change relative to P45 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
UKCS Reserves entitlement 5431 5431 5431 5431 5431
Response to oil price change relative to P45 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Panel B: PSC
Angola Reserves entitlement 6845 5877 4969 3698 3110
Response to oil price change relative to P45 38% 18% 0% -26% -37%
Egypt Reserves entitlement 3899 3664 3498 3327 3242
Response to oil price change relative to P45 11% 5% 0% -5% -7%
Indonesia Reserves entitlement 12664 10786 10723 10027 9679
Response to oil price change relative to P45 18% 1% 0% -6% -10%
for the disclosed SEC reserves in terms of either quantity of reserves or production
entitlement or present value. This omission could be rectified by an SEC/FASB re-
quirement for straightforward tabular disclosure as illustrated in Tables 6.6 and 6.7,
differentiating between Concessions and PSCs for both the quantity and present value
of proven reserves over a range of prices.
The tabular disclosure encapsulates the asymmetrical relationship between price and
PSC reserves, reflected in Table 6.6. Concession reserve entitlement does not change
in response to price movements, with the response remaining firmly at 0 on the Y axis.
Angola shows the most variance followed by Egypt and Indonesia. The price response
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Table 6.7. NPV (US$M) and Changes in NPV (Relative to Base Case, US$45/bbl)
Corporate entitlement to the net present value of the remaining oil and gas reserves is calculated for
five specific oil price decks (US$22.5/bbl, US$33.75/bbl, US$45/bbl, US$67.5/bbl and US$90/bbl)
for each oilfield in the sample (292 in total). For instance, a P45 price deck (and base case) represents
the case where the expected oil price (Brent blend) for 2006 is US$45/bbl, and results in a remaining
NPV of NPV45. The values in the table above show both the total corporate remaining NPV for all
the oilfields by country, for each of the five price decks, and the changes in total country remaining
NPV compared to the US$45/bbl of oil base case. Absolute figures are presented in US$M.
P22.5 P33.75 P45 P67.5 P90
Price Change relative to P45 -50% -25% 0% 50% 100%
Panel A: Concession
GoM Remaining NPV (US$M) 25475 45328 66174 106792 147400
Response to oil price change relative to P45 -62% -32% 0% 61% 123%
NCS Remaining NPV (US$M) 29015 56614 82110 132387 182483
Response to oil price change relative to P45 -65% -31% 0% 61% 122%
UKCS Remaining NPV (US$M) 20518 28594 41184 67050 92848
Response to oil price change relative to P45 -50% -31% 0% 63% 125%
Panel B: PSC
Angola Remaining NPV (US$M) 19166 33092 41016 50576 58530
Response to oil price change relative to P45 -53% -19% 0% 23% 43%
Egypt Remaining NPV (US$M) 6720 14101 18851 27958 36966
Response to oil price change relative to P45 -64% -25% 0% 48% 96%
Indonesia Remaining NPV (US$M) 9334 20178 30238 49800 69296
Response to oil price change relative to P45 -69% -33% 0% 65% 129%
of PSC reserves is also not linear across the range of prices, reflecting the differing
contract terms from Appendix 3.
The same price asymmetry exists with PV except that the asymmetry is less given
the compensatory effects of price increases. Figure 6.2, (a), pulls the price response
of reserves together with Figure 6.2, (b), which shows the NPV response to price
variations. The effect of the plus 50 and plus 100% price movement effects are most
apparent in Angola, where aggressive production sharing causes reserves entitlement to
fall 40%, while the corresponding growth in PSC NPV is 25% (relative to concession
regime reserve loss of zero percent and NPV gain of 125%).
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Figure 6.2. The Oil Price Relationship between Reserves and NPV
Distinction is made between countries based on specific tax terms aggregated across the sample.
Concession tax terms are represented by the US Gulf of Mexico (GoM), the Norwegian Continental
Shelf (NCS) and the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS), and production-sharing contract tax terms are
represented by Angola, Egypt and Indonesia. Changes in aggregate reserves are plotted against changes
in oil prices relative to US$45/bbl (a) and aggregate remaining NPV (b) when oil price changes from
a base case of US$45/bbl.
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6.5. Chapter Concluding Remarks
The SEC disclosure presumption that entitlements are consistent across ownership
structures has been shown to be incorrect for all three SEC measures. I suggest that the
practice of reporting year end reserves as a homogenous asset class conceals value rele-
vant information that would enable analysts to determine companies with oil reserves
most affected by price movements. The arguments in support of my recommendations
are rehearsed in the following paragraphs.
In essence I question the very tenets of SEC resource disclosures. I base the enquiry
on the existence of undisclosed claims in oilfield ownership contracts; noting that an oil
and gas firm value can be decomposed into (1) the present value of future discretionary
cash flows, (2) the present value of proven reserves (less contingencies) and (3) the
present value of growth and development opportunities associated unproven reserves.
Given declining reserve opportunities and the emergence of production sharing con-
tracts (PSCs) an important corporate value determinant is the role that government
contractual take (and hence residual corporate entitlement) plays in each of these three
value elements. Each element is contractually dependent upon an assumed pattern of
future oil prices, and as energy prices rise, fields producing through production sharing
contracts are shown to have their ‘bookable’ barrels reduced due to participation by
the local government.
PSCs are expected to increasingly affect the value of growth and development op-
portunities for oil companies as most of the regions of the world where opportunities
exist, are adopting PSC arrangements. Since growth and development opportunities
do not form part of the current supplementary disclosures, I do not examine this third
effect, but I have examined the effect of PSC arrangements upon proven reserve quan-
tities, their present values and upon production. Although SEC disclosures are made
net of contingent claims (at year end prices), the size of potential contractual claims
is not disclosed and hence the effect of the PSC terms at year end prices, let alone
their potential effect at future prices, is not readily understood by users of financial
information.
I have provided an overview of contract terms for a sample of countries through
which I make a rigorous empirical investigation of the effect of PSCs upon the SEC
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reserve disclosures. I find that, in comparison to concessionary terms, the present
value of reported reserves under PSCs, is significantly more sensitive to oil and gas
prices. Moreover, PSC terms directly affect both reserve and production quantities also
making these disclosures sensitive to oil and gas prices. Hence company entitlement is
difficult to understand in a period of price change and volatility. This in turn makes
the analyst’s assessment of the annual replacement of reserves more difficult, and the
isolation of sustainable discretionary cash flow problematic. Another effect is that on
earnings disclosure - as the price of oil rises and a larger share of production comes
from PSC regimes, oil companies will experience a larger effective tax take. This means
that if the current relationship between concession and PSC tax rates hold, companies
with larger PSC holdings are likely to experience greater increases in effective tax rates
than those with concession holdings.
Chapter recommendations suggest that as a minimum there should be separate PSC
and concession reserve disclosures. Secondly, I recommend that supplementary infor-
mation should reflect the disclosure response, resulting from contractual obligations, of
SEC reserve disclosures to oil and gas price changes. As a general rule I propose that
there be separate reserve disclosures whenever differences in contract terms result in
significantly different price response behaviours. The recommendations are to a large
extent an extension of emergent principles contained in the extension to SEC (1997)
dated June 15 1998 which require corporates to disclose market risk exposures resul-
tant from derivative and underlying non derivative items (or contractual positions) that
affect a reader’s understanding of the balance sheet. I conclude that contingencies as-
sociated with proven reserves are important data needed for the valuation of oil and gas
companies. It is not clear whether, despite non-disclosure, there is market recognition
of the difference in reserve holdings. This work is performed in the following chapter.
7. State, Size and Book to Market
Factors in Earnings and Returns
Chapter Research Focus
This final chapter of this (O&G) sector study uses the ‘constrained capital characteristic’ of physical
natural resource assets, and the state agency attribute of directly taxing oilfield assets to directly
address an outstanding research question posed by Fama French (1995). I provide market evidence
that global variations in state participation terms produce variations in shareholder earnings and
returns that are not captured by an overall market factor. The state variable also explains energy
sector anomalies in risk premiums in stock returns associated with size and BE/ME (Fama and French
1993). Specifically, I find market evidence that companies with OECD asset holdings outperform those
with Non- OECD assets, with earnings and returns differentiated from OECD assets by progressive
state participation tax terms.
Overview
This study provides market evidence of the effects of economic state variables on stock returns and
risk premia. Corporate values are underpinned by state reserve participation terms that directly
affect corporate cash flow entitlement. Non-OECD contracts favor sovereign state asset participation
resulting in relative stock return under-performance compared to companies invested in OECD oil
assets. I provide evidence of variation in corporate wealth not captured by an overall market factor
and demonstrate that state variables limit the value of emerging market investment.
Research Acknowledgements
This chapter was suggested by my supervisor Dr Paul André – and a version is planned for journal
submission – early in 2007. Kretzschmar (2007)
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7.1. Background
This section provides insights into an important open research question by identifying
and isolating state variables that produce variation in corporate returns. A research
objective in finance has long been to identify state variables not captured by an overall
market factor. Many papers have sought to critique and refine the underlying approach
of Fama French (Fama and French 1993; 1995; 2002). Lakonishok et al. (1994) for
instance focus on growth rates of earnings and the pricing of earnings growth,suggesting
that the superior observed return from high-book-to-market stocks are corrections of
irrational pricing. Fama and French (1995) refute this explanation and suggest that if
size and BE/ME factors are the result of rational pricing processes they are likely to be
driven by factors common to expected earnings. Fama French, are explicit and generous
in their articulation of open research questions and suggest guidance for future research.
In Fama and French (1995), they identify and articulate the unanswered questions in
inter-temporal asset pricing, for which size and BE/ME are likely proxies for sensitivity
to risk factors in returns.
Recent works for instance by Petkova (2006) have begun to take up the challenge,
examining predictive economic state variables that affect the yield curve and conditional
distribution of asset returns. This is certainly a valid approach but one that overlooks
the sector and country specific nature of state variables. The approach continues to fall
foul of identified difficulties associated with accurate measurement of state variables.
The general expectation offered by Petkova (2006) is that HML and SMB loadings
should lose explanatory power when predictive economic state variables are identified.
I concur but suggest that future work that add predictive state variables to Fama
French will need to recognise the attributes of country and sector specificities. Our
work suggests that the Fama French Three-Factor Model for returns is likely to progress
through the isolation of measurable sector and country specific macroeconomic state
variables rather than global measures of GDP or consumption growth. This approach
brings together the industry importance findings by Cavaglia et al. (2000), with country
factors Bekaert and Harvey (2002), and will provide a basis for understanding the
conditions under which equity premia findings by Mehra and Prescott (1985) hold.
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I suggest that it is precisely sector specificities in state variables that provide insights
into underlying causes of risk and return premia in the Fama and French (1993) Three-
Factor Model and propose a country location factor to provide sector insights into the
first of two open questions identified by Fama and French (1995). Findings are aided
by oil and gas sector attributes, state participation attaches to asset cash flows, as
opposed to the corporate entity. State participation is calculated at or near the oilfield
well-head. Country specific state oilfield participation, therefore, enables a direct link
between field taxation terms and corporate returns in the context of Fama and French
(1995).
Candidate state variables of gross national product and consumption are noted to
have measurement problems that are overcome by isolating state asset participation in
the homogenous oil and gas sector. The state return from oilfield assets is directly af-
fected by the nature of fiscal participation and draws on prior findings that demonstrate
that state participation varies widely depending on economic rent sharing principles be-
tween the state and the corporate (Adelman 1972). Specifically, in this prior work we
show emerging market assets in Non-OECD countries have state participation terms
that differ from those applied to oilfield assets in OECD countries. This distinction
enables the introduction of a proxy measure of state asset participation captured by
the R-factor. The use of a single sector to overcome endogeneity in the measurement of
risk and return variables has precedent in Jin and Jorion (2006) and is used to isolate
the effects of state participation in oilfield assets on the returns of corporate oilfield
operators.
This chapter builds on previous work where I identify that global variations exist
in state participation in the oil and gas sector. The previous chapters show that the
state participation factor suggests that variation in global fiscal participation terms are
able to forecast future investment performance in the oil and gas sector. By adding a
reserve location factor (R-factor) to the Fama-French Three Factor Model as a proxy I
show that the inclusion of a sector specific state variable provides insights into causes
of variation behind size and BE/ME effects for companies with global oil and gas asset
holdings. The addition of a state variable meets the Cochrane (2001) requirement of
including only factors that directly forecast future investment returns. The R-factor
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isolates a natural resource sector variable that is able to explain the causes of uniden-
tified risk and return premia associated with the size and BE/ME factors defined by
Fama and French (1995).
I provide evidence that progressive state oilfield participation effectively limits the
corporate value of emerging market O&G investment relative to developed markets.
Findings support financial market results by Stulz (2005) and enable an analysis of the
market effect of global differences in economic state variables (implicit in regulatory,
fiscal and legal differences). In developed markets, the state generally participates in
O&G assets in the form of profit taxation, while in Non-OECD countries. State par-
ticipation in the form of Non-OECD production sharing O&G contracts are contrasted
with concession state participation structures in OECD countries.1
Market findings contrast with prior equity market studies by Mehra and Prescott
(1985) and Bekaert et al. (2005) who suggest that emerging markets provide consistent
and compensatory value premia. Findings in this study mitigate against neoclassical
theory that anticipates large capital flows toward developing country oil and gas sectors.
Emerging market O&G reserve entitlement limits the upside for company earnings,
with the potential for knock on effects into capital flows as the government participation
effect becomes apparent at higher oil prices. As oil prices increase, the relative operating
costs of producing oil decreases and the reserve entitlement structure in O&G will
become the most important factor in future corporate cash flow entitlement.
In summary, this section refines Fama and French (2002). I find that, on average,
small companies tend to have higher returns compared to large companies. Value
stocks, in turn, tend to outperform growth stocks. The contribution of this work goes
to the effect of underlying economic state variables on expected returns. I deconstruct
the Fama French Three-Factor model portfolios into separate portfolios with low Non-
OECD and portfolios with high Non-OECD reserve holdings. This allows the isolation
of state participation effects on share price returns. Results from twelve portfolios
1In general, OECD countries in Europe, Russia, Australia and both North and South America use
royalty systems. Production sharing contracts generally occur in the Non-OECD regions of Africa,
Indonesia and much of the former Soviet Union. Reported reserves are based on the economic
interest held subject to the specific terms and time frame of the agreement. For a full discussion
of entitlement contracts see Guidelines for the Evaluation of Petroleum Reserves and Resources,
SPE Working Paper 2005, and Bindemann (1999).
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demonstrate that favorable Fama French portfolios, when weighted with a fourth factor
that reflects high Non-OECD reserve holdings, tend to under-perform compared to
unfavorable Fama French portfolios with low Non-OECD reserve holdings. I find that
small value stocks with low Non-OECD holdings outperform all other portfolios. This
fourth factor state variable loading suggests that relative share price performance for
the O&G sector directly depends on state variable effects.
7. State, Size and Book to Market Factors in Earnings and Returns 149
7.2. Research Design
7.2.1. Size, BE/ME and R-Factor Effects on Corporate Returns
In prior chapters I use a global sample of oilfield assets to provide insights into the effects
of economic state variables on the BE/ME factor, enabling insights into the first of the
two unanswered questions raised by Fama and French (1995). Based on this prior study,
a distinction is made between differential state participation effects on OECD and
Non-OECD assets. The distinguishing feature of this research is therefore the addition
of an R-factor that focuses on the share price effect of state variables. The Fama
French factors of size (market capitalization) and BE/ME are used as determinants of
performance while the addition of a new R-factor proxies for state variable effects from
OECD and Non-OECD countries. This variable allows the encapsulation of intensity
of participation effects on full field life reserve values, as between developed (OECD)
and emerging (Non-OECD) markets. The contribution is in analyzing the market
allocation (OECD vs Non-OECD) of these assets and the state participation effect on
the corporate returns of emerging market natural resource investment.
Natural resources deplete, with the result that oil reserve replacement is an accepted
imperative for companies that derive earnings and balance sheet values from global
resource assets and looking for sustainable earnings and shareholder value. For O&G
producers concerned with reserve replacement, reserve entitlement generally varies from
concession contracts in OECD countries to oil price related production sharing in Non-
OECD countries. The corollary is that state participation is increased by reserve en-
titlement terms that vary with oil price. At high prices, marginal corporate cash flow
entitlement is lower for oil and gas reserves in emerging economies than in developed
countries – see chapter 4.
The Fama French factor variables of size (market capitalization) and BE/ME are
derived from the annual financial statements. In line with the approach described by
Fama and French (1995), companies are allocated annually into six groups with respect
to size and BE/ME. At the first level, we break the sample into two groups with market
capitalization above (B, big) and below the Median size (S, small). At the second level,
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a split into three sub-groups of high (H, top 30% percentile of BE/ME), medium (M,
middle 40%) and low (L, bottom 30%) BE/ME is performed.
To expand the Fama-French Three-Factor-Model (Fama and French 1993; 1995) with
a proxy state variable, each of the six Fama French (size, BE/ME) portfolios are dis-
aggregated annually by percentage of reserve holdings in Non-OECD. I introduce the
R-factor to reflect Non-OECD holdings below 30% and above 30% of total reserves and
derive twelve new portfolios with annually re-balanced geographic asset classification.
The inclusion of this annual R-factor serves as proxy for the effect of state variables on
asset returns. In the context of the Fama-French framework, the R-Factor is calculated
as a weighted long position in portfolios with low Non-OECD holdings and an equally
weighted short position in portfolios with high Non-OECD holdings.2 Following the
Fama-French terminology, the R-factor is described as follows .
FFR ri − rf = α+ β1(rM − rf ) + β2SMB + β3HML + β4OMN + εi (7.1)
with OMN representing ‘Low Non-OECD Holdings Minus High Non-OECD holdings’
OMN = 1/6(SLO + SMO + SHO + BLO + BMO + BHO)−
− 1/6(SLN + SMN + SHN + BLN + BMN + BHN)
Findings in chapter 4 suggest the out-performance of a long position in low Non-OECD
holdings resulting in a positive loading on the R-factor.
I analyze 770 O&G companies ranked by commercially held reserves (liquids in mm-
boe) and focus on the top 100 entities holding 70% of global reserves.3 The focus is
on O&G producers rather than exploration and service companies. National oil com-
panies such as Saudi Aramco, Iraqi Oil Ministry and National Iranian Oil Company
and the lack of disclosure by these entities inhibits market analysis and so they are ex-
cluded. The market approach requires the isolation of companies that report detailed
reserve data to the market. Therefore, 32 O&G producers are selected from the top
2Key: S (size, small), B (size, big); L (low BE/ME), M (medium BE/ME), H (high BE/ME); O (low
Non-OECD), N (high Non-OECD)
3Wood Mackenzie’s Corporate Analysis Tool (CAT) is used to extract global commercial oil and gas
reserves by company
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100 representing 60% of commercially held global reserves (See Table 7.1 for 2005 re-
serve data). The sample selection is informed by extracting only companies compliant
with SEC reporting requirements. This standardizes reserve extracts to SEC proven
reserves. Companies which do not comply with SEC reporting standards or recommen-
dations and therefore fail to disclose regional allocation of reserves or quote proven and
probable (2P) reserves are not considered (e.g. Cairn Energy UK). The sample selec-
tion includes the six independent oil majors BP, Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, Shell, Total,
Conoco-Phillips and 26 companies that comply with SEC reporting requirements.
For oilfield holdings I extract reserve data for the selected 32 oil producing companies
on an annual basis. The differences in state participation terms allow the grouping of
oil and gas reserves as between OECD and Non-OECD countries by company and
informs the formation of portfolios based on state variables. OECD generally comprise
concession holdings and Non-OECD assets comprise production sharing contracts. The
exception is Russia where concessions dominate, but taxation terms are progressive with
oil price. For the purpose of this study, Russian concession holdings are included in
the sample of Non-OECD countries with PSC characteristics. Figure 7.1 illustrates the
change in relative reserve holding allocations since 1997. Specifically, it matters where
replacement reserves originate. Relative OECD and Non-OECD reserve allocation as
a percentage of total reserves is illustrated on the company level in Table 7.1. Panel A
displays companies with low relative reserve holdings in Non-OECD countries (less or
equal to 30% of their total reserves in 2005), Panel B reflects NOECDH05 companies
with high Non-OECD holdings (above 30% of total reserves in 2005).
The global allocation of proven reserves is the focus of this study. Company dis-
closures, however, are generally not standardized and nor do SEC regulations require
reserve reporting by country of origin.Therfore, all direct reserve holdings are man-
ually classified into either OECD or Non-OECD reserves. ‘Other’ reserves from the
SEC reports were similarly analyzed on the basis of company financial statement foot-
note disclosures, as were ‘Equity’ participation interests. This process involves manual
analysis of all proven holdings for 32 companies as to the country of origin and is
summarized by company in Table 7.1 as for 2005 reserve holdings and allows for the
allocation of an annual R-Factor.
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Daily share price data for a sample of 32 oil producing companies covering the eight
year period from 31.12.1997 to 31.12.2005 are extracted. SEC ‘EDGAR’ 10-K and 20-F
reports are extracted for nine reporting periods from 1997 to 2005. The MSCI ACWI
Energy is used as a proxy to assess market performance for oil producing companies,
the risk free interest rate is approximated by the 30-day Treasury Bill rate. Daily
observations are converted to monthly return data. All computations in the FFR-
framework are performed on a monthly basis and over a period of 8 years, where excess
return is calculated as:
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Table 7.1. Company Total Reserves (Liquids) and Company Relative Reserve Holdings
based on 2005 SEC Reserve Disclosures
This Table shows the absolute amount of total reserves in liquids (SEC disclosures in mmboe)
and the relative OECD and Non-OECD country allocation for the sample of 32 O&G companies
as at 31 December 2005. These reserves exclude synthetics, gas and oilsand holdings – price
response behavior differs from liquid reserve holdings. Companies are sorted ascending by their
amount of relative Non-OECD holdings. Panel A displays NOECDL05 companies with low relative
reserve holdings in Non-OECD countries (less or equal to 30% of their total reserves in 2005), Panel
B reflects NOECDH05 companies with high Non-OECD holdings (above 30% of total reserves in 2005).















Panel A: Relative Non-OECD Reserve Holdings ≤ 30% (NOECDL05) as % of Total Reserves
Suncor 7 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Husky 565 97% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0%
Norsk Hydro 853 81% 9% 0% 0% 9% 0%
Pioneer 428 90% 0% 0% 10% 0% 0%
Apache 976 90% 0% 0% 9% 1% 0%
CanNatResources 1118 88% 0% 0% 12% 0% 0%
Encana 1121 88% 0% 0% 12% 0% 0%
EOG 106 88% 0% 0% 12% 0% 0%
Talisman 627 86% 0% 0% 14% 0% 0%
Woodside 281 81% 5% 0% 0% 14% 0%
Statoil 1760 65% 18% 0% 0% 18% 0%
Occidental 2127 77% 0% 0% 21% 2% 0%
Devon 895 75% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0%
Panel B: Relative Non-OECD Reserve Holdings > 30% (NOECDH05) as % of Total Reserves
Anadarko 1130 66% 3% 0% 29% 3% 0%
Hess 692 68% 0% 0% 24% 8% 0%
PetroCanada 446 66% 0% 0% 34% 0% 0%
Murphy 182 65% 0% 0% 35% 0% 0%
ExxonMobil 10491 36% 0% 26% 34% 4% 0%
Nexen 379 62% 0% 0% 35% 3% 0%
Shell 4636 27% 0% 25% 44% 3% 0%
BP 9565 46% 0% 0% 14% 6% 34%
ConocoPhillips 6333 45% 0% 0% 0% 16% 39%
Marathon 704 41% 0% 0% 53% 6% 0%
Eni 3773 18% 16% 0% 51% 16% 0%
BG 572 31% 0% 0% 59% 9% 0%
Chevron 8000 23% 4% 0% 40% 4% 30%
Total 6592 18% 0% 0% 38% 28% 15%
RepsolYPF 1167 0% 0% 0% 99% 1% 0%
Petrobras 9716 0% 0% 0% 93% 7% 0%
CNPC 10961 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%
Sinopec 3294 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%
CNOOC 1456 0% 0% 0% 98% 2% 0%
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7.3. Empirical Analysis
7.3.1. The Fama French Three-Factor Model in the Oil and Gas
Sector
As expected, the Fama French Three-Factor Model performs robustly for returns over
the sample, with high indicative R2 as shown in Table 7.2. Significant factor loadings
for β1 being market outperformance as measured against the MSCI ACWI energy
index are observable. Factor loadings for β2 show significant outperformance for small
companies and significant underperformance for large companies with high BE/ME
factors (B/H), loadings for β3 indicate significant underperformance for low BE/ME
portfolios and significant outperformance for portfolios comprising high BE/ME stocks.
Fama and French (1995) suggest that common factors in returns mirror common
factors in earnings and suggest that market, size and book-to-market factors are the
source of corresponding returns. They acknowledge, however, the absence of evidence
concerning the causality of earnings book-to-market factors driving returns. It is sug-
gested that in the oil and gas sector pure reliance on Fama French factors while ignoring
the causality of differential returns in the sector (in this study state participation in
oilfield assets) could be potentially misleading.
I test this postulation by differentiating the results from Table 7.2 on the basis of
reserve holdings. This allows the introduction of geographic reserve distribution as a
proxy for the economic state variable of state participation in oilfield assets. The ex
ante expectation is that the dominance of Non-OECD assets in the company’s portfolio
would likely lead to an underperformance in returns without necessarily changing the
book-to-market measure used in the Fama French Three-Factor model. The addition
of a sector specific measure of the effects of economic state variables is necessary to
identify causality in return differentiation in the FF model. The contention is that
in line with Salomons and Grootveld (2003) and Bekaert and Harvey (2002) an ex
ante measure of returns should necessarily be country specific in the first instance and
industry specific in the second instance (Cavaglia et al. 2000). The proxy variable as
well as being measurable meets both of these requirements.
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Table 7.2. Pure FF Regression Results
This Table illustrates the estimated coefficients for Fama French Three-Factor Model regressions.
Calculations are performed for 32 companies and over 8 years. Significance at a 90% level is indicated
by *, at 95% and above by ** respectively; t-statistics are quoted in parentheses.
FF ri − rf = α + β1(rM − rf ) + β2SMB + β3HML + εi
Size
(US$M)
BE/ME Return α β1 β2 β3 R2
S/L 5676 0.2634 16.70% 0.0020 1.0211** 0.7343** -0.2331* 0.7793
(0.5322) (13.7674) (7.8338) -(2.3297)
S/M 5925 0.4486 23.29% 0.0024 1.1205** 0.9062** 0.0751 0.8629
(0.7273) (17.0551) (10.9133) (0.8469)
S/H 5211 0.6988 27.60% 0.0024 1.0229** 0.9817** 0.5091** 0.8714
(0.6950) (15.3653) (11.6682) (5.6682)
B/L 99387 0.2680 7.94% 0.0020 1.0490** -0.0981 -0.4845** 0.7048
(0.5330) (14.6291) -(1.0824) -(5.0078)
B/M 47855 0.4170 16.84% 0.0033 1.0683** 0.0659 0.0623 0.8691
(1.3064) (21.8488) (1.0663) (0.9441)
B/H 50140 0.8486 18.71% 0.0016 1.0472** -0.3455** 0.7733** 0.8046
(0.4138) (13.7881) -(3.5992) (7.5459)
7.3.2. Testing the R-Factor
Kan and Zhang (1999) highlighted the effects of “useless factors” on asset pricing mod-
els. I conduct preliminary tests to show the effectiveness of the R-Factor. Limited
disclosure of company reserve allocation combined with limitations of available time
series data suggests the need for insights into the R-factor. Corporate values in the
commodity sector are driven by entitlement to, and valuation of, the underlying asset
(Strong 1991). All things equal, the process of Non-OECD reserve replacement rather
than OECD replacement is expected to reduce share value. Stock returns embody the
expected benefit from assets over their whole life. Since Non-OECD asset entitlement is
limited, each increase in Non-OECD asset holdings is expected to results in a decrease
in returns in line with Kretzschmar and Kirchner (2007). The ex ante expectation
is that companies with low Non-OECD relative reserve holdings should, on average,
outperform companies with high holdings in Non-OECD countries.
Table 7.3 illustrates average annual share price returns as between low and high
Non-OECD holdings. The company allocation into NOECDLow and NOECDHigh
7. State, Size and Book to Market Factors in Earnings and Returns 157
portfolios is re-balanced on an annual basis. Re-balancing is based on the earnings
effect that reserve replacement from Non-OECD countries has on the overall company
reserve holdings. In a year where Non-OECD holdings exceed 30% a company is re-
classified from NOECDLow to NOECDHigh and vice versa. Table 7.3 indicates that
for the whole period (years 1998 to 2005) NOECDLow outperforms NOECDHigh by
an absolute difference of 11% (1.21− 1.10). The significance of the out-performance of
NOECDLow portfolio is particulary marked in 2000 and 2005.
As a second test, I analyze daily company equity betas with references to daily WTI
oil future returns. Two separate portfolios provide annual re-balanced beta insights for
Non-OECD holdings above and below 30% of total reserves as between December 1997
and December 2005. Linking the market response of OECD and Non-OECD reserves
to movements in oil futures price is based on forward looking asset price response
factors derived in previous research in chapter 4. In Table 7.3, I demonstrate on the
basis of state participation in reserve holdings that oil price betas are not homogenous.
Both Rajgopal (1999) and Haushalter (2000); Haushalter et al. (2002) find betas in
the range 0.24 . . . 0.25. Their findings cover low oil price periods comparable to 0.20
for NOECDLow (0.13 for NOECDHigh) in Table 7.3 for the period of 1997 to 2001.
Structural shifts are reflected in beta movements to 0.24 for NOECDLow (0.14 for
NOECDHigh).
7.3.3. Reserve Holdings in OECD and Non-OECD Countries
The importance of the R-Factor in the oil and gas sector is evident. Total reserves for
the sector have increased in absolute terms by 13,492mmboe for the observed period
1997 to 2005. Of the absolute increase in total reserves, (disclosed reserves, other re-
serves and equity interest) 90% are sourced from Non-OECD counties with only 10%
(disclosed reserves, other reserves and equity interest) from OECD countries (Table
7.4). The expectation is that state participation in replacement reserves which have
significant effect on long-term shareholder returns, a factor not previously measured
in Fama French studies. Table 7.4 provides instructive insights into the reserve move-
ment for the period 1997 to 2005. Total reserves and movements in disclosed relative
allocation in OECD and Non-OECD countries are reported for 1997 and 2005. Equity
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Table 7.3. Annually Re-Balanced Equity Betas Relative to WTI Oil Futures
This Table displays equity betas for companies and illustrates the relation between WTI futures
returns and company share price returns. Following insights into structural shifts in oil price provided
by Geman (2005), the analysis is split into annual time periods. Portfolios are annually re-balanced
to NOECDLow and NOECDHigh based on the percentage of company reserve holdings (≤ 30%
and > 30%) in Non-OECD countries. To provide comparability, eight annually re-balanced betas for
NOECDLow, NOECDHigh are computed. The existence of significant differences in returns between
the NOECDLow and NOECDHigh portfolios is verified through paired 1-tailed t-tests run at the
daily individual stock return level for the sample. Significance at a 90% level is indicated by *, at a
95% level by ** respectively; p-values are quoted in parentheses.
Year Stock Returns and Tests for Difference Equity Betas on WTI Futures Returns
NOECDLow NOECDHigh t-Test NOECDLow NOECDHigh WTI
1998 –20% –15% (0.3451) 0.14 0.11 –32%
1999 26% 23% (0.4011) 0.28 0.16 18%
2000 35% 09% (0.0737)* 0.18 0.09 5%
2001 –4% –8% (0.3748) 0.23 0.13 –23%
2002 07% –6% (0.1528) 0.25 0.15 53%
2003 45% 35% (0.2544) 0.09 0.01 4%
2004 40% 23% (0.1047) 0.27 0.14 33%
2005 66% 31% (0.0223)** 0.46 0.26 40%
1998–2005 21% 10% (0.0143)** 0.22 0.10 17%
1) WTI Futures daily continuous time series annualized
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Table 7.4. Reserves
This Table reflects the total amount of reserves and their absolute and relative allocation (OECD,
Non-OECD, Other, Equity) across the entire sample of 32 companies as at 1997 and 2005. To
illustrate the origins of reserve replacement, the relative and absolute composition of the difference in
total reserves as of 2005 and 1997 is calculated. The origin of the increase is analyzed and indicates a
preponderance of Non-OECD replacement. Negative replacement occurs as a result of the utilization
of other Non-OECD reserves. Absolute figures are presented in mmboe.







1997 77,462 26,971 18,580 897 23,108 3,167 4,739
35% 24% 1% 30% 4% 6%
2005 90,953 27,190 28,716 1,314 20,846 3,848 9,040
30% 32% 1% 23% 4% 10%
1997-2005 13,492 219 10,135 417 -2,262 681 4,301
increase 2% 75% 3% -17% 5% 32%
participation and cumulated reserves from unspecified ‘other’ regions are also allocated
into OECD and Non-OECD based on the availability of more detailed information in
the notes of individual companies’ annual financial statements. ‘Other’ international
reserve holdings are only classified where they comprise more than 5% of total reserves.
7.3.4. FFR Model – Proxied by Global Reserve Distribution
The introduction of a state variable necessitates the creation of a extra set of portfolios
to lift out the performance effects of the R-Factor. In Table 7.5 I incorporate a measure
of low Non-OECD state participation (below 30% of relative reserve holdings in Non-
OECD regions) described by the suffix ‘O’ and high Non-OECD state participation
described by ‘N’ (above 30% of relative reserve holdings in Non-OECD regions). At
the sample level, 90% of reserve replacement in the period 1997 to 2005 has been
sourced from Non-OECD holdings (Table 7.4, 75% from disclosed reserves, -17% being
a reduction in other reserves, 32% from an increase in equity interest). This compares
to the 1997 holding of 40% in OECD and 60% in Non-OECD, reflecting an increase in
industry dependence on Non-OECD holdings.
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Omitting the R-factor in the Fama French Model masks the underperforming effect
of high Non-OECD reserve holdings. A comparison of Panels A and B in Table 7.5
demonstrates that with the exception of BHN, portfolios with Non-OECD holdings
below 30% of reserves outperform portfolios with high Non-OECD holdings. This
effect is not observable in Table 7.2 where excess return of 16% for S/L oversimplifies
the SLO excess return of 22% by including SLN of −2%.
Following the inclusion of the R-factor accounting for high Non-OECD reserve hold-
ings, it is possible to observe results from twelve portfolios. Table 7.5 demonstrates that
most favorable Fama French portfolios (as defined by underlying Fama French factors),
tend to under-perform compared to unfavorable Fama French portfolios with low Non-
OECD reserve holdings. Table 7.5 presents two panels of data differentiated by low
Non-OECD holdings as distinct from high Non-OECD holdings. In all instances except
BHO and SHN, portfolios comprising low Non-OECD holdings outperform portfolios
with high Non-OECD holdings. These findings are consistent with chapter 4. The
BE/ME measure is the book value of common equity divided by market equity at year
end, calculated as the portfolio average of annual BE/ME factors.
If the trend of replacing reserves from Non-OECD countries continues, reserve re-
placement is expected to be reflected in significant differences in share returns between
companies that have high levels of OECD holdings relative to those that have low levels
of OECD exposure. Table 7.6 shows two sets of annually re-balanced portfolios based
on relative reserve holdings. The first with low relative Non-OECD holdings equal or
below 30% (NOECDLow), the second with high Non-OECD holdings greater 30% of
total reserves (NOECDHigh).
7.3.5. FFR Model Regressions Analysis – R-Factor vs Size and
BE/ME
As Fama and French (2002) note, the equity premium – defined as the difference be-
tween returns on the market portfolio of stocks and the risk free rate – is important
in modeling portfolio allocation decisions. An outstanding question remains as to the
effect of state variables on equity premia. This effect is approximated through the in-
troduction of the R-Factor, Table 7.7b distinguishes between low and high Non-OECD
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Table 7.5. Fama French Portfolios with R-Factor Factor
This Table illustrates factor characteristics of 12 portfolios. Panel A describes factors for the first
group of size and BE/ME portfolios consisting of companies with relative Non-OECD reserve holdings
below 30%. The return above risk free ri − rf is calculated for each of the 12 FFR portfolios, with
annual re-balancing. The excess return calculation is performed using annualized daily data. Panel
B shows the same measure factors for portfolios with relative Non-OECD reserve holdings in excess
of 30%.
ri − rf ME (US$M) BE/ME Non-OECD Reserves
Panel A: Low Non-OECD Holdings
SLO 22% 7,250 0.26 22%
SMO 25% 6,444 0.46 15%
SHO 34% 6,347 0.64 11%
BLO 27% 41,128 0.26 5%
BMO 15% 36,261 0.43 23%
BHO 15% 88,453 0.71 8%
Panel B: High Non-OECD Holdings
SLN –2% 4,751 0.26 69%
SMN –1% 6,501 0.42 65%
SHN 41% 5,205 0.76 62%
BLN 2% 123,408 0.28 61%
BMN 13% 52,791 0.41 61%
BHN 17% 33,796 1.06 84%
Table 7.6. Test for Difference in Low/High Non-OECD Portfolio Returns
The existence of significant differences in excess returns between the six NOECDLow and
NOECDHigh portfolios is verified through paired 1-tailed t-tests run at the daily individual stock
return level for the sample. Significance at a 90% level is indicated by *, at a 95% level by **
respectively; p-values are quoted in parentheses.
ri − rf SLO SMO SHO BLO BMO BHO
SLN SMN SHN BLN BMN BHN
t-test (0.0162)** (0.0210)** (0.2716) (0.0749)* (0.4139) (0.4393)
7. State, Size and Book to Market Factors in Earnings and Returns 162
holdings in the portfolio construction. The focus is on positive or negative factor
loadings and their contribution to expected excess portfolio returns. For β1, market
premium, an analysis of 60% of global commercially held oil reserves across 32 compa-
nies indicates a positive and significant effect on expected returns. This intuitive result
is consistent with evidence from Fama and French (2002).
The findings for the β2 factor, in which small companies are expected to outperform
big companies, are also consistent with Fama and French (2002). Small companies
with low Non-OECD holdings (Panel A) significantly outperform large companies with
comparable holdings. These results are repeated in Panel B for high Non-OECD re-
serve holdings. Interestingly, when reading Table 7.5 together with Table 7.7b, large
companies with low Non-OECD holdings are shown to outperform small companies
with high Non-OECD holdings. This provides early insights into the possibility that
country variables (R-factor) have an effect on expected returns.
The β3 factor which links out-performance of companies with high BE/ME ratios
(value stocks) to positive factor loadings provides results inconsistent with Fama and
French (2002). Specifically, high BE/ME is consistent with Fama and French (2002),
medium BE/ME is only consistent with Fama and French (2002) only for low Non-
OECD holdings (Panel A). Panel B indicates negative loadings for this factor, an
observation inconsistent with findings by Fama and French (2002). The addition of the
low BE/ME ratio provides inconsistent results in both panels.
The ex ante expectation is that progressive state participation in Non-OECD asset
cash flows are likely to translate into return discounts for companies overweight Non-
OECD asset holdings. This fourth factor in the FFR model is included as β4 with
positive loadings expected to reflect the benefits of low Non-OECD holdings. Findings
in both Panels A and B are consistent with ex ante expectation and evidence provided in
chapter 4. Panel A reflects a significant and positive effect of low Non-OECD holdings
across all portfolios. In Panel B, five out of six portfolios have the expected negative
loading with only SHN demonstrating a positive but insignificant loading.
The four factors β1 to β4 are all expected to have direct relevance to expected stock
returns. Difficulties in measuring state effects contrast with the general equity risk
premium findings of Bekaert et al. (2005) and Mehra and Prescott (1985). Findings
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Table 7.7b. FFR Regression Results
This Table illustrates the estimated coefficients for the first and second stage regressions. Significance
at a 90% level is indicated by *, at 95% and above by ** respectively; t-statistics are quoted in
parentheses.
FFR ri − rf = α + β1(rM − rf ) + β2SMB + β3HML + β4OMN + εi
α β1 β2 β3 β4 F-Statistic R2
Panel A: Low Non-OECD Holdings
SLO 0.0088 1.0128** 0.5197** -0.2854** 0.2444 38.1906 0.6103
(1.6876) (10.4909) (4.0179) -(2.4936) (1.5480)
SMO 0.0016 1.2381** 0.7118** 0.1204 0.5677** 90.8720 0.7910
(0.3493) (14.6237) (6.2758) (1.1996) (4.0997)
SHO 0.0058 1.1472** 0.7687** 0.2916** 0.6280** 127.9880 0.8424
(1.5057) (16.0707) (8.0378) (3.4455) (5.3785)
BLO 0.0043 0.8750** -0.4346** -0.1949 1.5689** 22.5018 0.4752
(0.5820) (6.3550) -(2.3560) -(1.1940) (6.9664)
BMO 0.0012 1.1410** 0.2546 -0.1513 0.3568 32.0700 0.5668
(0.1917) (10.1921) (1.6976) -(1.1401) (1.9484)
BHO -0.0043 0.8367** -0.1823 0.6308** 0.5036** 43.7042 0.6426
-(0.8401) (8.8713) -(1.4423) (5.6419) (3.2648)
Panel B: High Non-OECD Holdings
SLN -0.0040 1.1293** 0.5703** -0.3480* -0.4214* 26.5100 0.5179
-(0.5853) (8.8789) (3.3466) -(2.3085) -(2.0257)
SMN -0.0036 0.9558** 0.7938** -0.4495** -0.1924 19.0932 0.4324
-(0.4685) (6.7623) (4.1920) -(2.6831) -(0.8322)
SHN 0.0088 0.7677** 1.2737** 1.0822** 0.0431 70.0656 0.7441
(1.5065) (7.0936) (8.7847) (8.4358) (0.2433)
BLN 0.0072 1.0620** 0.1101 -0.5472** -0.8731** 38.0875 0.6096
(1.3667) (10.8146) (0.8371) -(4.7011) -(5.4357)
BMN 0.0029 1.0086** -0.0152 0.0539 -0.0309 113.5363 0.8257
(1.0497) (19.5212) -(0.2192) (0.8801) -(0.3661)
BHN 0.0060 1.3275** -1.0947** 0.6199** -0.6559** 51.5107 0.6802
(0.8562) (10.1901) -(6.2721) (4.0144) -(3.0782)
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suggest recognition of the effects of state participation in O&G production and provide
sector evidence in support of Stulz (2005), who notes that when rulers of sovereign
states pursue their interests at the expense of corporate agents, investor payoffs are
directly affected.
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7.4. Chapter Concluding Remarks
The results of this study present early evidence that state variables captured by the
FFR model directly and differentially affect stock returns. Evidence is provided of limits
to the corporate value of Non-OECD asset participation. Discounted share returns for
companies overweight Non-OECD assets provide evidence of market awareness of long-
term value divergence based on OECD and Non-OECD asset holdings. Reasons for
Non-OECD discounts are explored in this study.
On the basis of this work, a constant and consistent discount, regardless of oil price
levels, should exist if the discount is based purely on risky Non-OECD asset holdings.
Market returns for shares overweight Non-OECD assets suggest evidence that markets
are price sensitive to state asset participation.
Reserve replacement is a ‘presumed’ imperative for companies operating in the nat-
ural resource sector. The source of reserve replacement as between OECD and Non-
OECD countries is a significant factor in the determination of share price returns.
Shares of companies with OECD dominated asset holdings trade at a consistent pre-
mium as compared to shares of companies with high Non-OECD reserve holdings. The
premium is particularly observable when oil prices are above US$45/bbl, a finding that
corroborates work in chapter 4. Further work on state effects in sectors other than the
natural resource sector is required to determine the state variables that affect market
pricing.
8. Thesis Conclusion
The findings of this work revise asset valuation findings by Rajgopal (1999), Haushalter
et al. (2002) and Jin and Jorion (2006), who derive O&G findings during the low oil
price paradigm extant in the 1990’s. Specifically, I show that the global nature of
government participation directly affects asset prices and as a result, it matters in
which country reserves are held and the entitlement structures under which the state
and corporates share economic rents from resource assets. Evidence is provided that
progressive Non–OECD state entitlement structures affect the corporate value of assets
adversely when compared to OECD state asset participation.
This thesis provides empirical insights into the effect of state participation on the
value of expected cash flows. State agency differences are shown to potentially pre-
vent asset valuation model convergence, a finding in support of those anticipated in
works by by Bekaert and Harvey (2002) and Bruner et al. (2002). Intrinsic asset values
are a function of expected future cash flows, but, they are also a function of market
uncertainty associated with them. My findings demonstrate that under conditions of
stochastic commodity price volatility, entitlement to global concession and production
sharing reserve asset cash flows is not homogenous. As result, it matters what expecta-
tions are for oil price. The corporate asset value response of OECD and NON-OECD
assets diverges under high oil prices as result of the progressive nature of Non-OECD
state agent participation in economic asset rent. Despite the lack of adequate account-
ing disclosures, a value premium exist for companies with OECD assets – in periods
of low oil prices. The premium increases in times of high oil prices, providing market
evidence corporate agents in OECD countries benefit from non progressive state agency
participation. Findings are consistent with work by Hampson et al. (1991) who suggest
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that state agency does have the ability to affect asset pricing and limit the value of
globalization (Stulz 2005).
The final chapter of this study presents early market evidence that state variables
(captured by the FFR model) directly and differentially affect stock returns. Evidence is
provided of limits to the corporate value of Non-OECD asset participation. Discounted
share returns for companies overweight Non-OECD assets provide insights into a market
awareness of the potential for long-term value divergence based on OECD and Non-
OECD asset holdings. This allows me to provide a natural resource sector refinement
to work seeking to adapt the Fama and French (1995) model. Prior works overlook the
sector and country specific nature of state variables. The general expectation offered
by Petkova (2006) is that HML and SMB loadings should lose explanatory power when
predictive economic state variables are identified. This work suggests that future studies
that aim to add predictive variables to the Fama French models will need to recognise
the attributes of country and sector specificities.
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Appendices
A. Wood Mackenzie GEM Data
Extraction
Annual Price, Cost and Cash Flows Estimations over
the Whole Field Life




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B. Descriptive Statistics for
Stochastic Simulations
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Table B.1. Descriptive Statistics for Stochastic Present Value Price Response Simulations
Post-Tax (US$22.5/bbl)
Panel A (Table B.1) summarizes important descriptive statistics of stochastic post-tax present value
simulations at an oil price of US$22.5/bbl. Results were obtained through Monte Carlo simulation
with exogenous price volatility at the field level and aggregated to arithmetic country averages. Each
simulation is based on log-normally distributed price estimates (see (4.9) and (4.10)) and feeds pre-tax
present value forecasts through a field specific tax filter in order to estimate a post-tax present value
frequency distribution. Panel B and Panel C (Table B.2) reflect the same data at price of US$45/bbl
and US$90/bbl respectively.
Reserves Mean ($M) SD ($M) Skewness Kurtosis
Panel A: Price US$22.5/bbl
GoM all fields 216.1929 38.5807 0.4996 3.4625
<60mmboe 136.0108 21.5311 0.5106 3.4687
>60mmboe 433.2417 64.0079 0.5159 3.5605
UKCS all fields 137.7850 22.9253 0.2892 3.2465
<60mmboe 23.2800 11.6008 0.3032 3.2785
>60mmboe 638.7447 72.4699 0.2282 3.1062
NCS all fields 289.6678 91.1648 0.0227 3.4530
<60mmboe 9.9089 14.6915 0.0123 3.6163
>60mmboe 396.2426 120.2975 0.0266 3.3907
ANG all fields 654.2789 130.4100 0.0587 3.0267
<60mmboe 22.6070 9.8699 0.0940 2.8629
>60mmboe 1040.3006 204.0735 0.0370 3.1269
IDO all fields 201.1981 28.7864 0.0835 3.2407
<60mmboe 26.1051 7.2562 0.1112 3.1844
>60mmboe 327.2651 44.2882 0.0635 3.2813
EGY all fields 212.5215 20.7317 0.3033 3.2664
<60mmboe 44.0891 5.7150 0.3524 3.3222
>60mmboe 510.5174 47.2998 0.2164 3.1679
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Table B.2. Descriptive Statistics for Stochastic Present Value Price Response Simulations
Post-Tax (US$45/bbl, US$90/bbl)
Reserves Mean ($M) SD($M) Skewness Kurtosis
Panel B: Price US$45/bbl
GoM all fields 597.8627 76.4922 0.5005 3.4676
<60mmboe 320.8999 42.6408 0.5122 3.4779
>60mmboe 1068.8848 128.8400 0.5048 3.5410
UKCS all fields 444.7852 42.8523 0.3360 3.2492
<60mmboe 162.5723 20.9145 0.3530 3.2778
>60mmboe 1679.4667 138.8299 0.2617 3.1242
NCS all fields 1396.5351 157.6514 0.3444 3.3067
<60mmboe 103.2768 18.3481 0.3268 3.3474
>60mmboe 1889.2050 210.7193 0.3512 3.2912
ANG all fields 1417.8667 96.6283 -0.1838 3.9589
<60mmboe 65.6689 5.3137 -0.6347 4.2520
>60mmboe 2244.2097 152.4317 0.0917 3.7799
IDO all fields 548.5307 44.8433 0.3056 3.2266
<60mmboe 80.1935 9.8437 0.3662 3.2827
>60mmboe 885.7335 70.0431 0.2620 3.1862
EGY all fields 450.2173 33.1340 0.3454 3.3005
<60mmboe 92.3534 9.7980 0.3921 3.3453
>60mmboe 1083.3610 74.4207 0.2627 3.2212
Panel C: Price US$90/bbl
GoM all fields 1353.1761 152.8813 0.5030 3.4657
<60mmboe 688.5946 85.2414 0.5152 3.4754
>60mmboe 2311.1390 257.6317 0.5052 3.5414
UKCS all fields 1064.2787 88.1822 0.3481 3.2502
<60mmboe 458.3071 45.1818 0.3672 3.2781
>60mmboe 3715.4045 276.3090 0.2649 3.1283
NCS all fields 3508.7030 315.1012 0.3492 3.3089
<60mmboe 249.0173 36.5152 0.3384 3.3511
>60mmboe 4750.4880 421.2292 0.3534 3.2928
ANG all fields 2060.8427 159.7016 0.1105 5.3283
<60mmboe 91.3000 6.2096 -0.7751 6.7142
>60mmboe 3264.4522 253.5023 0.6516 4.4815
IDO all fields 1246.5440 88.3127 0.3376 3.2275
<60mmboe 168.8104 19.0978 0.4042 3.2853
>60mmboe 2022.5121 138.1474 0.2896 3.1858
EGY all fields 882.7426 64.1390 0.3929 3.3172
<60mmboe 178.7798 19.1610 0.4466 3.3549
>60mmboe 2128.2153 143.7155 0.2978 3.2505
C. Fiscal Term References
Detailed Fiscal Terms used in Wood Mackenzie GEM
OECD Countries – Concession Regimes
• UK Continental Shelf
• Gulf of Mexico
• Norwegian Continental Shelf
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